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

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
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By John Fischer
Editor

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1962

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

ALASTAIR BUCHAN, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London; former Defense and Diplomatic Editor of *The Observer*; author of "NATO in the 1960s" * * * *PHILIP E. MOSELY,* Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; former Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; Political Adviser, European Advisory Committee, London, 1944–45, and Adviser to U.S. Delegations at international conferences, 1943–45; author, "The Kremlin and World Politics" and other works * * * *SIR SOLLY ZUCKERMAN,* Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Defense Research Policy Committee, London; Professor of Anatomy, University of Birmingham; author of many scientific works * * * *PIETRO NENNI,* Secretary-General of the Italian Socialist Party; Vice-Premier and Minister of the Constituent Assembly, 1945–46; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1946–47 * * * *CARYL P. HASKINS,* President, Carnegie Institution of Washington; member of the President's Science Advisory Committee; author of "Of Societies and Men" * * * *CHESTER BOWLES,* Special Representative and Adviser to the President on African, Asian and Latin American Affairs; recently Under Secretary of State; Ambassador to India, 1951–53; author of "Ambassador's Report," "The Coming Political Breakthrough" and other works * * * *JANEZ STANOVNIK,* Director, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade; member of the Jugoslav Parliament; Economic Counselor, Jugoslav Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 1952–56, and several times a member of the Jugoslav Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly * * * *FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY,* Chief, U.S. Military Mission to Jugoslavia, 1945; author of a National Security Council study for the Second Hoover Commission; member, Rockefeller Special Studies Panel on Economic Policy, 1956; member, Gaither Committee on National Security Policy, 1957; now Vice-President, ITEK Corporation * * * *T. CUYLER YOUNG,* Chairman of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literature, and Director of the Program of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University * * * *CHIEF H. O. DAVIES, Q.C.,* a graduate of the London School of Economics, now practicing law in Lagos, Nigeria; former President of the West African Students' Union; author of "Nigeria: The Prospects for Democracy" * * * *RUPERT EMERSON,* Professor of Government and Research Associate of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; author of "From Empire to Nation" and other works.

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 40 JANUARY 1962 No. 2

THE REFORM OF NATO

By Alastair Buchan

FOR several years there has been a general feeling on both sides of the ocean that the central institutions of the Atlantic Alliance, especially NATO itself, are inadequate to the steadily widening complex of problems which confronts them. The Berlin crisis, which directly concerns only three or four of the fifteen allies, has in fact illustrated, as no doubt Mr. Khrushchev intended that it should, a number of important divisions among them in both political and military policy, and has brought to light certain weaknesses in the organization of the alliance which have been visible below the surface of events for some time past. Indeed, the Berlin crisis could be a blessing in disguise, even though only a fragile or unsatisfactory negotiated compromise emerges over the city itself, if it forces governments and public opinion in the Atlantic countries to confront some distasteful facts about their shortcomings in constructive coöperation.

But before attempting any analysis of the internal and external pressures that demand a refashioning of NATO, it is wise to set out the frame of reference within which we must work over the next few years. There are two particular boundary fences which must be accepted.

The first is that NATO is in no sense a synonym for "the free world" and can only very partially act as the focus of that "cohesive community of free nations" which Senator Fulbright has suggested as our goal (*Foreign Affairs,* October 1961). This, if it can be achieved, presupposes an identity of view and purpose with powerful democratic countries—India, Japan, Sweden, Brazil, Australia among them—which cannot or will not be-

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come members of NATO. It is not a substitute for the United Nations, and would have only an indirect influence upon the course of events in areas far from the Atlantic—the confrontation of China, for instance. Nor is it the sole center for the coördination of Atlantic interests; the creation of O.E.C.D. has fortunately resolved any argument that the cure for NATO's ills should be found by a synthetic injection of new responsibilities. NATO is an instrument of limited usefulness: it is concerned with meeting the Soviet challenge to the security and interests of the Atlantic powers, with the cold war and the deterrence of hotter war, and with the eventual construction of a more stable system of international relationships in the area where the majority of its citizens dwell—Europe. It is only by being clear about the limitations of NATO that one can see how vast and expanding its real responsibilities are. The fact that questions of military policy play such a dominant part in NATO is a reflection of the dominant part they now play in the whole of international relations, and no extension of its responsibility in the cultural or other fields should obscure the fact that its success or failure depends on the extent to which its central institutions can grapple with the hard and dangerous facts of power politics.

The other limitation that must be accepted is that NATO is an alliance and that its institutions have no supra-national powers (except in time of war). Occasionally, when statesmen or thinkers become too despondent about the problems of inter-allied coöperation, they turn to the idea of creating an Atlantic political federation. It may be that at some point in the future it will be necessary to take such a step. All one can say for certain is that at this moment neither public opinion nor political leaders in the Atlantic countries are prepared to think in these terms, or to accept such a proposal if it were put to them. The only responsible course, therefore, in the years immediately ahead is to work for the improvement of the central machinery of intergovernmental coöperation and coördination that does exist.

II

When one considers the ramshackle world that would now surround us if no Atlantic system of collective security had been established, one must conclude, I think, that the Atlantic powers would be foolish if they did not seek to improve the instrument that they have roughly fashioned. The difficulty is to be certain

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that the effectiveness of the Alliance, as a political as well as a military instrument, will increase at the same rate as the demands upon it. There seem to me a number of developments, pressures both from within as well as from without, which may necessitate considerable modification of its central structure if the burdens which the alliance imposes are not thought by its members to outweigh the additional strength which it creates.

The first development is by no means new. It concerns the steady widening of the range and types of challenge which the Soviet Union now feels able to offer to the Atlantic powers. Mr. Khrushchev's confidence in this regard is very largely justified. In the first place, while it is true that by any numerical count the United States can, and perhaps always will be able to, pose a much more formidable threat to the Soviet Union than vice versa, the Soviet strategic threat to the European allies is not only very formidable but becoming more so. Any period of tension is likely, therefore, to create an unequal incidence of risk for the different NATO countries. Since the disintegration of NATO as a political alliance is one of the most consistent aims of Soviet policy, this is an asset of considerable value. In the second place, as both the Soviet Union and the United States transfer their strategic strength into relatively invulnerable forms of striking power, the certainty of being able to destroy the opponent's strategic weapons systems must fluctuate, and probably diminish. If, as the sixties progress, the prospect of strategic war is seen with increasing clarity to involve an exchange of blows on great cities, the credibility of the American resort to it even under severe provocation must fluctuate or diminish also. This would be true even if the United States were to undertake a massive civil defense program which, because this option is not open to the European allies who lack the warning time and wealth, would itself be a source of tension within NATO.

The great uncertainties and dangers that technological progress has created dispose of any lingering Western hope of being able to deter a tactical move by a strategic threat. The American military reactions to the Soviet moves on Berlin exemplify an appreciation of this fact. But, far beyond Europe, Mr. Khrushchev knows that the equivocal nature of the contemporary and developing strategic balance increases his freedom to support "movements of colonial liberation" and to exploit the forces of change in Asia, Africa and Latin America, unless not he but his

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agents can be thwarted at the seat of trouble. Thus, the widening range of Soviet options, below the level of strategic war, is not only creating the need for a wider range of Western military responses, but making it important to coördinate non-military policy in a way never envisaged in the early years of NATO.

The second external development of which any reconsideration of NATO's responsibilities must take account is that the process of disimperialism, which has been set in motion by its own members, is inevitably creating a precarious world order which may take a generation or more to find firmer foundations. As the number of new sovereign states increases, so the likelihood of situations of internal chaos or local aggression—a Laos, a Congo, a Kuwait—increases also. This is, unfortunately, happening at a time when the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations is still very immature, but when modern communications are shrinking the world so as to increase the speed of action and reaction, and affect the balance of political power, however remote the original seat of trouble may be from the Atlantic area. It is a problem to which none of the NATO powers can be indifferent, while at the same time it tends to sharpen conflicts of interest or policy among them.

The third interrelated development concerns this uncertain balance of strategic power. It seems to me to be imposing three requirements on NATO itself. One is that the military preparations of the alliance must now be constantly considered with an eye to advancing the prospects of limited agreements with the Soviet Union to mitigate the worst dangers that arise from the combination of cataclysmic destructive power with very fast means of delivery—surprise attack, accidental war, miscalculation; and this in turn requires effective civil coöperation in all aspects of military *planning*. Another consequence of the delicate balance is to increase the importance of civil control over military *action,* to ensure that political judgment is interposed between each step of military decisions, and, in a world dangerously dependent on computer-fed information, to eliminate the dangers of automatic reaction to mechanical intelligence. Finally, the delicacy of the balance of power sets a high premium on unified political responses in the kind of swiftly moving diplomatic exchanges we have seen over Berlin. As the speed of action and reaction accelerates, as factors of public morale come to play an increasingly important part, disagreements over diplomatic strat-

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egy can, in a tense situation, undermine the strength of NATO every bit as much as weaknesses in military power.

III

But perhaps the least explored developments are those that are altering the balance of power within NATO itself. Clearly the most crucial is the gradual change in the politico-strategic relationship of the United States to its European allies. Briefly, my proposition is that the military power of the United States within NATO is growing, while on non-military questions it will have a less dominant role than in recent years.

As the problem of maintaining a credible system of strategic deterrence in the open countries of the Atlantic area becomes more and more complex, the disparity between the strategic resources of the United States and the European allies becomes more and more marked. As the premium on invulnerability of bases increases, strategic weapons systems not only involve scientific and economic resources which no one European country or even a large group of them can command, but are the product of continuous American programs of research and development in which the European countries have been only sporadically engaged. Moreover, even if the European allies could muster the technical resources, nothing can provide them with the geographic advantages of the United States—a distant, large and relatively underpopulated land area bounded by two great oceans.

The European allies are becoming strategically more dependent on American technological prowess all the time, for reasons clearly set out by Albert Wohlstetter in the April 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs* ("Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country"). Even the British government, which set out to acquire a measure of strategic independence, now acknowledges that, for reasons of both geography and economics, it can make only an "independent contribution" to the deterrent and only with active American technological assistance. The feasibility of the attempt to construct a system of strategic deterrence in France around a small force of manned bombers by 1965 and around an I.R.B.M. by 1970 is now widely questioned, even in French government circles. Moreover, American strategic power will, as the years progress, be less and less dependent on European bases except for marginal services. Whatever European leaders may say about the impossibility of being dependent on another country for their

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ultimate survival, the fact is that they are and will remain so.

The overwhelming strategic dominance of the United States extends for the moment also to tactical forces. Because France is still heavily committed in Algeria and has not fully grasped the implications of the age of nuclear equipoise, because British policy has yet to be readjusted from the disastrous misreading of the future which led her to concentrate in 1957 on a policy of increasing nuclear firepower at the expense of conventional manpower, and because the dramatic growth of the economies of Western Europe has created a manpower shortage in many countries, the main burden of increasing the flexibility of Western strategy and diplomacy falls for the moment principally on the United States. Until European defense and manpower policies are adjusted, this unhappy imbalance will persist, but to remove it must first require the hammering out of a common view in NATO of what the tactical requirements of the age of nuclear equipoise really are.

Yet the military hegemony of the United States within NATO is counterbalanced by the extent to which it is becoming increasingly affected by the general policies of its European allies. For one thing, as international relations become more complicated with the rise of new states, as Communist policy concentrates on discrediting the Atlantic countries as a whole in the eyes of the uncommitted world, so the United States becomes more and more involved in the colonial or post-colonial policies of her allies. Disimperialism has helped solve the old American dilemma between championing colonial freedom and maintaining close ties with the colonial powers, but it has created a new range of problems that affect the United States and those countries alike. For another, the Kennedy Administration has expressed an understandable desire to shift some of the burden of technical assistance, economic aid and other programs onto the shoulders of the wealthier European countries, which means close involvement in their policies.

But the group of allies with whom the United States must maintain this close political relationship are very different societies from those whose governments signed the North Atlantic Treaty 12 years ago. Most of them have recovered, and surpassed, their old economic and social dynamism. Moreover, their confidence in American political leadership, which was high in the early days of NATO, is nowadays qualified, largely because

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of the failure of the American policy-making process in Washington to mature at the same pace as American physical power and responsibilities. It is unwise to generalize about European opinion, but one can be certain that the restored pride of Europe will make the countries that compose it play a critical or even obstructive role in the formulation of allied policy, unless a means can be found which enables them to play a constructive one. This will be so whatever the military realities. For the diversification of the external challenge now makes it as impossible for the United States to use its strategic dominance within the alliance in order to lay down general policies for the West as it is for the European allies to develop independent strategies. This increasing dependence of the two halves of the alliance on each other could be the source of great friction or of a better working relationship and more useful central institutions, depending on the candor with which it is confronted.

But if the balance of power and mutual dependence between the European allies and the United States is becoming clearer, the relationship between the European allies is in transition. Nevertheless, I think one can identify two developments which point toward a strengthened and revised NATO. The first is the collapse of the idea on which the structure of NATO is largely based, namely that the alliance consisted of three "great" powers and nine (later 12) others whose prime concern was with the security of their own particular area. In 1950 when Britain and France were still vast imperial powers and the rest of the allies were preoccupied with reconstruction, this view was a tenable one. But in recent years not only have the world-wide responsibilities of Britain and France considerably diminished but the interests and influence of the other NATO countries have markedly expanded. Italy, for instance, has developed important economic and political relationships in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Canada is expanding her relationships not only with the new Commonwealth countries but also in the Far East. Norway and Denmark have a very special relationship with their northern neighbors. Germany not only plays an important part in the defense of Europe, but is spreading her interests to every corner of the world. Turkey is vitally involved in Middle Eastern affairs. Greece, like Norway, is now a world-wide shipping power. The Netherlands has an unfinished chapter in her relations with Southeast Asia, and Belgium and Portugal still play a vital role in

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African affairs. Though the old ideas may die hard in London and Paris, any attempt to perpetuate a distinction between the "great," the "middle" and the "small" powers in NATO will create increasing friction. The only durable solution is to devise means of drawing all 13 countries (for Iceland does not claim to have more than local interests, though these she claims tenaciously) into a better form of political association with the United States. For between them its allies have a range of world interests, information, opportunities and commitments equal to its own, whereas no smaller group of NATO power has. It would be ironic if we were to accept and perpetuate the idea of a *troika* in NATO when we are resisting it in the United Nations.

At first sight, the other development—the creation of stronger forms of regional associations within Europe—suggests that NATO might one day become less important or be transformed into a quite small body consisting of the United States, Canada and the E.E.C. It is very likely that as time goes on the E.E.C. will acquire not only political functions but also some responsibility for defense. It is difficult, for instance, to imagine Britain, France, Italy and Germany being for long in an economic association without evolving agreements to rationalize and standardize the production of aircraft or tanks on a European basis. E.E.C. may acquire some of the characteristics of the abortive E.D.C. not only for European defense, but also for the protection of certain overseas interests which are of greater concern to Europe than to the United States. (This will be all the more probable if China becomes a serious nuclear power, forcing the United States to concentrate more resources on deterrence and defense in the Pacific and to ask her European allies to assume a considerably larger share of the defense both of Europe and of their overseas interests.) But not one of the European countries will be prepared to expand the political or defense responsibilities of E.E.C. if it means weakening its association with the source of Western strategic strength, the United States. It is fair to say that the possibility of creating more than just an economic union in Europe depends absolutely on maintaining and improving the central political and military institutions of NATO as a 15-nation alliance.

IV

If one is right in thinking that these are the most important external and internal pressures to which NATO must respond, there

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are three aspects of NATO which need close examination. The first is the effectiveness and authority of the machinery of political consultation and control. The second is the basic concept and the structure of the defense of Europe, which will remain the central responsibility of NATO. The third is the relationship between the European allies and the United States as it concerns strategic weapons and policy.

In the early days of NATO the principal emphasis was on the speedy development of central military commands. The central political institutions, the NATO Council with its permanent representatives and the Secretariat, were developed more slowly, and were not really considered of prime importance until the Suez débâcle led the smaller powers to insist on increasing the authority of the Secretary-General and widening the Council's terms of reference. But even so, neither the Council nor the Secretariat today wields the authority or is equipped for the responsibilities which the need for a high degree of political consultation imposes. These responsibilities divide into two categories, those concerned with the direct confrontation of the Soviet Union in Europe, and those deriving from the need to maintain a stable pattern of international relationships in the rest of the world.

It would be absurd to suggest that the NATO Council does not devote a great deal of time to questions of European security. But consultation between national representatives on problems as they arise is one thing; joint planning is quite another. There are two serious deficiencies. One is that the NATO Council has little authority over military planning in the Standing Group or Supreme Headquarters Europe, and therefore, unlike a national government, little control over the military environment in which it may be asked to reach political judgments. The other is that the civil secretariat in NATO is not a strong enough body to undertake effective long-range planning on behalf of the alliance, nor to play the dominant part it should in the evaluation of political, economic, technological and strategic trends which themselves shape military goals. There are some 23 intergovernmental committees reporting to the Council, including the Military Committee (which meets only sporadically), but this is not joint planning. Because political consultation and military planning are conducted in separate compartments, NATO has made virtually no contribution to the evolution of constructive arms control and disarmament proposals—a subject that is as central to its respon-

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sibilities as defense policy, and more complex. Because there is no central civil-military staff in the NATO Secretariat permanently concerned with this problem, the proposals of national governments have more than once foundered on the hostility or misunderstanding of other NATO governments; for this reason one must feel considerable doubt about the wisdom of establishing a strong Disarmament Agency in the United States Government without creating any counterpart in NATO.

The problem of resolving differences of national policy on questions outside the NATO area is somewhat different. It has been growing in importance and has now become acute as Europe's neighboring continent splits into a score of sovereign nations. Belgian policy in the Congo, British policy in the Rhodesias, Portugal's actions in Angola, French policy in North and West Africa increasingly affect the interests of their other allies. There is no simple answer here, for the new countries—especially in Africa—are intensely suspicious of any attempt to devise a monolithic Western policy towards them, and Lord Avon's recent suggestion of a "political general staff" might do considerably more harm than good. But equally illusory is the hope still cherished by every NATO government that it can somehow or other be made clear to the new countries that its membership in NATO implies no responsibility for the policies of other allies; as the nationalist revolution gathers force, so the white West comes more and more to be regarded as collectively responsible for the acts of individual countries. What this does is to impose an absolute responsibility on member governments to inform their allies through the NATO Council of changes in policy or of plans for action in other parts of the world which may involve the use of force. In view of the widening interests of the smaller NATO allies and the accelerating tempo of action and reaction, the processes of conventional diplomacy are not always adequate. This is primarily a question of intergovernmental consultation and only secondarily of joint planning, although there is a great deal of forward thinking to be done on an international basis on developments beyond the NATO area.

Both these problems raise the question of whether the status of the NATO Council should be enhanced. The value of the Permanent NATO Council is that it is the only body of Western political representatives which meets every week or more, so that important subjects can be considered by men who have a thorough

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knowledge of each others' minds and without creating that unnecessary sense of crisis or tension which special gatherings of ministers or officials from different capitals often produce. The practice has been to appoint professional diplomats or officials as national representatives on the Council; but, skillful as they may be, there now seems to me a strong case for appointing men with political standing in their own countries who can speak directly to heads of governments and, where constitutionally possible, to parliaments. The exact title or constitutional device would have to vary with different countries. In countries with cabinet government, it would involve the appointment of a Minister of State (or, to follow a British precedent, a Minister Resident) for Atlantic Affairs. Under the American Constitution, it would involve the appointment of a special representative who would be a member of the National Security Council or would report directly to the President as the U.S. representative at the United Nations does. In those NATO countries under personal rule, it would involve the appointment of someone high in the confidence of the head of government. The purpose of this reform would not be to give the Council supra-national powers, nor to abandon its essential rule of private discussion, but to increase the authority of its views with governments, electorates and adversaries by appointing men who can interpret its conclusions and directives to their own people with high authority. Moreover, it is probably only by this means that NATO can respond swiftly to diplomatic probes or avert the kind of ragged and belated response which was all that the NATO powers could make to the closing of the East Berlin frontier on August 13. If the inherent disadvantages of a large alliance when confronting a single adversary are to be overcome, it is as important in times of tension to have a political operations center as a military one; in an alliance of democracies this can be manned only by men who wield political authority in their own countries.

V

It is the nature of the strategic balance of power which determines the means by which Europe must be defended. The United States must be the best judge of this strategic balance, since its officials must live daily with the problem it presents. But the modification of European defense plans profoundly affects the policies of its allies, especially if they involve additional military

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manpower. It is therefore a vital American interest to ensure that the European allies have a continuous and clear picture of strategic realities—something that is much easier said than done, given the inevitable time lag in communicating ideas across geographic, language and intellectual barriers.

To avoid the cleavage that now exists between the military thinking of the United States and that of its allies, ways must be devised whereby all members of NATO have continuous access to the inner debate from which American policy emerges, and can be treated with greater candor about new developments. If policy for the defense of Europe is to keep abreast of the rapid pace of technological development, there seems little alternative to a system of joint international planning in which the United States has a powerful but not a dictatorial voice.

On paper such a system exists. The two Supreme Commands, Europe and Atlantic, are international though their commanders are American. They report to the Standing Group, that is, representatives of the U.S., British and French Chiefs of Staff in Washington whose recommendations are transmitted through the Military Committee (which consists of all the Chiefs of Staff of the alliance) to the Council. But this is no longer in fact the way NATO military policy is evolved. The Standing Group has become largely a shadow organization and the Supreme Commander Europe (whose headquarters is only 12 miles from Paris whereas the Standing Group is 3,000) has had to become the Chief of Staff of the alliance. Thus, one man is required to function as a planner, military adviser to a civil international body, and commander of a vast area. Consequently he is placed in an impossible position; he is asked to be judge and advocate in his own cause; and, as an American, his views are generally supposed in Europe to be American policy, although, being quite independent of the American policy-making process, they may not have the backing of Washington.

But there are two even more serious defects in the NATO military planning process. One is that the formulation of military policy takes place almost entirely within military channels, with civil-military liaison only at the highest level. Thus NATO procedure is contrary to the developing practice within national governments where, as weapons and policies become more lethal and more costly, treasuries, foreign offices and other civil agencies have become deeply involved in the evolution of military policy from

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the ground up. The other is that American practice precludes American officials from discussing with fellow members of international staffs any factors that involve the possible use of strategic nuclear weapons. No one wishes to prejudice security, and there is clearly no requirement for American officials to, say, tell their colleagues how to make a thermonuclear bomb. But the net effect of this extreme secretiveness about the factors which govern and change American strategic policy is to deprive international military planning of much of its value, and to leave European governments with a very hazy and inaccurate picture of the trend of American strategic policy—which, after all, governs so much of allied foreign policy—often pieced together from leaks in the American daily and technical press.

To meet these difficulties, the strengthening of the NATO Council provides only part of the answer. For it cannot act as an authoritative center for the evolution and continuous modification of allied military policy nor as the effective and coördinating agent of other policies if it continues to be served only by a maze of intergovernmental committees and a largely autonomous military machine. What is required is a strong secretariat in which civil and military planners work under a central authority. But whereas in the Council the fact that internal developments within the alliance have made it impossible to create any form of directorate of the representatives of the larger powers or to operate on any narrower basis than the full 15 members, the Secretariat could effectively serve the Council only if the division of functions was related to the contribution which different countries make to the collective military and economic resources of the alliance.

Official blueprints are for officials to devise, and there are probably several routes to the same objective. I sketch the outline of one for purposes of illustration.

The office of Chairman of the Council and Secretary-General, combined since 1957, would be separated: the Chairman to be a distinguished European political figure, who, apart from running the Council's business, should be its principal public spokesman and concerned with maintaining contact with allied heads of governments.

The Secretary-General would occupy a position analogous to a British Secretary of the Cabinet, responsible, not for making policy, but for drawing together the threads of official planning and debate so that his political masters can be presented with

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intelligible choices in a proper order of priority; a powerful but not a public position. The foregoing analysis suggests that he should be an American civilian (perhaps also an Assistant Secretary of State or Defense to ensure that he has the proper access) in order that the alliance can be in continuous contact with the development of American policy at the working level.

Three Deputy Secretaries-General would deal respectively with (a) European questions; (b) extra-European questions including liaison with the other alliances; (c) economic and industrial questions affecting NATO policy (including the ugly commercial lobbying which so distorts and delays agreement on weapons and aircraft). These three posts would be filled by officials, lent for long terms by the governments of Britain, France, Germany, Canada or Italy.

A civilian Deputy Secretary-General would be responsible for both military planning and arms control policy; he would not be an American. Under him would come a Chief of Staff, who would be an American (and perhaps a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and three Deputy Chiefs of Staff drawn from Britain, France and Germany at the head of a combined staff drawn from the whole alliance. As in a national government, the Chief of Staff would in the first instance tender his advice to his civil superiors, but would have the right of access to the Council itself. The Standing Group in Washington could then be abolished and the military representatives of the smaller powers absorbed into the national delegations of the NATO Council so that members of it could assess the military advice tendered by the Secretariat in a more expert fashion. The Supreme Commander Europe could then become once again what his name implies, an operational commander, though if NATO had a powerful staff organization in Paris it might well prove desirable, on close examination, to split this vast area into more than one command. Whether he should continue to be an American must depend on the long-term priority which Britain and France decide to give to their European commitments. Throughout the Secretariat, the representatives of the smaller powers would form part of planning teams, according to their special interests.

Since NATO does not have supra-national powers, it would be important, if the work of this powerful new staff were not to be undermined by national doubts and jealousies, to devise means of subjecting its work to regular review by governments. This

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could be done by supplementing the biannual meetings of Foreign Ministers, which are so brief as to provide scope only for the most general *tour d'horizon,* by a quarterly meeting of Ministers of Defense (whose rise in importance in every country is symptomatic of the way in which military policy is ceasing to be a matter of purely military consideration), and regular meetings of Ministers of Finance and Trade or Industry.

Finally, it should be made clear that what is at issue is not the creation of a large bureaucracy to duplicate the administrative responsibilities of national governments; what is required is a staff of very high quality, consisting of men whom only considerations of the greater importance of allied rather than national planning will induce governments to spare, so that within the glass walls of the new NATO building in Paris a candid and informed assessment of the requirements of today and tomorrow can be conducted by international teams composed of men of real ability.

VI

I have left to the last any consideration of the relationship between the European allies and strategic nuclear weapons and their planning, because it seems to me that the solution of this problem depends on reorganizing the central institutions of NATO along some such lines as I have sketched. True, the ambivalent fears of some Europeans that the United States might unleash strategic war too readily or not find Europe worth the price of strategic war are losing much of their force with the development of an effective American second-strike capacity. But the problem will not solve itself. No alliance has ever before been based on a virtual monopoly of strategic power in the hands of one ally; and the problem might become more acute with the attenuation of various forms of dual control as American strategic bases are withdrawn from Europe. At the same time, the idea of NATO control of some American strategic weapons—the so-called "NATO deterrent" (which I among others thought would have to be considered seriously if it proved necessary to deploy land-based M.R.B.M.s in Europe)—will no longer have any real validity if those American strategic weapons that are based in Europe are to be withdrawn and if the NATO system of deterrence in Europe is to be supported primarily by Polaris submarines.

But the controversy which the idea has created in recent years

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has illuminated a profound confusion of thought that exists within the alliance, as in disarmament negotiations, between the French concept of *contrôle* which means examination, verification, the right to criticize, and the English word *control* which in this context means the physical grasp of buttons and levers. If one analyzes European fears, or examines the reasons why first Britain, then France, embarked on an independent nuclear capability, it becomes clear that the basic European desire is not so much for operational control of bombers or missiles as *pour controller* American strategic policy, to gain some measure of control over the context of peace and war.

It is here that a strengthened Council and a powerful European-American Secretariat would play such an important role. If the United States could present a clear and continuous picture of its strategic policy through these strengthened institutions (which need not include such highly classified secrets as targets, though it must include the general considerations by which it would fight a war as well as deter one) and accept informed criticism of its plans, then not only would European governments at last have a clear picture of the considerations which must govern their own defense policies and diplomacy, but their main motive for wishing to acquire operational control of nuclear weapons would disappear. The United States would not then have to consider devolving operational control of nuclear weapons; by bringing NATO within the American policy *planning* process, the President's *operational* freedom of action in an emergency would thus be enhanced.

Two further developments could then be expected. First, it is not unreasonable, in these circumstances, to assume that if it were clear in London and Paris that the civil-military machine of NATO provided a better channel of *contrôle* than the independent maintenance of increasingly expensive national nuclear strategic forces, these could be replanned within NATO as tactical forces and in the end very probably dispensed with. Second, the operational control of tactical nuclear weapons could then be vested in the Secretary-General or Chief of Staff of the alliance under strict "rules of engagement" laid down by the Council (though the weapons themselves would remain in American hands), thus creating joint European-American responsibility for nuclear weapons remaining on European soil, and also for defining their true role and value (a process which must be the essen-

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tial precursor of an equally constructive arms-control proposal for Europe).

VII

The evolution of a stronger center for the Alliance is not a final goal for the Atlantic Community, but a means to a common end —the avoidance of war, the coördinated defense of legitimate interests and the construction of a better system of security and stability which demonstrates that the allies are in full control of the military strength they have created. At present no better means presents itself, and we shall be neglecting our opportunities if we fail to make what we can of NATO simply because we must acknowledge that its functions are limited and that other agencies also have a constructive role to play in creating a new world order.

In conclusion, I would like to point to the degree of common interest that exists in evolving such a center in all the countries of the Alliance, for it has too often come to be assumed in recent years that any modification that advantages one ally must disadvantage others. First, the smaller countries of the Alliance would gain immeasurably. At present they are tarred with the brush, in Soviet or uncommitted eyes, of alignment with the three Western nuclear powers without really being able to play a constructive or influential role in the formulation of Alliance policy. At present they have not the sense of participating in centrally evolved policies—as Mr. Khrushchev knows very well when he invites their Prime Ministers to the Kremlin. Their contribution might not entitle them to many of the key positions in a new civil-military Secretariat of enlarged responsibilities, but it would entitle them to participate in every aspect of its work.

For France the new system would reject the shadow and offer the substance of what President de Gaulle has always required of the Alliance. There would be no French veto on the decisions of the Alliance, but instead an opportunity to exert a strong French influence upon policy in its formative stage. If closer association with the real problems and needs of NATO should convince President de Gaulle that it is the historic role of France to revitalize the defenses of a Europe that must inevitably become more dependent on its own resources, rather than standing aloof from what he conceives to be largely American organization, the power and influence of France within the Alliance would grow rapidly.

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For Germany, where both major parties now attach great importance to NATO and German membership in it, the strengthening of the central institution would help to mitigate that sense of frustration which a divided country is bound to feel. The present German loyalty to NATO and the declared readiness of her government to abide by its decisions could easily wither if NATO proved incapable of taking decisions.

For Britain, a decision to submit more of her policy planning to the *contrôle* of NATO would be to grasp history by the forelock. As Britain becomes less a world power and more intimately concerned with Europe, so the importance of NATO to her must rise. Her aloofness from Europe, the tendency of successive governments to treat her NATO commitments as expendable, has diminished British influence in continental Europe at a time when, for economic and political reasons, she is becoming vitally dependent on it. If national pride can accept the hard fact that the old Anglo-American partnership is dissolving, that henceforth the main road to Washington will lie through Paris, Bonn and Brussels, a strengthened and expanded NATO becomes a vital British interest.

For the United States, such a proposal creates both difficulties and opportunities. It would require a great firmness and consistency of policy to accept the role of NATO as an integral part of the American policy-making process. Yet if it be the case that the United States is becoming politically more affected all the time by the policies of its NATO allies, and if it wishes to shift part of its material and political burdens and responsibilities onto their shoulders while retaining sole control of strategic weapons and decisions, it has really little alternative but to take the lead in evolving means whereby Canada and the European allies have greater access to American counsels.

The great assault which Soviet policy has launched is aimed not at the military forces of the Alliance but at its political cohesion. If NATO can be dismembered politically, then no amount of physical rearmament can redress this defeat. It is to the increase of confidence of ally in ally that any reform of NATO must be addressed.

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KHRUSHCHEV'S PARTY CONGRESS

By Philip E. Mosely

DURING the Party Congress, which met in the new Kremlin theater from October 17 through October 31, the attention of the world was divided almost equally between the vivid and almost daily attacks on the "antiparty group" of Khrushchev's repentant and unrepentant rivals and the clear if somewhat muffled Sino-Soviet divergences over revolutionary strategy. The first of these "sensations" was obviously orchestrated in advance, and each spokesman for the central leadership was assigned a larger or smaller dose of "revelations" to pepper up the otherwise somewhat routine speeches. The second, which came to a head early on in a dispute over the future treatment of the recalcitrant Albanian Party, was clearly unplanned, and it has left a wide-open field for speculation about its implications for the future.

The questions that most concern people living beyond the writ of Communist power are somewhat different, and to them only indirect answers are suggested by the published reports of the Congress proceedings. One of them is: Has the struggle for leadership in the Soviet Party been ended, or is Khrushchev's power challenged from within? Another: Is his dominance of the Communist bloc stronger or weaker than it was in December 1960, at the issuance of the Declaration of Eighty-one Parties? And finally: Does the Congress offer any useful clues to Khrushchev's strategy and tactics of the next few months in the sphere of world politics?

The adoption of the new Party Program "for the building of Communism" in the next 20 years sets very high, popular and impressive goals for the Soviet economy. Thrusting to one side doctrinaire disputes over whether the collective farms should be merged into the system of state farms, and whether or not to prohibit the free market for the sale of surplus foodstuffs, the program promises to maintain strong incentives of differential wages for better work, but it also provides for a gradual expansion of "free"services to be provided out of the state budget. For example, textbooks and other school supplies, which have been provided free of charge for almost 100 years in America, will also be made available free after a few years to Soviet schoolchildren. On

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the whole, the economic goals reflect the more realistic approach to management and investment that has been increasingly emphasized in Soviet pronouncements and practice since Stalin's death. They include, especially after 1970, a steady rise in the production of consumer goods, to a level closer to that of other advanced industrial societies.

Some significant changes were introduced into the draft program as a result of widespread discussions between July and October. Khrushchev now states that, instead of providing adequate housing for all badly-housed families during the decade of the 1970s, this is to be accomplished during the 1960s. Since one-quarter of new capital investment is now going into the construction of housing, this promise, which was greeted by prolonged applause, will require some marked shifts in the allocation of resources. Of course, the problem can be met in part by changing the definition of what constitutes "adequate" housing. On the other hand, the finding of a solution has been complicated by the larger-than-planned influx of people into the cities. In his report of October 17, Khrushchev admitted that by 1966 "the urban population will have increased by about fifteen million more than had been estimated; consequently, even more houses will be required."

Numerous other proposals were rejected by the leadership. In view of the great increase planned in heavy and extractive industries, in consumer goods, foodstuffs and housing, Khrushchev was understandably reluctant to endorse a wide range of special benefits such as shortening work hours for mothers of small children and abolishing night work for women workers. These would, he said, require "further study."

A second major line of internal development, as laid down in the process of "achieving Communism," is the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat; no longer suited to the needs of Soviet society, it is to be gradually transformed into a "general-people's state." In effect, this means that more and more of the people, whether Party members or not, are to be drawn into active participation in a wider range of local decisions, inspections and other activities. Through their recently expanded commissions, local and regional Soviets are to enroll many more citizens in the tasks of supervising and improving education, public health, housing and retail marketing. The role of trade unions, cultural societies and even the new parent-teachers' associations

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is to be enlarged. One legacy from iron-fisted rule from above has been the timidity and passivity of ordinary citizens in combating inefficiency and protesting injustices. The new trend broadens and dramatizes the efforts that have been made over the past several years, again mainly "from above," to elicit more initiative from below, but without really lessening the extreme centralization of the system.

There may be more substance in the changes that have now been incorporated into the Statutes of the Communist Party. The amended procedures for admitting and expelling members seem designated to enhance the role of rank-and-file members, grouped in more than 300,000 primary Party organizations. These provisions, together with new rules requiring a periodic turnover in the membership of Party committees at local, county and regional levels, are supposed to broaden the recruitment of new leaders and to undercut the tendency of Party bureaucrats to dominate their local units and muzzle criticism. In presenting the amendments, which had been approved at a secret meeting of the Central Committee, Frol Kozlov laid special stress on secrecy of voting in choosing members of local and regional Party committees. His announcement that the Central Committee had rejected numerous proposals for reinstituting the "mass purges" or periodic review of all Party membership, so typical of Stalin's time, was greeted with "prolonged applause."

Throughout the Khrushchev and Kozlov reports on the Statutes, the emphasis was on a slogan that is as old as the dictatorial Party itself, "criticism and self-criticism." To publicize the new methods of rule, even the theater has been mustered into service over the last five or six years. One example of Khrushchevian reëducation is the popular play "Battle Along the Road," which last spring was playing in 46 different theaters at one time. In this play, by Galina Nikolaeva, two types of factory managers, the Stalinist and the Khrushchevian, wrestle for the leadership of an important factory. The struggle between the old and the new, the gradual intervention of the workers as an almost faceless but discriminating judge, and the final and "wise" decision by "the Central Committee," pictured as an offstage *deus ex machina,* obviously involve the hopes and fears of the audience as a real problem of Soviet life, however melodramatic it may seem to an outsider.

In appealing for greater "activism" by both Party members

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and loyal and hardworking citizens, the Party leadership sets definite limits to these initiatives. "Increase the responsibility of the primary Party organizations," they say in effect, but in the next breath Kozlov reminded the Congress that "the C.P.S.U. is not a federation of parties or party committees; it is a centralized organization." While urging every opportunity "for a free and businesslike discussion of questions relevant to Party policy," Kozlov denounced any attempt to form fractions or cliques. Even discussion has narrow limits. "Naturally one must not allow a situation to come about in which the Party can be drawn into a sterile discussion at the whim of some small group of muddle-headed or immature people, in which individual antiparty elements can undertake actions leading to the subversion of party unity." Basically the leadership is urging the middle ranks of the Party to throw off their fear or friendship for the petty bosses above them and to speak their minds, and thus to help the top leadership meet its goals more efficiently than in the past. "Democracy" in the Western sense is not one of those goals.

II

Even more completely than the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses, the Twenty-second was "Khrushchev's Congress." Since the purge of the "antiparty group" in June 1957, and the dismissal of Marshal Zhukov in October of that year, the Party-Presidium has been completely "his" presidium and the Central Secretariat has been "his" secretariat. During the steady turnover in the upper ranks of the Party over the past four years, Khrushchev has reënforced his control over the entire apparatus of power. Since February 1956 the membership of the Party has grown by some 2,500,000, from 7,215,000 to 9,716,000 and over 200,000 members have been expelled. Why, in the light of the consolidation of his power, did Khrushchev devote so much time at the Congress to denouncing his former rivals for power?

One explanation that has been put forward is that somehow Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov are still active contenders for power, that they retain a large potential following within the Party, and that a further purge, on a substantial scale, may follow this public attack on them, on their crimes during the Stalin era, and on the policies that they are accused of advocating. This seems most improbable. If the "antiparty group" was not able to muster its forces better in June 1957, when its mem-

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bers were still close to the levers of power, how much strength can it summon now, after it has been scattered and reviled? Its fate was actually determined by January 1955, and it was sealed by the failure of its attempt, in February 1956, to prevent Khrushchev from delivering his secret anti-Stalin speech to the Twentieth Congress.

In most respects the recent attacks on Stalin constitute a relatively restrained and unmelodramatic re-run of the famous "secret speech," perhaps expurgated for wider distribution at home and abroad. Significantly, each spokesman of the central apparatus—Presidium and Secretariat—was assigned some part of the denunciatory material, perhaps to demonstrate the solidarity of the leading group, perhaps to make each of their speeches that much more stirring to the Congress. A few additional details were offered on Stalin's actions, particularly on his alleged planning of the Kirov murder in 1934. The most striking addition to the "chamber of horrors" was the painstaking and direct linking of the "antiparty group" with the crimes of the Stalin era. Anyone living abroad is bound to ask a further question: "But will not people in the Soviet Union associate Khrushchev with the same misdeeds? Will they not recall the long years in which he served and praised Stalin no less faithfully and obsequiously than did his defeated rivals?"

Some, possessed of longer memories or feeling somewhat freer now to make cynical comments about the leaders, will no doubt do so, but this is of no political importance. After the Congress of February 1956 the "secret speech" was read by or to all members of the Party, and even to millions of nonparty activists, and to Communist leaders outside the Soviet Union. The shock has long since been absorbed by them, and the differences between the Stalin and Khrushchev methods of rule have been drilled into them for several years. By naming scapegoats for the Stalinist crimes, Khrushchev actually makes it easier for himself and the Party members to localize the diffused sense of shared guilt in a few powerless individuals. The fact that for long years these same individuals wielded, even by delegation, the heavy hand of monolithic power makes their downfall and Khrushchev's contrasting image of success and benevolence a more convincing part of a mammoth "morality play," Communist-style.

Since the Congress provided no opportunity for genuine debate or discussion, any more than in Stalin's day, its effectiveness as

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a transmission belt of Party directives was enhanced by the drama of "crime and punishment" played out on its stage. The anti-Stalinist tirades spelled out, probably with a substantial dose of exaggeration, the differences over recent and future policies. Khrushchev was, it now appears, full of good ideas as early as 1950 and 1951 for improving agriculture and housing; Molotov and Kaganovich frustrated these proposals. In 1957 they also opposed his program for partially decentralizing the management of the economy. Molotov resisted bitterly Khrushchev's attempts to develop a more relaxed system of control over the Communist bloc and his efforts to enhance Soviet influence beyond the area of the Leninist writ through personal contacts with foreign statesmen. Molotov underestimated the growing might of the Soviet Union and therefore rejected Khrushchev's foreign policies as dangerous to its survival as a state and a revolutionary ideology. Far from repenting of his dogmatism, Molotov wrote the Central Committee just before the Congress, according to Satiukov, to denounce most of the new policies; his letter has, of course, not been made public.

By spelling out in his own words the sharp differences between his own policies and those of the "antiparty group," Khrushchev has given a clearer focus to his own policies and has sent the delegates home with a vivid picture of the "perils of Pauline" that the party has escaped. Like other congresses since Lenin's death, the latest one did not actually shift power from one leader or group to another; it merely registered and consolidated a previous shift of power that had already been carried out by the top leadership through its exclusive power of promotion and demotion. It has not laid down new policies or even debated them; it has received, for transmission down the line, the codified policies already worked out and applied by the leadership. The basic message its members have taken home is that Khrushchev intends to continue the gradual broadening of responsibilities and initiatives downward within the Party; that no drastic changes in the system are being planned; that the relaxation of tension between the ruling group and the people at large is going to be continued; that the Soviet Party intends to assert its dominance over the bloc; and that Khrushchev is confident that outside the bloc the growing Soviet military might and his own more flexible political strategy will enable him to make important and eventually decisive gains for Communism without involving his people in a nuclear war.

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III

The most unexpected feature of the Twenty-second Congress was the direct disagreement, publicly recorded, between Khrushchev and the Chinese Party leadership. This new tension was highlighted by Chou En-lai's departure for Peking, lamely and belatedly explained as due to "previous engagements." The immediate occasion of the dispute was the recalcitrant position taken by the Albanian Party since mid-1960, but the conflict between Moscow and Peking is clearly proceeding on several planes.

How did Albania happen to become a testing-ground of Chinese and Soviet dominance within the Communist bloc? The specific accusation that Enver Hoxha has stubbornly clung to Stalinist methods of rule can hardly be taken seriously, for the East German, Czech and Bulgarian Parties are only slightly less Stalinist today. The difference is that in those other Parties Stalinist methods are being applied by pro-Moscow leaders, whereas Enver Hoxha has put himself under Peking's protection. Differences between Moscow and Tirana can be traced to Khrushchev's ebullient efforts in 1955 to win back Tito to "the socialist camp," and to Enver Hoxha's fear that he might again be assigned to a Jugoslav sphere of influence. In any case the severe tension between Stalin and Tito between 1948 and 1953 must have given Enver many hopes, later dissipated by Khrushchev, that after Tito's expected overthrow Albania would be permitted to double its territory and population at Jugoslavia's expense.

In addition, the coming of long-range bombers and missiles has wiped out Albania's strategic value to the Soviet Union. And perhaps Khrushchev had meanwhile discovered, like every invader or protector of Albania since 1912, that this poor country simply cannot afford to pay for its own governing and military apparatus. If he then decided to cut back Soviet subsidies to Enver, he may not have suspected that Peking would be bold enough to take over Moscow's role as supplier and protector.

Enver's purposes in destroying his pro-Soviet rivals at home and in seeking a new supporter abroad are fairly obvious, but Mao Tse-tung's motives appear both more obscure and more far-reaching. Is he using the quarrel over the Albanian Party to establish the principle of dual and equal leadership within the bloc? Did he have hopes, during the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956–1957, of sharing with Moscow the leadership of the satellites

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in Europe, only to have to settle for the doubtful prize of Albania's allegiance? Or, believing literally in the imminence of a final and bloody struggle against "the imperialist bloc headed by the United States of America," is he painstakingly establishing his own super-orthodoxy in advance? Does he foresee the weakening of Russia in a nuclear war with the United States, and is he therefore hanging on to a minor "position of strength" within the European group of satellites, in preparation for later claims to a dominant role within an expanded "socialist camp"?

The published reports of the Sino-Soviet debate at the Moscow Party Congress offer only faint clues. Chou insisted that Albania is still a member of the bloc, thereby implying that Khrushchev is not entitled to read Enver Hoxha out of the Communist family. Khrushchev retorted that Albania had practically read itself out of the bloc by Enver's action in walking out of the Moscow Conference of November 1960, and by his refusal to carry out the provisions of the Declaration of December 1960. Obviously Chou was incensed at Khrushchev's insistence that he holds the final authority to decide whether Enver Hoxha and other leaders have or have not carried out the contradictory tenets of that compromise Declaration. In a subsidiary accusation Chou attacked Khrushchev for publicly airing the differences that had arisen within the bloc. Khrushchev parried this charge rather weakly by accusing Enver of having already aired these differences, and he concluded by urging the Chinese leadership to persuade Enver to accept the "decisions" of the bloc! This rather circular line of reasoning leaves unresolved the basic question: Can Khrushchev speak for the bloc, or must he first seek a private agreement with Communist China?

The dispute has clearly set up serious strains for several Asian Parties. Tsedenbal, speaking for the Mongolian Revolutionary Party, opted for Moscow without hesitation; in his speech he did not refer even once to China specifically, though he praised the "solidarity of the bloc." On the other hand, the North Korean spokesman and Ho Chi-minh expressed the gratitude of their Parties to China by name. D. N. Aidit, speaking for the Indonesian Party, first read a message of greeting, drafted in advance of the Congress, praising "the experiences of two great peoples—the Soviet Union and China" as "an example that inspires the Indonesian peoples." In his own speech Aidit expressed gratitude "to the Communist Parties, the governments, and the peoples of

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the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union." In contrast, the Secretary-General of the Indian Party, Ajoy Ghosh, made no mention whatever of China, in the midst of fulsome praise of Soviet achievements and Soviet policies.

It is not hard to imagine several basic sources of the discord between Peking and Moscow, but firm information on their relative importance is almost completely lacking. The two major Communist powers stand at entirely different stages in their revolutionary development. The Soviet leadership has achieved very great military power and also seems increasingly aware of the risks it would run in any nuclear war. Communist China has taken literally Khrushchev's claims to strategic superiority, repeated so often since 1957, and it may interpret his unwillingness to place that great force at the service of Peking's ambitions as "pacificism" or a loss of "revolutionary zeal."

After four decades of almost unremitting suffering and sacrifices, Russians, whether Party members or not, can now see just ahead a time when they can at last enjoy a standard of living far better than they have known before. China can hardly hold its own, much less build a strong economy, unless it enforces on its Party and its people a more-than-Stalinist discipline for several decades to come. The Soviet leadership has no pressing territorial ambitions, except for its continuing phobia about West Berlin, while Communist China has many appetites. Because of what it regards as Soviet "pacifism," it is farther than ever from overrunning Taiwan and thus ending once and for all the civil war. It may even fear that Moscow could accommodate itself in practice, though not in so many words, to a "two Chinas" solution.

It is not at all clear that the Chinese Communist leadership is completely happy about Moscow's role in supporting and guiding the campaign of the North Vietnamese Party to take over Laos and South Viet Nam, for Peking seems to be playing no direct role in this. Ho Chi-minh may be very pleased at the Soviet eagerness to help him expand his realm and to do so without his falling into dependence upon China, for he knows the Russians are unlikely to settle permanently in that part of Asia. And the Soviet leaders obviously feel that it is much safer to keep this intricate game in their own hands, rather than let the Chinese bull their way into the Southeast Asian crockery shop. An advance of Chinese military units into the area might provoke a sharp reaction in Indian opinion, which, with some exceptions, takes a very bland view to-

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day of the Soviet role in Laos, perhaps because Indians regard the Soviet Union as the only power that can restrain Chinese claims to more of India's territory. In any case, Khrushchev certainly feels that he is now an experienced master of the international chessboard, compared with the isolated and parochial Chinese leadership, and he has shown a persistent disinclination to let the Chinese Communists commit Soviet strategic and political power beyond a predetermined limit, as laid down by him.

Did Khrushchev believe that China's current dependence on Soviet aid, however small in volume, and perhaps its greater dependence in the near future, would oblige Chou En-lai to accept Soviet leadership over the bloc without a public expression of dissent? Did he expect that the bitter arguments of November and December 1960, leading up to the compromise Declaration of Eighty-one Parties, could now be won by him? Perhaps we shall never know how far doctrinaire, personal and cultural frictions may have fed this growing irritation, and how far it is due to cold calculations of the risk of a nuclear war. A more pressing question is: Will the public divergence between Moscow and Peking, expressed before an international Communist conclave, simplify or complicate the problems of United States policy?

Perhaps one key to this question should be sought in the more general tendency of each great alliance system to display serious internal cleavages. The development, real or assumed, of a kind of nuclear stalemate has, in fact, not led to full agreement within the loose coalition that has been formed around the deterrent power of the United States. And since Khrushchev has been preaching a modest and controlled "relaxation of controls" within the much more rigid Soviet system of alliances, it is possible that, behind the scenes of Communist allegiance, he may also be encountering a wider range of separately defined interests and aspirations.

The divergence in interpreting the purport of Khrushchev's new program was expressed most clearly at the Congress by Gomulka and Ulbricht. From the new Soviet Party program Gomulka picked out two major points for enthusiastic endorsement. Because of present and promised Soviet economic advances, Communism is, he stressed, bound to prove its superiority everywhere and therefore triumph throughout the world by peaceful means. His second theme was a rapid replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat by a new type of "socialist democracy,"

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in which mankind will enjoy all the rights promised by "bourgeois" democracy and many new ones, besides. Both promises—"no war," and a steady movement from dictatorship to democracy—are obviously welcome news for Poles, including Polish Communists. Speaking after Gomulka, Ulbricht made no mention of a slackening of controls or of the dictatorship, but stressed the growing menace of Western and West German militarism. He also set as a goal the establishment of a reunified and demilitarized Germany, of course under Communist control.

With the building up of Soviet missile-nuclear forces, the leadership has clearly moved this factor into top place as a strategic and political weapon. This means that the armed forces of the European satellites, and even their territories, now play a less crucial role in Soviet strategic planning than they did in the first postwar decade. This change of strategic perspective, among other factors, has made it easier for Khrushchev to tolerate a considerably wider range of variation in cultural, economic and other policies within the satellites, short of abandoning the basic principle of Communist control. True, he at first accepted only reluctantly this policy of limited divergence even with respect to Poland, and no other satellite has strayed as far as Poland from the Soviet model. Yet the variations in patterns are both substantial and exceedingly significant to the peoples of the satellites; witness the strength of individual peasant farming in Poland.

This policy of limited tolerance and controlled divergence has many advantages both for the Soviet leadership and for the local Communist satraps. It has assured the necessary degree of strategic conformity to Soviet interests, and it has done so at far less cost in political and economic strains than the now-discarded Stalinist norms of absolute conformity and blind obedience.

If Khrushchev now finds it expedient to accept a somewhat wider range of divergence among the relatively powerless satellites in Eastern Europe, he must have discovered again how much more difficult it is to exact obedience from his Chinese partner within the bloc. After all, he cannot refuse economic support to Communist China in its present and probably temporary straits, even though both he and Mao may agree, for different motives, on holding that aid within the narrowest practicable limits. Neither can he compel China to renounce any of its direct ambitions; perhaps it has not been easy to persuade Mao to postpone them from year to year. The contest within the Communist régimes

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and Parties in Asia over whether the Soviet or Chinese example is the more applicable to their ambitions may be spurring Khrushchev at present to make important gains for Communism in Southeast Asia.

Perhaps Khrushchev feels pressed, in a time of Chinese weakness, to build up a barrier of Moscow-oriented Communist allies in Southeast Asia and thus forestall China's ambition to do the same. If this be the case, the implications are ominous for the independent states of that key region—and for Western political, economic and strategic prospects there. The Sino-Soviet rivalry may be placing stronger pressures and setting more urgent deadlines for a Moscow-sponsored expansion of Communism. Far from handicapping Soviet ambitions in Southeast Asia, the contest between Moscow and Peking may lead Khrushchev to take greater risks than in the past in order to demonstrate that his policy of graduated risks is both more fruitful and less dangerous than Peking's emphasis on all-out "revolutionary zeal."

IV

The Twenty-second Congress has thrown little new light on Khrushchev's policies elsewhere in the world. The standard mixture of peace-loving protestations with threats of Soviet missile-nuclear might was highlighted by Marshal Malinovsky's claim that the Soviet Union possesses Polaris-type submarines and "has solved" the problem of the anti-missile missile. Though discounted abroad, both assertions indicate important lines of Soviet efforts in military technology. In announcing that the Soviet Union had resumed nuclear testing, Khrushchev was merely continuing the double line, which he has followed since September 1, of playing this warlike threat soft at home and hard abroad.

In relaxing slightly his year-end timetable for signing a peace treaty with East Germany, Khrushchev was continuing his hot-and-cold tactics abroad, at the same time reassuring the delegates of his ability to achieve his goals without bringing on a nuclear war. By rejecting the charges, attributed to Molotov, of falling into the twin heresies of "pacificism" and underestimating the central importance of unrelenting "revolutionary struggle," Khrushchev further reinforced his domestic image as a new type of leader who can assure the "worldwide victory of Communism" without involving his country in a nuclear war.

Basically, the purposes of Soviet policy, as stated at the Con-

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gress, are the same that Khrushchev had set forth in his program speech of January 6, 1961, and therefore they differ somewhat in emphasis and tone from the compromise Declaration of Eighty-one Parties, of December 1960. Less was said at the Congress about the "national revolution," by which newly independent nations are to be moved step-by-step out of the political and economic sphere of the West and into the Communist orbit. One significant innovation was the presence of delegates from three non-Communist parties in Africa—from the governing parties of Ghana, Guinea and Mali.

Unlike the predictions of the 1952 and 1956 Congresses, recent Soviet pronouncements speak less frequently of the inevitable slide of the newly-independent countries into a Communist system of rule, and they refer more often and more eloquently to the advantages of long-range coöperation between national and anti-imperialist revolutions, on the Cuban model, and the Soviet Union. As a corollary, the speakers at the Congress emphasized the opportunities, provided by Soviet power and aid, for the new countries to advance toward "socialism" through non-violent means. Apparently, the Soviet leaders now realize that even the most anti-Western and anti-imperialist leaders in Africa and Asia do not enjoy being reminded that, according to the dialectic, they in turn will be superseded before long by simon-pure Communist dictatorships.

On the whole, the Congress showed once again that Khrushchev has a profound knowledge of the Soviet system, and that he understands the aspirations of his people for peace, economic progress, greater security and more local initiative at home. He showed himself on somewhat more uncertain ground in his dealings with the bloc; in particular, he may discover that Peking's stubborn insistence on playing an independent role within the "family of socialist nations" is something he will simply have to live with. In his attitude toward the major questions of world politics, Khrushchev again displayed a strong, partly justified, but oversimplified optimism about the prospects of Communist victories in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Toward the West and Japan, and particularly toward the United States, he exhibited at the Congress the same unyielding illusions and the same arrogance, both focused on Berlin, that have brought the two systems of power dangerously far down the road to a confrontation of both strategic power and political determination.

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JUDGMENT AND CONTROL IN MODERN WARFARE

By Sir Solly Zuckerman

THE trend of military evolution on which the world has been set since 1939 has seen the harnessing of the most advanced technology to the elaboration of an extensive series of new weapons and weapons systems. Through the development of a large family of ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, destructive power can now be brought to bear on unseen targets over distances ranging from tens to thousands of miles; at the same time, the capacity of a single explosion to destroy has been multiplied thousands, even millions, of times. These technological developments have been associated with the emergence of new scientific processes of management (most of which are loosely grouped under the term "operations analysis"), whose purpose is to try to help the commander control the apparatus of which he now disposes. But a question which becomes increasingly urgent in our age of nuclear deterrence, and one which grows in importance as more and more technology becomes harnessed to the demands of defense, is whether these new measures of control extend or curtail the possibilities of human, as opposed to machine, judgment.

A useful approach to an answer to the question is to consider three general propositions, of which one is observable fact and the other two are unassailable deductions from experience.

The observable fact is that the amount of military input into modern weapons systems, and particularly complex strategic systems, is declining rapidly, with a complementary increase in the technical input provided by the non-military man. This change is associated with the increasing specialization of single-purpose weapons systems. By "military input" one means, of course, the fruits of actual military experience. The simplest illustration of this proposition is that no military genius or experience has gone into the conception or design of I.C.B.M.s. If one wishes to push it that far, there is no logical need for such a weapon to be deployed

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by the military, as opposed to some other agent of government. If the name Moscow, or New York, or London, or Paris were written on each I.C.B.M., the missiles might well be deployed and operated by the firms which produced them. The complex operations of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are not military operations, nor is putting a man into space a military operation, even though the men who go into space may all be military men.

Sophisticated anti-aircraft missile systems are equally automatic in their conception—and, one suspects, in their potential operation. For them to operate properly, one needs virtually complete information about what is happening in one's air space, not to mention infallible and unshakeable judgment about what to do with that information.

My first major generalization, therefore, is that the more modern technology one puts into weapons systems, and the more automated they become, the less they constitute the fruits of military thinking, and the less flexible they become in use.

My second proposition is this: However much importance one attaches to firepower, battles and wars are not necessarily won by matching unit powers of destruction, or by having a few more potential units of destruction than one's enemy. The best victory is the one where an adversary surrenders without a shot being fired; at the other extreme, the worst victory is one which is associated with a maximum of unnecessary and expensive destruction. War, of course, is a tricky game, and rather than take risks, commanders almost inevitably over-insure. Once there is no scarcity of bombs or aircraft, the tendency is to use more rather than fewer on a given task. The frequency with which the principle of economy of force has been violated in the past makes one wonder in what sense it constitutes a principle of real military action as opposed to something to talk about at staff colleges.

Space prevents my illustrating the proposition that neither battles nor wars are *uniquely* determined by matching units of destructive power. For present purposes, I base this assertion on an extensive series of special studies which I personally made of the "natural history" of destruction during the course of the 1939–1945 war. They all illustrate the conclusion that, while firepower is a major factor, it is only one of several vital factors which may determine the outcome of conflict. History, alas, pro-

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vides no guide as to which factor will determine the outcome of some battle which has not yet been fought.

My third proposition is so obvious that it hardly bears mentioning. It is that the more vast, the more heterogeneous, the more scattered any organization becomes, and the more complicated its component parts—it makes no difference whether we consider the civil or the military sphere—the more difficult it is to control and to concert its multitudinous activities to a single common purpose. The difficulty is an ultimate limitation on the practical uses of good judgment.

II

Let us consider the first proposition—that in the present phase of military evolution military experience as such is contributing less and less to the development of complex weapons systems, and that, correspondingly, we are being committed more and more to systems which, as they grow more complex technologically than anything we could have conceived of before, increasingly limit our freedom of choice and action.

The nature of the military armory has always helped determine the character of tactics and strategy. To that extent, weapons have always set constraints on freedom of choice—which means on the exercise of judgment—when military means have been used to secure political ends. The danger today is that our complicated armory, and particularly our nuclear armory, may in the end drive us to a position in which we are committed to operate as in a set-piece. Such an eventuality would mean that if tactical warfare were ever to break out in Europe, it would simply become one part of a program of predetermined strategic action.

There is an immediate corollary to the overt recognition of this trend in weapons development. If the way in which our potential freedom of military operation and deployment is constrained becomes obvious—and in these expensive technological days these things cannot be kept secret in a democratic society—our potential enemies can adjust their plans, military and non-military, in a complementary way to suit their own convenience.

This trend in the development of tactical warfare as one part of a set-piece of predetermined strategic action may well be something we need as part of our strategic deterrence. But it is not what most people have in mind when they refer to the "proper

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use" of tactical nuclear weapons in a land battle in NATO Europe. It is essential, therefore, that the armory of which we dispose in order to defend ourselves in field warfare does not contain within itself trip-wires which unwittingly set into operation the whole panoply of strategic deterrence. I know that this matter is very much the concern of General Norstad today. Ten years hence his successor will have to wrestle with an even more severe problem.

Let us be quite clear about this. There are those in the West who already believe that the use of any nuclear weapons in a war involving NATO would mean the opening of a Third World War. There are indications that the Soviet leaders believe the same thing. If this view is right, all freedom of choice may be lost, and with it all possibility of exercising judgment and control in a future war between the great powers.

I am not concerned here either to discuss this view or to paint the picture of mutual suicide which it entails. I refer to it simply as an indication of a major consequence of the development of weapons systems into which one builds only a predetermined set of functions. The guidance and navigational systems of a long-range ballistic missile are magnificent achievements, but they themselves are incapable of any more judgment than is built into them. Only in a very crude way is a nuclear-headed missile of this age a substitute for a manned aircraft. Once launched, all it substitutes for is the bomb the aircraft might have dropped.

The technological panoply of set-piece warfare is the panoply of deterrence. Its weapons are not weapons in the conventional sense. Our deterrent weapons are there to make any potential aggressor realize that if he strikes he will be struck. What would happen after that, in the case of strategic war, is matter for speculation, in which scientists have no need to engage in public. They may better appreciate the significance of the facts of destructive power, but they cannot lay claim to better imaginative powers than the next man.

There is one related point, however, that I must touch on. If one assumes that such a thing as tactical nuclear warfare could occur in isolation, how are armies equipped with nuclear weapons to be controlled? This is an immense problem for the military scientist. Only someone who wishes to blind himself to the obvious facts would fail to see that our machinery for surveillance and for condensing, analyzing and disseminating military intel-

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ligence does not match the force and range of our striking power and the potential speed of reaction of the modern weapons systems which are deployed on the battlefield.

This is an enormously important area for military research and development. Which of several towns, or how many of them, are going to be effaced from the map as interdiction targets 50 or 100 miles from the front? More important, how is one to know what the effects of their elimination are on the movement of the enemy forces? Once our own nuclear weapons start detonating, how is the news of what is happening to be flashed from one to another part of our own lines? How are we to inform ourselves of what the enemy has done with his nuclear weapons? How are all these data to be collected? And, every bit as important, how are they to be reduced quickly enough to the kind of intelligible terms in which they could be disseminated and without which neither judgment nor control can be exercised?

III

I turn now to my second proposition, which is simply that battles and wars are not necessarily won by the side with the greater number of units of destruction at its disposal. A corollary of this proposition is that the way our power to destroy has multiplied over the past 15 years may itself impose a major limitation on military freedom of action in field warfare.

I do not propose to set out figures which define the nature of modern destructive power. The yield of the two bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki—two moderate-sized industrialized towns—was between 15 and 20 kilotons. The NATO armory contains weapons of this caliber, and also many others with higher and lower yields. The use of any one of these—and of any equivalent nuclear weapons the Russians might use—would mean the instantaneous and total destruction or elimination of an area varying in size between, say, a large village and a large town. Depending on the way forces are disposed, the explosion of a nuclear weapon of, say, 100 kilotons could mean the elimination of one or of dozens of battle groups or of one or of several squadrons of aircraft on the ground. But if one's target information happened to be wrong, it could mean the elimination of none.

The dispersal of troops, which is a tactical consequence of the power of nuclear weapons, is one of the basic reasons why we

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need a better apparatus than we now possess for the reconnaissance and surveillance of potentially nuclear battlefields, and why we also need better communications. It is a reason for increased mobility of troops, since this is as much a requirement of a nuclear battle—assuming such a thing is a reality—as of a conventional battle.

There is also the problem of radio-biological hazards, which again focuses attention sharply on the need for highly sophisticated intelligence and communications systems, if any measure of control is to be exercised under conditions of chaos.

When I use the term "chaos," I am thinking not only of the direct effects of radiation and blast resulting from attacks on purely military targets, but also of the likely effects on military operations of nuclear explosions on adjacent civilian populations. For, to the best of my knowledge, there is no area in Western Europe where a nuclear battle could be fought without causing considerable damage to non-military targets.

This point can be illustrated by what is a representative scenario of such a battle, but one smaller and more confined than most that have been considered. In a war game involving just three NATO Corps, nuclear weapons were "used" against military targets only, in an area of 10,000 square miles which contained no large towns or cities. In this "battle," lasting only a few days, it was assumed that the two sides together used a total of between 20 and 25 megatons in not fewer than 500 and not more than 1,000 strikes. It turned out that $3\frac{1}{2}$ million people would have had their homes destroyed if the weapons were air burst, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ million if ground burst. In the former case, at least half the people concerned would have been fatally or seriously injured. In the case of ground burst weapons, all $1\frac{1}{2}$ million would have been exposed to a lethal radiological hazard and a further 5 million to serious danger from radiation.

I am, as I have said, referring only to the actual battle area in which the three Corps were engaged. If we wish to obtain a more realistic impression of the circumstances which would actually prevail in such a limited battle, we need to bear in mind that no such operation, however confined, would be likely to occur without collateral, so-called interdiction attacks with nuclear weapons beyond the area of local engagement. Also, in all probability both sides would launch nuclear attacks on distant airfields or missile sites.

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My purpose in trying to give an indication of some of the likely facts of a nuclear land battle—and I have described only part of the picture—is both to answer questions that have been put and to indicate that problems of judgment and control become increasingly difficult the more one's weapons automatically lead to over-hitting—even of strictly military targets.

In the ideal, the best weapon is the one just big enough to destroy the specific target against which it is directed. This is true whether looked upon from the standpoint of military practicality or plain economics. For example, both theoretical and field studies of World War II battles have shown that the smaller the units into which a given weight of anti-personnel weapons was divided, the greater the number of casualties they caused.

But nuclear weapons have changed all this. It will require the utmost judgment and control if the secondary, non-military effects—even when they are directed against assumed military targets—are not to dominate the situation once they are used, and having done so, to generate a new situation which is outside all possible military control, as it certainly now is outside all military experience. I am not suggesting that the problem of trying to operate rationally within an environment of chaos is new to military experience and command, or that civilian populations have not suffered from military operations in the past. What I am saying is that the problem today assumes such new proportions that it moves into a dimension completely different from the one in which we have all gained our experience.

There is, of course, no rule which says that a land battle in Europe would immediately "go nuclear." Equally, there is none which says that it would not. My experience of the way commanders worked in the Second World War does not lead me to suppose that, if unlimited force were available, less rather than more would be used in order to secure some objective, whether on the defensive or offensive.

The very existence of tactical nuclear weapons is thus the most urgent challenge that has ever been presented to military judgment and control. As weapons to deter aggression, they serve a very precise purpose; the context of field warfare in which they might actually be used is an entirely different matter. There can be very few military targets which are not disproportionately small in relation to the area of effect of the smallest nuclear weapon that might be used against them. Once one goes beyond,

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say, a yield of 20 kilotons, one is in the "town-elimination range." Because of this, one cannot make any valid comparisons between the introduction to the military scene of nuclear weapons and, say, the introduction of conventional explosives or chemical warfare at the time they emerged.

One further point. In the development of nuclear warheads, particularly those which are designed for missiles, there is a tendency to add to their yield in order to compensate for the inaccuracy of the delivery system and for inadequacies of target information. To a lesser extent, this is also true of free-falling and guided bombs. This, again, means that one builds into nuclear weapons greater destructive power than is necessary for military purposes, and that their secondary, non-military effects overshadow those which relate specifically to their military use.

IV

I turn now briefly to the third consideration which I see circumscribing the area within which military judgment and control can be exercised in this rapidly expanding technological age. It is simply that the larger, the more heterogeneous, the more complex, the more scattered any organization becomes, the more difficult it is to control its actions to fulfill a common purpose.

With the active concurrence of the military, we have moved into an era of weapons systems rather than isolated weapons, and this trend is unlikely to be interrupted. Each new system emerges as a combination of complex components; and each of these needs to be monitored and manned in an increasingly specialized way. Early warning systems, missile systems, certain forms of intelligence systems—they are all similar in that each cog is vital, each has to be complete and perfect within itself, each has to have its built-in programs, computers and comparators. Each sub-system has to synchronize precisely with the next one. Increasing specialization of systems inevitably leads to rigidity of operation—and to the danger of breakdown.

Similarly, the men who operate and service the components of the newer weapons systems, whether they be early warning radar chains or supersonic high-altitude aircraft or Polaris submarines, are working at the extremes of their physical, psychological and mental capacities. As the decade progresses, each new weapons system will place still greater demands on the judgment and control of the individual.

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Today, command has to be exercised over varieties of weapons systems which interlock over vast areas and, in the case of NATO, over systems which cross national frontiers. If the ultimate limitations of human judgment and control are not to be exceeded, it is vital that every effort be made to unify and simplify those human procedures which are concerned with the collection, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence.

In examining the impact of future scientific developments on military affairs, there are two more points which I believe to be highly important. The first is that, while the sheer pressures created by technological progress themselves generate limitations to the proper and free exercise of judgment and control, the problem of maintaining this essential quality has not been made any easier by the way the military have altered the concrete nature of certain military problems by turning them into abstractions. One dangerous example of this tendency is the term "interdiction targets." Another is the idea that nuclear weapons are just a new and more powerful form of artillery, and that one exchanges "nuclear fire" like counter-battery fire. A third is that one is able "to restore a situation" with nuclear fire. There are other conventional military terms which relate properly to the pattern of warfare in pre-atomic days but which hardly fit our present technological era.

We think we know what we mean when we use such terms as "interdiction." To take a special case, let us assume a series of bridges over a river; they must be destroyed lest they be used by the enemy, even though, as is so often the case, they are in centers of population. The nodal points in a railway communications network might be another set of interdiction targets. As such, they would be dealt with as part of a set-piece offensive.

In this kind of thinking, however, the target is not a body of troops or a particular bridge. It has become an abstraction—"interdiction." The purpose of interdicting—in this case, the prevention of the movement of a particular body of men—may not be fulfilled at all in "set-piece interdiction." For all we know, the men may not have been there, or may have planned to move by another route. This is how it often was in the Second World War with one major class of interdiction targets in Northwestern Europe; and I know nothing which suggests to me that it would not be the same in the next. The use of nuclear weapons to carry out interdiction plans may or may not impede the enemy, but it

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is very likely to make the environment more difficult for our own commanders to exercise judgment and control.

It seems to me, therefore, that when we talk about the potential use and effects of nuclear weapons, we must avoid the conceptual framework derived from the military terminology of pre-nuclear warfare. One may fairly ask what meaning there is to the idea of using nuclear weapons "to defend our territories and peoples." One can deter with nuclear weapons. Can one defend?

V

My final point derives from the fact that the situations encountered in warfare are as empirical and as experimental as those thrown up in a laboratory, and that they do not lend themselves any better to predetermined judgments. Experience in dealing with experimental situations helps one in dealing with new ones; but the results of one set of experiments do not apply to another—unless they are identical, which is seldom the case.

Warfare, the behavior of men and nations in conflict, is a far more complex thing than the behavior of men and women in normal peaceful groupings. Experience has shown that even the latter is hardly amenable to the discipline of scientific method. History, we know, was made yesterday; and social science has not yet provided the predictive generalizations which would allow us to write tomorrow's history today.

Discussion of this point requires a consideration of military operational analysis and how it was born—or perhaps I should say, was allowed to be born—in the Second World War. It emerged as a new procedure in military affairs, as an intellectual tool for the military, so as to help the proper exercise of judgment and control. Without it, warfare was already becoming too difficult technically for those in whose hands its conduct rested. I say this with no disrespect. In the American Civil War, in the Franco-Prussian War, in the First World War, war—in the words of Colonel Nathan Forrest—was still largely a matter of getting there "fustest with the mostest." Firepower had increased over the years both in range and in the degree of physical destruction that could be caused. The tank had increased the possibilities of mobility in the face of enemy fire. Chemical warfare, in spite of its limitations, was a clear-cut and understandable procedure that nearly broke the static conditions of trench warfare. In general, the strategists and tacticians of the First World War

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were still operating with weapons they could understand over ranges they could, in effect, see, and in accordance with the hallowed military principle of the economy of force.

With one minor qualification, the First World War was thus historically still a period of balanced military forces and balanced weapons systems. The balance lay essentially in the control the commander could exercise over his troops and weapons, the consequences of whose use were also within his comprehension, and potentially, therefore, within his control. I can see no other possible useful meaning to the term "balanced military force."

My one qualification to this generalization was the emergence of air warfare. This was the germ which destroyed the traditional frame in which the military commander had hitherto exercised his judgment and control. Out of the first aircraft grew a weapons system whose striking power was to leap well ahead of the capacity to apply destructive force specifically for the elimination of what it is still both useful and wise to call "military targets." The aircraft was thus as much a leap into the dark as into the air.

In comparison, the submarine, when it first appeared, was a weapon whose effects could be envisaged without difficulty. Submarines certainly imposed a new threat, but it was one which was understandable and technically manageable, given a detection system, depth charges and the intelligent deployment of surface shipping and anti-submarine forces. In its traditional sense, it was—I use the word "was" deliberately, for it is different now that submarines have become launching platforms for ballistic missiles—a weapons system which was posed against specific but mobile targets. The aircraft was something quite different. Able to penetrate deeply into enemy territory, it could achieve effects the consequences of which were unpredictable, and certainly outside the framework of the airman's experience.

I do not know how it was in other countries, but we in Britain —to illustrate my point—entered the 1939–1945 war with highly unrealistic estimates of the capacity of aircraft to find their targets, and of the destructive power of the bombs they dropped. Equally, we either underestimated or overestimated the resilience of people under attack, or the economic consequences of our strategic attacks, or the functional significance of different target systems. We had to learn the hard way. We had to learn to treat air operations as an empirical experience, the results of which had to be analyzed with a strict respect for scientific dis-

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cipline if the next set of plans was not to perpetuate the errors of those preceding it. Because the results of our air plans were not analyzed in this way during the first half or so of the war, at the start they did, in fact, often merely perpetuate errors. Submarine warfare, too— on the scale it was waged during World War II— became a matter for analysis of a kind different from what had gone before. In short, war was becoming extremely complicated technically. Scientific analysis, in consequence, became as powerful an intellectual tool as the more traditional kinds of military intelligence. And sometimes it was far more valuable and reliable.

Operational analysis was thus born out of the need generated by the interaction of a variety of complex problems resulting from the intrusion of modern technology into the military environment. In essence, and at its simplest, it was no different from the methods by which industry had improved its operations over the years. It came late into the military sphere, because the military world until then was a more conventional world, one less amenable to directional change than the continuously competitive world of commerce and trade. Then three varieties of operational research emerged.

The first category can be described as the analysis—observational and experimental—of the technical and military problems relating to the introduction of new weapons and techniques. The advent of radar is the classic example of this category of operational research. If radar was going to work, civilian scientists had to be brought into the military machine. And if the civilians were to discover how to work radar, they had to become operational researchers, or operations analysts, in order to see how the new apparatus could be fitted into a military context. Other examples of this category of operational research can be found in the field of electronic counter-measures and in the logistics of supply.

The second category of operational research dealt with the tactical consequences of the interaction of new and complex weapons systems and technologies. It concerned itself with the scientific appraisal of new situations in warfare resulting from the threat imposed by these weapons systems. Anti-submarine warfare is the classic example of this kind of operational analysis.

The third category of operational research consisted in the analysis of the way military plans—both strategic and tactical—unfolded in actuality, as opposed to how they were supposed to work. It was in this kind of operational analysis that I was par-

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ticularly interested, and which I had the opportunity to develop as a result of my association first with Admiral Mountbatten, at that time Chief of Combined Operations in the United Kingdom, later with General Norstad, then on the staff of General Spaatz in the Mediterranean Area, and then with Air Chief Marshal Tedder in northwestern Europe.

No opportunity of analyzing operations in relation to their stated purpose was afforded us until early 1943, when the Axis forces were driven out of the Western Desert and North Africa. As the British armies advanced, studies were made of Tripoli and of other targets of air operations. The bomb damage as seen on the ground, and as recorded by the civil authorities at the time, was compared with the operational planning of, and intelligence reports on, the attacks which had caused the damage.

Essentially, what was being done was to treat each operation as one might an experiment of a very crude kind. How closely did what was achieved correspond to what we had set out to do? Why were intention and effect not always the same? A much more direct experimental approach was followed in planning and in executing the operations which led to the capture of the island of Pantellaria in 1943 and in analyzing them afterward—work in which I was closely associated with General Norstad. The lessons learned from this operation were then applied in 1944 to the pre-D-Day offensive against the coastal defenses of northern France. Similarly, the lessons learned from a detailed analysis of the functional effects of attacks on the railway system of Sicily and southern Italy provided the basis for the 1944 plan to destroy the communications network of northwestern Europe. Subsequent analysis fully confirmed all the expectations that had been based on the experience gained in the Mediterranean. However, there was little opportunity for this kind of analysis of field warfare—largely, I think, because it moved too fast for the results, when they became available, to be applied; also, the situations in field warfare were infinitely more varied than in either air or sea war.

I am emphasizing this aspect of operational research because its purpose is also that of the new school of operational analysis which is trying to achieve its objectives by theoretical and abstract reasoning, aided by recourse to various mathematical treatments of the concept of probability.

But before I discuss this new aspect of modern operational

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analysis, let me refer to another and simpler postwar variant of operational research as it applies in the military field. This is the kind of systems operations analysis that is carried out before one starts developing a weapons system for some definable purpose. It considers the operation of component sub-systems not only within themselves but also in their relation to other sub-systems. For example, a sophisticated air-defense system requires ground radar and associated data-handling systems. It needs command links. And these in turn have to be tied in with the active or passive elements which are deployed to deal with the actual attack.

Obviously, the only thing that matters is: "Can the whole system deal with the attack?" If the strike component of the defense is too slow, it does not matter how efficient the radar system is—and so on. Within the limitations imposed by such factors as range and response time, extent of cover, and—dare one say it?—financial cost and lead time, each part of the whole must be designed for optimum efficiency in order to achieve one end result.

Compared to what goes on in an actual battle, this should be a relatively simple problem for the operational analyst. The requirements seem precise enough; the parameters in the equations seem measurable; everything is as it should be for the mathematical and statistical analysis of an extremely complicated situation. In fact, one cannot do without this kind of extrapolated, theoretical operations analysis. But let us be honest with ourselves. The number of times this kind of systems analysis has come up with the wrong answers—by which I mean encouraged the development of the wrong systems—provides a warning that theoretical operational analysis is only an aid to, and not a substitute for, human judgment.

VI

Now let me turn to the more abstract form of operational analysis which has emerged over the postwar years. It deals with what has been called "the mathematizing of thought processes," and is based upon "game theory," which burst upon the world a few years ago. Protagonists believe that this form of operational analysis can contribute materially to "decision making" in the fields of strategy and tactics. The issues with which it deals, then, are among the most important which face Western man today—deterrent strategy and nuclear warfare in particular. Upon its conclusions—so we are told—are based certain of the most important

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decisions which have been taken in determining the defense posture of the United States in the strategic field, as well as some of the predetermined decisions which would be taken if deterrence ever failed.

I do not pretend to understand the intricacies of either the mathematics or the logical symbolism one finds in the writing of the game theorists. As I understand it, game theory is based upon the interaction of sequences of probabilities. It is assumed—to oversimplify the basic case—that you can calculate from a move made by an opponent at chess which of several possible moves open to you is the best—and so on to victory. In the next remove, it is assumed that you can make this best choice even when one randomizes one's opponent's moves. As a result, decision makers, we are told, can "optimize their solutions" even in the most complicated situations. This should undoubtedly be true in some cases—at any rate in theory—for example, in such problems as choosing where best to build a road, or which of several ways is the cheapest and best to build a nuclear reactor of a given type.

Certain parts of the very wide areas with which the calculations of the strategic game theorists deal are undoubtedly amenable to the most rigid treatment by formal logic and by means of probability statistics or mathematics, and the conclusions which emerge are fully valid over the part of the field to which they relate. What worries me is the fact that the total situation with which the theorists deal also contains extremely broad parameters of so qualitative a nature that no one could attribute numerical values to them. Some of these parameters are among the most important issues with which the game-theory strategists pretend to deal—if not the most important. For example, they include such matters as the enemy's intentions, as well as his strength and capacity; the resolution of our people; the capacity of a country to restore itself economically when it has suffered a degree of devastation well beyond anything that lies within human comprehension—let alone experience—and other matters equally vague. These are vitally important issues. But they are not numerical issues, and probably never could be made such, even if they were ever to come within our experience.

I have already said that some of the more empirical results of the analysis of operational planning in the Second World War were subsequently used in the planning of new operations. What I did not say was that this took place only after considerable

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energy had been spent in persuading people that what had happened had indeed happened, and that experience was as useful a basis for the elaboration of future plans as was wishful thinking. Since this was so 20 years ago in a less rapidly moving technological age, what I, as a scientist, would like to know now is what weight would a commander really attach—when the moment of decision came—to the new kind of abstract operational analysis as an aid to his judgment?

Mathematical conceptions of probability clearly have real value in experimental situations when they relate to precise issues. But the more qualitative and non-numerical—the more human—the factors that are played into the system, the less precise and, indeed, the less meaningful become the estimates of probability that are churned out of the machine. One has to remember, too, that the social and political significance and weight of the different qualitative factors concerned in these strategic situations vary not only between themselves but also from moment to moment. Strategy, no more than politics, can be static.

The fact that the considerations of the new school of operational analysis do not violate the laws of physics or engineering seems unimportant to me. What is important is that, if our sophisticated preparations for possible tactical warfare link the latter more closely with the set-piece strategic deterrent, game-theory operational analysis may not be able to help the tactical commander in his hour of need. As I have said, estimates of probability become less valuable the less precise numerically the matters with which they deal become. Can this kind of operational analysis serve any purpose at all in the field of military judgment and command? Does it now? Can it ten years hence? These are vital questions to which commanders should—so it seems to me—address themselves.

I believe that some commanders are over-optimistic, and overgenerous, in what they imply about the scientific nature of the social sciences. I know of no philosopher of science, no student of scientific method, who would claim that the generalizations of the social sciences could ever be characterized by the same attributes of predictive value which apply to the natural sciences. The processes of war are essentially sociological phenomena—and like other such phenomena they certainly do not constitute the material out of which one can yet see a predictive science being born. It is conceivable that it might become such one day—as conceiv-

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able as the idea that "the thought processes can be mathematized." But if this involves, as I imagine it must, a prior understanding of the biochemical and biophysical nature of thought processes, that day is far away.

The validity of probability methods when applied to single events is an academic matter which has not yet been sorted out. The conclusions of the new school of theoretical military analysis are in essence based upon probability laws which apply to repetitive situations. If one decides wrongly about the use of nuclear weapons, we shall be in a situation which may never repeat itself, which may end the leadership of the Western world—win or lose—in one critical shot.

Before game theory burst upon a too-generous military world, Whitehead, a world-renowned philosopher and mathematician, had written:

> There is a curious misconception that somehow the mathematical mysteries of statistics help us to evade the proper limitations of the observed past. But statistics tell you nothing about the future unless you make the assumption of the permanence of statistical form. . . . Mathematics can tell you the consequences of your beliefs. For example, if your apple is composed of a finite number of atoms, mathematics will tell you that the number is odd or even. But you must not ask mathematics to provide you with the apple, the atoms, and the finiteness of their number. There is no valid inference from mere possibility to matter of fact, or in other words, from mere mathematics to concrete nature.[1]

If ever there was a world in which situations do not repeat themselves like some mass production model, it is the military world. If we are to avoid the imposition of arbitrary limits to the exercise of judgment and control, let us be careful not to create in a mathematical vacuum situations which are based neither on past experience of affairs, nor on any conception of the innumerable variables and factors that determine social decision either today or tomorrow. The human brain, human values, human judgments, are still superior to the mechanics and processes of electronic computers or guidance systems. The day this ceases to be true there will probably be no human brains. But until then, let us use true scientific method as an aid to human judgment—and not as a hindrance. Science *is* human experience; it is not an alternative to judgment, and it is certainly not something that can operate outside human experience.

[1] Alfred North Whitehead, "Adventures of Ideas." New York: Macmillan, 1933, p. 161.

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WHERE THE ITALIAN SOCIALISTS STAND

By Pietro Nenni

AMERICAN newspapers frequently describe the Italian Socialist Party in oversimplified terms. For instance, they say: (1) that it differs, for the worse, from the other Socialist parties of Western Europe; (2) that it is a copy of the Communist Party; (3) that it does not make much effort to exercise a democratic influence inside Italy; and (4) that in foreign policy it espouses the brand of neutralism often identified with the Soviet point of view.

Such criticism is heard in governmental circles and is widespread among the few socialist groups active in the United States, as well as in the labor unions. It may be useful for me to answer this criticism in as objective a manner as possible, making due allowance for the fact that for 40 years I have been leader of the party in question. As such I am not a disinterested witness or an historian; I am so deeply involved in the party's action that I may be mistaken as to its validity and effectiveness.

The Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.) does indeed differ from the other European Socialist parties. It is more strongly attached than most of them to the doctrine of scientific Socialism, that is, Marxism. It operates in quite different economic and social conditions, partly because the development of democratic government and a democratic way of life has been slower in Italy than in other countries.

The P.S.I. is 70 years old, having started in 1892, in the epoch when the major European Socialist parties all came into being. It arose in response to two distinct pressures, which have persisted throughout its history: the pressure of the rural population, especially in the south, and that of the working class in the north, which grew during the early years of the twentieth century along with big business and industry. It therefore had to satisfy two demands: the tumultuous, somewhat anarchistic demands of the associations of poor peasants and agricultural day-laborers (*braccianti*) and the demands of the factory workers' unions growing out of the modern class struggle.

Dissensions within the party were a reflection of these diverse elements, together with a third, the intellectuals. Disagreement

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was emphasized by the fact that the Italian Government acted as a sort of *carabinier,* with the function of defending private property against the rights of the workers. Italy was a country, too, which, although industrially backward, sacrificed money, human lives and the possibility of economic development to fighting a series of colonial wars, the first of them at the end of the last century, the second, leading to the conquest of Tripolitania, in 1911, and the third in Abyssinia, in 1935, under the Fascist dictatorship.

This is why the P.S.I. was so intransigent in the struggles of the last decade of the nineteenth century, why it constantly battled against militarism and colonialism, under the slogan "Not a penny or a man for the war in Africa." The fierceness of this battle, fought in the streets and in parliament, diminished somewhat in the years 1900–1910, with the growth of industry, the recognition of the right to strike and the beginnings of social legislation. In the years after the Tripolitanian war and the war of 1914–1918, the party became more intransigent, more revolutionary. In a theoretical sense it became more "maximalist," which means that it stressed the long-range and maximum aims of the party as opposed to "reformism," which emphasizes the immediate gains obtainable within the framework of a capitalistic society.

In 1914 the P.S.I. was one of the few European Socialist parties to oppose the war, and hence it did not share responsibility for the collapse of the Second Socialist International. When Italy entered the war in 1915, the party stuck to its neutralist convictions under the slogan, "Neither support the war effort nor sabotage it," and it gradually sharpened its stand as a result of its isolated position and the increasingly radical character of its philosophy. This attitude contrasted with that of other major Socialist parties from England to Germany, which adapted themselves to a policy of national unity—*union sacrée,* as it was called in France—and gradually let the spirit of out-and-out struggle against bourgeois society and its capitalist governments die out.

In 1919 the P.S.I. reaped the fruits of its battle against militarism and imperialism. It found itself unexpectedly powerful; it elected 156 deputies to parliament and came into control of local government in 26 provinces and over 2,000 towns.

But this moment of power was also a moment of error. Under

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the influence of its Communist wing, the party dribbled away its strength in disturbances and agitations aimed at bringing about a Bolshevik-type revolution which was not justified by the country's historical and social background and had no natural point of departure like the military disaster which engulfed the Tsarist régime in Russia. In Italy, the immediate postwar problem was how to achieve a democratic revolution and establish a modern republican government. In those tumultuous days it was not immediately possible to evaluate the new factor created by the emergence of a strong Catholic party, the *Partito Popolare,* forerunner of the present-day Christian Democratic Party, which elected 100 deputies to parliament and came into power in more than a thousand local governments, largely in rural districts. The upshot of the events of 1919–1922 was the collapse of liberal and constitutional government, the advent of Fascism and the tragic dictatorship of Mussolini, which lasted till 1943 and was carried over until April of 1945 in the self-styled "Social Republic" of Salo, named for the last-ditch Fascist capital during this final phase of the Second World War.

The foregoing will have made clear that the differences between Italian Socialism and Socialism in other European countries have had an historical basis. These differences persisted during the 20 years of the Fascist régime, so that it was said of Fascism, quite erroneously, that it was the expression of a superannuated horse-and-buggy society in a steam-engine world.

II

The P.S.I. is not, and never was, a copy of the Communist Party. This remains true though the differences between them in ideology and policy have taken varying forms and were diminished, although not abolished, by the fact that for two decades they had to take action in common against Fascism.

In Italy, as well as in the rest of Europe and in America, the Communist Party started in January 1921 as a secessionist movement from the Socialists. But whereas in other countries the scission arose from an irreconcilable divergence in doctrine and method, in Italy it seemed as if it were brought about by minor things, motives of form more than substance. There was disagreement, for example, as to the party's name, which the maximalist majority wanted to remain P.S.I., and as to the interpretation of some of the 21 conditions laid down by the second congress of

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the Third Communist International as the basis for an alliance with Moscow.

In Italy there was no time to ponder these things, for the split between Socialists and Communists coincided with the outbreak of Fascist violence, of which it was, somehow, both the cause and the consequence. The working-class movement found itself catapulted from the offensive position of 1920 back to the defensive position of 1921–22, and in these conditions the sharpness of the attack launched by the Communist minority against the Socialist majority made for weakness and disintegration.

At the end of 1926 the opposition parties were dissolved and the anti-Fascist press was wiped out. Thenceforth the factional dispute was relentlessly carried over, in prison and exile, into the underground struggle. This was the period when the Communist International evolved the theory of "social Fascism," especially in France and Germany, and thereby split the forces which were attempting to face up to the common enemy. This state of things continued until Hitler's rise to power, when Communist tactics switched from the concept of social Fascism to that of the "popular" or common front; and in 1935 this was elevated to the rank of dogma. A year earlier it had already begun to draw Socialists and Communists together, through the first pacts for united action signed in Paris between French and Italian Socialists and Communists.

This common cause, which lasted until the eve of the Second World War—that is, until the Nazi-Soviet agreement of 1939—fulfilled a common need, both offensive and defensive. After Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union it again came into being and grew in strength through the resistance movements and partisan guerrilla activities until the end of the war. The fall of Fascism created a situation diametrically opposed to that of 1922. The workers were united in their claims and stood in the forefront of a broad anti-Fascist movement embracing all the forces of both secular and Christian democracy.

A decisive factor in the Socialist-Communist rapprochement was the abandonment by the Communists (in an even more pronounced degree than by the Socialists) of the maximalist position. The Communists adopted a policy of participation in the government—sometimes participation at any cost and sometimes involving gross errors, the consequences of which are still felt today. This led to a new pact for unity of action signed in 1946.

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The basis for this pact was a common desire to avoid the mistakes of 1919 and also what was called the "Greek alternative," referring to what had happened in Athens when the Partisan and Communist movement made excessive demands, came into conflict with the British occupying forces and was crushed. The prospect of the same disaster hung over the democratic and workers' movement in Italy in relation to the British and American forces of occupation. Later on, after the controversy between Stalin and Tito, it became evident that although Communist tactics were intuitively sound in estimating what was and was not feasible, they were essentially part of the general Communist scheme to block the division of the world into two zones of influence, with Italy in the Anglo-American zone.

Awareness of this Communist aim was increasing in the P.S.I. when Saragat's withdrawal literally threw the Socialist movement into the Communists' arms. It took years of effort to rebuild the Socialist Party structure and to give it, toward 1953, a new political orientation. Day by day it became more necessary for the Socialist Party to follow an independent course of action, especially after the Twentieth Communist Party Congress's repudiation of Stalin in 1955 and the tragic events in Poland and Hungary in 1956.

The protest made at the Socialist Party Congress in Venice in 1957 was political rather than merely sentimental. The party contested the assertion that Soviet power had been weakened solely by the crimes, errors and "personality cult" of Stalin; and proceeding from there to matters of principle, it criticized the Communist conception of party, government, power and the construction of socialist society. In what happened in Hungary it saw confirmation of the fact that, for the Communists, successive experiments with a "popular front" were nothing but historical and tactical variations of the theme of domination and dictatorship by the Communist parties. This, rather than expediency or parliamentary tactics, was the basis of our condemnation of pacts for united action and of the "popular front," as also of the statement made during more recent P.S.I. congresses as to the impossibility of a joint Socialist-Communist effort to attain power on the governmental level. Thus after a long and very special sequence of historical events the two parties are back in a position which they would have assumed 40 years ago had not Fascism forced them into a common line of action.

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This position does not conflict with the defense of trade-union unity, which we Socialists not only wish to preserve in the General Italian Confederation of Labor but which we also seek to extend to the dissident Italian Confederation of Independent Labor Unions and Italian Workers' Union; nor does it impair our defense of the command posts held by workers in the various cities and provinces. The Communist majority in the trade unions is not a settled fact, but depends upon factors which changed circumstances may very well modify or even reverse. Meanwhile, the division among the union groups creates a weakness in the whole labor movement.

The P.S.I. is not, then, either a copy or a counterpart of the Communist Party. In the particular configuration of Italian society, its half-million members and its more than four million voters constitute a powerful element in support of the doctrine and ideals of modern Socialism. It has a makeup and a method all its own, well established for 70 years, wholeheartedly dedicated to the interests of the working class and of democracy.

III

The P.S.I. has made a large contribution in theory, action and initiative to the democratization of Italian society and the Italian Government. It has taken part in all the struggles for liberty and democracy in the last 70 years, often in the forefront of the battle, paying a heavy toll, even in human lives, for every advance of political democracy.

Thus there was a Socialist basis for the political struggle for the reconstruction of the nation which began in 1944 with the watchword "A Constitutional Assembly and a Republic." This struggle rallied all the democratic and labor forces of Italy and, after much parleying, won the support of the Christian Democrats as well. Although the Socialist Party mistrusted the pre-Fascist liberal groups it considered that collaboration with them was necessary both before and after the war in order to rebuild the country. In the governments which preceded the first general elections and the referendum on the question of Republic or Monarchy, it ran the special Ministry of the Constitutional Assembly and directed its studies toward writing a modern and republican constitution. After the elections for the Constitutional Assembly (June 2, 1946) where it emerged as the second largest political party, next to the Christian Democrats and ahead of the

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Communists, it made a noteworthy intellectual contribution to the formulation of the constitution itself. When the peace treaty was signed, it took over the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a platform of neutrality, a position that until 1948 was common to all the democratic parties, and took part in the efforts of various Ministries of Economic Affairs to work out a program for developing southern Italy and strengthening the national economy. It thus brought to the fore problems which are still seeking solution today.

As I see it, the democratic course of Italian politics was interrupted in 1947–48 by three events. First, the split in the Socialist Party brought about by the Social Democrats under Saragat lost it its primacy as the largest working-class party and handed this position over to the Communists. Second, Premier De Gasperi's trip to the United States, during which the Christian Democratic leader decided to make a turn to the right, was intended to weaken the Communists but in fact strengthened them. The third event was the upset of alliances in the international field and the beginning of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It was said then and has been repeated ever since that what led the Socialist Party to cross over to the opposition was that it was unwilling to take a position different from that of the Communists. This was not so. The Communists had not hesitated to take part in the second Bonomi government (1945), while the Socialists were in the opposition. And there was nothing to prevent the Socialists from collaborating with De Gasperi while the Communists opposed him. But two prerequisites were lacking. The collaboration would have had to originate in a context of Italian social and political realities instead of from a sudden anti-Communist prejudice which had no real psychological or political basis. The Italian political current should also have broken away from the influence of the Right; but instead, as time went on, the Italian political scene was increasingly dominated by the conservatives and, at certain moments, by the extreme right-wing Monarchists and Fascists.

In the light of the past 14 years we can see that the direction taken by Italian domestic politics in 1947, with the Socialist split and the turn to the right of the Christian Democrats, is the Italian aspect of a similar course of events in the world as a whole which thwarted hopes for a rapid development of democracy in

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a way that would absorb or isolate all forms of right-wing or left-wing extremism. In the 1948 elections the Christian Democrats had a startling triumph and won an absolute majority. But from this time on none of the fundamental problems of our society has been faced or resolved, and the military and civil establishments have returned to their old authoritarian and paternalistic ways. The electoral defeat of De Gasperi in 1953, shortly before his lamented death, bore witness to the fact that no progress had been made, and indeed that there had been a retrogression. Since then the country has been ruled by unstable and unenterprising center governments, often condemned to immobility or mere everyday routine administration, whether they were supported by the secular Left (the Social Democrats) or the Fascists of the extreme Right, until, as in July 1960, they brought the country to the verge of civil war.

For the past several years Italy's greatest problem has been how to get out of this situation. The solution lies in the possibility of direct or indirect Socialist collaboration with the Christian Democrats.

What Italian and also American newspapers call "Operation Nenni" has nothing so personal about it. It answers the demand for an "opening to the Left," which has been voiced by a majority of the people and by strong elements of both secular and Catholic democracy. Today the prospects for this opening are favored by propitious economic circumstances which, together with the new technical discoveries, have stimulated production in what can only be called a miraculous manner. The fact remains, however, that the recent economic boom has left behind it vast areas of poverty and backwardness in Southern Italy as well as in several central and northern provinces; there is an agricultural crisis and a serious imbalance between north and south, between city and country, which means that the nation is in constant danger of slipping downhill in case an economic recession should occur.

At its last party congress and again in recent weeks the P.S.I. has declared itself ready to support a new parliamentary majority and a government with leftward tendencies, even though conditions are not such that it can participate in the government itself. A fresh program and a break with the Right—these are the necessary conditions for winning its support. The problem is now being debated in Italy. The situation is rendered particularly thorny by the breakup of the former Centrist government majority and

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the reluctance of the Christian Democrats to demonstrate their characteristic flexibility by executing a turn to the Left instead of, as heretofore, to the Right. During 1961 some progress has been made toward solving the problem in a number of cities—Milan, Venice, Florence and others—where the municipal governments include both the Christian Democratic Party and the P.S.I. The same is true, on the regional level, in Sicily, though the situation there is rather precarious because of the narrow party majorities and the particular social and economic background of that region.

IV

Now comes the question of neutralism. The P.S.I. is indeed neutralist and firmly believes in the validity of its foreign policy platform both from the national and the international point of view. Throughout its history it has opposed military pacts and alliances. This was true in the far-distant time of the Triple Alliance between Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary, which was based on dynastic rather than national interests. It was true at the time of the Rome-Berlin Axis, dictated by the Fascists, again contrary to the interest of the country as a whole. It was and is true in regard to NATO, which was subscribed to by the Italian Parliament for reasons of domestic rather than international policy. Conditions ten years ago were such as to guarantee that through a policy of neutrality both Italy's security and her capacity to contribute to world peace were assured.

Parliament decided otherwise; and we have never raised the question of withdrawal, for two reasons. First, because to do so would convict us of demagoguery; and second, because to withdraw under present conditions would jeopardize the European equilibrium, which though it is dangerously unstable does contribute to the maintenance of a truce between the two opposing blocs. We have tried and are trying to go beyond these military blocs and render them unnecessary, in order that the United Nations may become the sole and permanent meeting-place of all peoples and nations, where every international controversy can be discussed and resolved.

Why are we attacked, then, both in Europe and the United States, because of our neutralism, and accused of taking up the same position as the Soviets? Did we not as regards Hungary, Jugoslavia and even Berlin give ample proof of our independent judgment?

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I wish to make my answer to this question very clear because it lies close to my heart. If our neutralism is considered one-sided it is because of our struggle against colonialism and imperialism, a struggle in which the Soviet Union has obtained the greater successes while the European and American democracies have chalked up the worst failures. In China, South Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, North Africa, Cuba and other Latin-American countries, they have mistakenly bet on military adventurers or Fascist-type dictatorships; they have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in shoring up rotten situations doomed in any case to crumble; they have opened doors to the Communists instead of supporting democratic and socialist forces that would be capable of directing the impulse to freedom of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The same thing has happened in Europe: in Spain, Germany, France, Greece and Italy, recent administrations have leaned on right-wing elements. If the United States and the West European nations do not correct this error they are in danger of suffering still greater failures.

It is said that the lessons of history are taught in vain. By now Americans and Europeans alike should have learned that liberty and democracy are not served by seeking support among ultra-conservatives but by relying on those who espouse liberal and democratic ideals.

V

I shall conclude with a rapid survey of the principal international problems of the day and our attitude toward them. We believe that the United Nations must be made universal by recognizing the actual government of China in both the General Assembly and in the Security Council. We believe that the U.N. Secretariat should be organized in such a way as to take account of the relationships existing in the Assembly but without paralyzing its executive functions. No "troika," and no veto, but likewise no exclusions and stand-pat positions based on prejudice.

We consider the failure to solve the problem of Germany one of the greatest international errors of the past 15 years. The problem is not purely German; it is not merely, to put it bluntly, a matter of free elections; it includes factors of world equilibrium and European security which cannot be ignored. Twice in a quarter of a century the militarism of the German ruling class has plunged Europe and the world into war; twice the United States

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has had to intervene in order to prevent pan-Germanism from extending its rule world-wide. Europe and the rest of the world, too, are right to be on their guard against the German peril. It is an error, however, to believe in the efficacy of dividing Germany into two parts, or, as Khrushchev jokingly says, into 250. Germany territorially divided is even more under the control of the militarists than a unified Germany. But a unified Germany must be neutralized and disarmed, in a context of other disengaged and denuclearized powers, along lines something like those proposed in Poland by Foreign Minister Rapacki, in England by Hugh Gaitskell and in the United States by George Kennan.

In these circumstances the Berlin problem should be considered merely one aspect of the wider problem of Germany. After Khrushchev's speech to the Twenty-second Party Congress the threat of a unilateral solution has faded and there seem to be increased possibilities for a Soviet-American compromise agreement. The compromise should guarantee the freedom of West Berlin and its communications. It should bring down the wall recklessly erected by the Pankow Government through the heart of Berlin, where dramatic episodes are enacted every day—each the possible cause of tragic provocations. It should include an international guarantee of the frontiers established by the armistice with Germany (and also the Oder-Neisse frontier). It should make use of whatever recognition is given to the *de facto* existence of two Germanys not in order to sanction it as something permanent but in order to work out the conditions for eventual reunification.

A Berlin compromise should further be an occasion for a resolute step forward in the fundamental question of disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons. In this connection, and whether the talk is of atomic or super-atomic bombs of 50 or 100 megatons, we make no distinction between American and Soviet weapons; we condemn both as an intolerable threat to humanity, and in the same way that we considered the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing to be completely unjustified.

The whole matter is quite clear: either these problems are resolved or we shall have war. My optimistic conclusion is that from the dilemma facing the world we shall advance toward a solution. For this to come about we must consider that the consolidation of peace is more important than the power interests of nations and military blocs.

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TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Caryl P. Haskins

ON August 6, 1961, Major Gherman Stepanovitch Titov circled the earth 17 times, traveling at 18,000 miles an hour in an elliptical course which took him at maximum altitude about 160 miles into the stratosphere. For 25 hours and 18 minutes he traveled in regions until then unfathomed. In considerable discomfort he endured a prolonged state of weightlessness, hitherto known in all of human history only as a relatively fleeting experience to a handful of men. When Titov finally ejected himself from his four-and-one-half-ton vehicle and parachuted to earth he had set an all-time high mark in exploration.

There were a number of things of particular interest about the flight of Vostok II beyond the human daring and impressive technical ingenuity demanded for its accomplishment. One was its timing. A week later came the sealing of the border of East Berlin; 25 days later, on August 31, the Soviets announced their resumption of nuclear testing; 26 days later, on September 1, the conference of "nonaligned" nations convened in Belgrade. On that day, also, Major Titov, speaking to a large crowd of citizens of East Berlin on the Marx-Engels Platz, less than a mile from the border of West Berlin, pointedly remarked that the Soviet rockets that had propelled him into outer space could likewise deliver nuclear warheads to any point on the globe. Further, as almost his last action before being closed into his spaceship, Major Titov had dedicated his flight to the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party scheduled for October.

This constellation of events underlines with fresh immediacy the lessons already brought home by the history of Soviet space achievement since October 1957 when the first space satellite was placed in orbit. It gives force to the observation that outstanding technical achievements can be extraordinarily powerful in cementing a people's sense of solidarity, in augmenting its confidence, in reinforcing its pride, its verve, its sense of national identity. It also emphasizes anew how closely and skillfully the knot may be drawn between impressive technical organization, accomplishment and initiative in exploration on the one hand and a grand design of power on the other. It demonstrates how

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effectively in Soviet hands a spectacular technology may be made to implement a many-sided psychological offensive, ranging from cajolery to indirect blackmail to direct threat, all added to and at the same time detracting from the genuine excitement and admiration which the feat should alone have inspired. The dispatches from London, Paris, Bonn, New Delhi, Tokyo on the following day left no doubt that the event had been fully appreciated by the free world in its various significant aspects.

Further evidence of how closely linked technical and political planning can be in the Soviet Union, and of how excellence in a special, appropriate technology may be oriented to serve the political offensive, is suggested by a comparison of Soviet and American programs over the past several years in space research as distinct from large-scale space engineering. Since the beginning of the space age, the United States has placed in orbit some 45 satellites designed primarily for the gathering of scientific data about conditions in outer space. Some 13 have been launched by the Soviet Union. It would appear that such neglect of the scientific investigation of space, implied by this relative inattention to research satellites, could, in the long run, seriously hamper development; American satellites are producing information of the highest value, pertaining among other things to levels of radiation in space—information which must be essential in the planning of any manned space travel in the future. Such a conclusion may well be mistaken, however, for at least two reasons. The first is the impressive capability of the Soviet Union to marshal resources for research in very many areas and with excellent efficiency once it is decided that it is more economical, in terms of the objectives sought, to do such research than to borrow from abroad. Again, Soviet inattention to research in favor of an apparent concentration on more conspicuous technology has a familiar historical ring in some other areas of development—for example, the earlier history of Russian aeronautics after A. N. Tupolev and N. Y. Zhukovsky joined forces in 1918 to launch the Central Aerodynamics Research Institute (TSAGI) and the Zhukovsky Air Academy. In initiating the first consistent and relatively large-scale programs in the field of flight, they, too, demonstrated how much an ability to keep abreast of technical developments in other countries, to adapt them effectively and dynamically to specific ends, to plan over long periods with endurance, tenacity and singleness of purpose may compensate

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over the short run for the comparative neglect of disinterested research. On the other hand, all experience suggests—and we shall do well to bear this continually in mind as a cardinal principle—that such a pattern can be productive only in the short run, and that we could emulate it only at inadmissible cost, not only to our own progress but to our whole pattern of scientific and technical well-being, self-confidence and self-respect.

This contrast of approach, indeed, must drive home with special force one of at least three great lessons taught anew by the flight of Vostok II and the circumstances surrounding it. It is the lesson that there are few things more precious to us than our autonomy, our balance, our pluralism—in technology and science no less than in other aspects of our national being. There could be no more fatal error than to suppose that, because the U.S.S.R. has grown in an extraordinarily short time from a technically backward society to a technically very powerful state, the attitudes and operating patterns by which this was accomplished have *per se* a special validity for ourselves. To imagine, moreover, that the most exciting, vital and enduring aspects of our own scientific effort necessarily have any pragmatic bearing whatever upon affairs economic or military, or should necessarily even be undertaken in their service, would be to abandon one of our precious avenues of growth—to negate, indeed, one of our major sources of spiritual strength. It will take wisdom and tenacity, in the face of the threats that beset us, to remember, and constantly to act upon, such cardinal truths.

But to maintain faith in our own way is not enough. To emphasize the importance of cultivating one's own garden in one's own pattern is not to be fully satisfied with the effectiveness of the garden or its crop. And we can never forget the none-too-subtle coupling of science and technology with military power, to which Major Titov called specific attention in Berlin, and which the circumstances surrounding his flight have emphasized.

Sputnik I stimulated a noteworthy series of innovations and improvements in the organization of science within the American Government—the most important, probably, which had occurred since World War II. Among them were the strengthening of the President's Science Advisory Committee and its reconstitution within the White House; the creation of the post of the President's Science Adviser and its subsequent increase in significance, especially in the current Administration; the establish-

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ment of the Federal Council of Science and Technology; the increased scope and significance of the Federal support of research, as in the National Science Foundation, and in the conduct of research within the Federal agencies, as in the National Institutes of Health, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Space Agency.

But problems concerning the organization, appreciation and use of science and technology at the Federal level remain, and Vostok II has given them new emphasis. Further developments in the structure, the range of duties, the modes of work of the President's Science Advisory Committee are clearly called for, and indeed are inevitable. The position of the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology itself may need some redefining to increase its scope. Further improvements are urgent to equip the Departments to deal with scientific and technical matters. The creation of the Office of the Director of Defense Research in the Department of Defense has been most encouraging. Despite recent innovations, it may be fairly said that within the Department of State there is still a less-than-satisfactory level of scientific competence. The problems are especially urgent and complex in the foreign-aid agencies, which have still some distance to go in exploiting the tools which science and technology could bring to their planning and operations.

Finally, one of the most critical and difficult issues of domestic policy in the field of science and technology will be posed in the implementation of the expanded Project Apollo, which aims to put a man on the moon by the close of the decade. Much of the basic strength and symmetry of the national scientific effort over the next few years may depend upon the way in which the claims of concentrated programs in a vast but specialized technical field can be balanced against the broader requirements of research and training which are vital to the continuing scientific health and growth of the nation. For Project Apollo will be even more demanding of highly trained manpower than it will be of funds. The issue, moreover, is critical beyond the arena of domestic policy; it is also deeply involved with aspects of foreign policy, in ways to be considered.

II

A second lesson posed by the flight of Major Titov and all its attendant circumstances is that of the vital importance of the scientific and technical health and growth and solidarity of the

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community of Western Europe as an absolute condition of survival over the coming decades. The challenge is indeed to the vigor and quality of research within each nation. Even more, however, it is to their combined and coördinated capacity and to the confidence and sense of capability that such capacity can bring to the community itself. For regardless of energy and will, it is clear that no one member alone in the coming years can muster the strength or command the universality to meet the challenge independently. Nowhere, indeed, is the charge on both the wisdom and the coherence of the free world more severe than in the area of its combined science and technology.

Of special interest in this connection are the recent appeals by highly placed European officials for an integration of some major Western European technological concerns within the structure of NATO and the formation of an agency empowered to contract for research and development projects throughout the area. Whatever its specific nature, an important focus of such coördination and institutional strengthening might well lie in the office of the Science Adviser to NATO. A core has been developed here in recent years from which a significant structure of adequate size and character could well evolve. Currently the North Atlantic Council of NATO, with its Science Committee, is empowered to award grants for scientific research in the member nations on the order of a million dollars annually. This small but significant sum permits the office of the Science Adviser to act, in effect, as an international science foundation. In 1960, the NATO Science Fellowship Program was provided with $1,750,000 in international funds, and a NATO Advanced Study Institute Program has made a start with about $200,000.

Such developments are obviously minuscule, yet they represent a beginning in forwarding close coöperation in the fields of science and technology among the nations of Western Europe. Upon this, much could conceivably be built. In so doing great strength may be derived from the very existence of such "working" structures of international science as the European Organization for Nuclear Research in Switzerland (CERN), currently operating on a budget of almost 68,000,000 Swiss francs and conducting a flourishing program in high-energy physics which could well be expanded further; and by such technical groups as the Training Center for Experimental Aerodynamics (TCEA) in Belgium, which has made available to all the NATO nations

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equipment for research and facilities for education on a considerable scale.

Not to be forgotten, either, are various efforts and plans for the establishment of international universities: the University of the Middle East in Turkey, aided with financial support from the United Nations; the European University which has been under study by the Community of Six; and an Atlantic Institute of Science and Technology, which has been suggested as an international scientific university comparable in scope and quality with the best in the United States. These are ambitious and inherently difficult undertakings. Yet they need not reach the impressive goals set for them in order to be important. Even a small institution could have significance if planned and conducted with vision, administered in a way to avoid conflicts with important national interests, and designed to strengthen rather than compete with the best national programs of education. Also, students must be encouraged to return to their own countries at the end of their terms of residence, and, if the institution does not seem promising after a reasonable trial, then the venture should be terminated.

Last but by no means least, the newly established Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development may have an important contribution to make to the scientific unity of Western Europe, especially in relation to technical and scientific assistance to the new nations.

The ultimate strength of such coördinated structures of science and technology must depend on the quality of its components, and that will be strongly conditioned by patterns of scientific and technical education. In many Western European nations, programs of scientific education are of high quality in a substantive sense. But some of them are quite inadequate to the requirements of modern competitive technology. There is clearly a particular need to further improve scientific secondary education, despite encouraging progress in recent years, and often to extend it in time. In many European nations there is still a serious shortage of qualified teachers of science and technology, especially at the secondary level. A variety of specific conditions needs to be remedied. In France, for example, a high proportion of gifted students who enter the national schools of engineering because of the attractive careers to which such training leads graduate thence into engineering positions where their talents may be perma-

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nently lost to science and technology. In the Netherlands and in Italy it may be fairly said that professorial salaries are too low. The West German system of education nourishes outstanding individuals, but still makes inadequate provision for team research.

In the last ten years, the output of trained scientists and engineers in many countries has expanded by 25 to 50 percent. This apparently promising increase, however, is quite insufficient for the competitive conditions of the contemporary world. In the United States the annual rate for the production of engineers, tallied without reference to quality, is about 200 per million of population. The Soviet Union produces about twice as many. But the output of the European Economic Community has averaged only about 70 per million per year—a figure that is far too low, and should surely be corrected.

A part of the answer to these deficiencies—though clearly only a part—is economic. Both Great Britain and the United States currently invest about 2 percent of the Gross National Product in the fields of science and technology, generally defined, and devote about a tenth of this sum to fundamental research. Experience suggests that these are desirable goals of expenditure provided that the human and material resources for scientific and technical education, research and development are adequate to use the funds effectively.

There is undoubtedly much that the nations of Western Europe can do to strengthen their own scientific resources, both individually and in combination. There are abundant opportunities here for effective American aid if it can be given with a proper sense of the sharp limitations of our own vision and capacity. We must constantly keep in mind that a true internationalism in science and technology among the industrial nations of the West means far more than a simple exchange of information, far more than coördination of research programs in international administrative bodies, far more, even, than the training of scientists from many nations in international universities, or their subsequent careers in international research centers or engineering establishments. All these activities, important as they are, can serve only as means to promote a working expression of the internationalism that is an inherent substantive quality of science—a quality upon which the structures of scientific knowledge itself are founded. Failures of communication among peoples inheriting a

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common scientific tradition must perforce be reckoned as failures in the very processes of scientific understanding, and, at a yet deeper level, as failures in realizing an essential quality of scientific verity. So the only final goal of coöperation among the nations of Western Europe which can have real meaning in terms of scientific understanding, as well as of the pragmatic challenges of the day, must be of a more profound kind. It must involve an interpenetration of scientific concerns at a very deep, substantive level along those multifarious frontiers of knowledge which today make the pursuit of science one of the most compelling of all intellectual pursuits—visual and radio astronomy, high-energy physics, geology and geophysics, communication theory, the mechanisms of heredity and of the differentiation and coördination of cells in the living body, and all the rest of those fascinating avenues of inquiry which reach far beyond the confining boundaries of human organization.

In no potential field of overseas assistance must scientific planning be more carefully meshed with educational, technical, economic and social considerations if the aid is to be truly effective and not merely a temporary stimulus, accepted at the risk of grave long-term imbalances.

III

A third lesson driven home by Vostok II was almost new in our experience. It was implicit, to be sure—yet hardly more than an implication—in the days of the first satellite launching four years earlier. The approximately 500,000,000 people included in the free nations of Western lineage, comprising perhaps a sixth of the world's population, constitute a fraction that is critical in terms of science and technology, far beyond its numerical proportions. It is a fraction, moreover, bonded together in fundamental ways by the historical sharing of the cultural experience symbolized by the scientific revolution from Copernicus to Newton to our own day. These nations hold the formal precepts of that revolution in common and, beyond that, share its concepts of the essential nature of the universe.

But it was probably not to this sixth of the world's population that the flight of Vostok II and the intense and highly coördinated publicity that accompanied it were primarily directed. Titov also spoke to the substantial portion of the remaining five-sixths of the world's population represented by the new nations.

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These are nationally conscious of their acute material needs and of the power of technology in the fulfillment of those needs, though without, in many cases, yet fully understanding the means or the requirements of technological or of scientific development. Titov could influence a tremendous audience which simply was not reckoned significant in the scales of world power in the First or Second World Wars, or in any adequate sense even later.

In 1945, 52 states had signed the Charter of the United Nations. By the autumn of 1961 the membership had risen to 103. A majority of the new nations are underdeveloped and their needs are starkly practical. The control of hunger, the conquest of epidemic disease, the elementary development of natural resources are obviously imperative for any adequate realization of their potentialities. They stand in acute need of appropriate and developed technologies. Today their demands on science must be addressed almost wholly to its pragmatic side. But it is not to be forgotten that tomorrow they will surely wish to participate in the continuing scientific revolution of the wider world outside their borders. As that time arrives, the problem of providing effective scientific and technical aid may become more subtle, and also, perhaps, more critical.

We are well placed to aid the new nations of the world with appropriate technologies to strengthen their economies, and few areas in the whole field of foreign aid can be more important in their implications. In this respect the matter seems relatively straightforward in principle, however massive and complex in practice. In fact, however, basic questions are involved which relate as much to underlying concepts as to matters of execution. Some of the most formidable of these cluster around judgments as to what constitutes true relevance in the technologies that are sought by the new nations or that we seek to bring them. Clearly, the simpler and more elementary fields are likely to be most relevant. We should generally be wary of complex and striking technologies which may promise more than they can accomplish, bringing an initial rise in expectations to be followed by disappointments which can be disillusioning and dangerous. Techniques claiming the highest priority will be those bearing upon food production, including agronomy and crop and animal improvement and soil science; those for estimating, prospecting and extracting minerals and renewable resources; those for civil engi-

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neering, urban planning and the development of appropriate and available energy sources.

But there are other important criteria of relevance. The scarcity of capital in the new countries demands that technologies in any field carry the lowest capital and development costs consistent with their effectiveness, and that, moreover, they require the shortest possible span between investment and return. The characteristic abundance of manpower relative to capital in the new nations requires that relevant technologies maximize the productiveness of existing manpower rather than conserving it by replacing manpower with machines. Thus in food production, for example, technologies should be directed particularly toward securing an increase in yield per acre rather than in output per man.

The knowledge on which these relevant technologies are based clearly does not lie at the frontiers of Western scientific advance. Indeed, there is probably more basic information appropriate to the needs of the new nations presently available than can effectively be put to use for many years to come. The problem here is not of research, but in a sense one more formidable. It is a problem of discovery, of sensible and sensitive selection, and, above all, of adaptation to the peculiar and individual requirements of each nation, people and region.

In most of the new nations there will be at least a few men generally familiar with technical matters who can seize upon the world's store of technical knowledge, can with some assistance abstract appropriate elements from it, and, under favorable circumstances, can adapt such elements successfully to the needs of their countries. Where the corps of such men is adequate in numbers and relatively sophisticated in outlook, the task of aid may be primarily to make sure that the appropriate information and the means for implementing it are at their command and that any advice which may be helpful and welcome is provided. This is a serious undertaking in itself, and calls for a high order of skill and subtlety. But it is not, basically, an unfamiliar task.

In far too many cases, however, technically sophisticated personnel are still extremely rare in the new nations. It is of the highest importance that their numbers be augmented as rapidly as possible through appropriate secondary training, bearing always in mind the great importance of breadth in training and the dangers of narrow specialization. So vital is this objective that it

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must be achieved even, if necessary, at the cost of short-term sacrifices in education at the primary and the university levels, and even at the cost of postponing the goal of universal literacy.

Where adequately trained manpower is wholly lacking, the challenges upon us to provide effective technological aid are grave indeed. For then a preponderant share of the burden of selection, adaptation and introduction must rest upon the donor, and the effectiveness with which these things are done will largely determine the success of the enterprise. There is an acute need for improving the quality of our technical assistance, and most particularly the caliber and training of those associated with its ministration. For lack of skill and of effective effort can spell disaster more serious than if the effort had never been undertaken.

We are not at present sufficiently equipped or practiced to be at all certain of meeting this demand well, and it is of great importance that we become so. Few challenges to the whole pattern of our foreign aid will be more severe than this. The field bristles with practical pitfalls. There is not only the danger of offering too advanced, too glittering, or otherwise poorly adapted technologies. There is the equally grave danger of forgetting that in all programs of technical aid an indispensable element must be the social will of the recipients to develop their own technical frontiers. Without it, without a tolerant and helpful political climate, technical aid is all too likely to bring in its train the same hazards that we have come to associate with monetary aid similarly applied. It is important to recall in this connection that among present or past political leaders of the new countries only those of India and of Israel have had extensive scientific training.

Finally, we must keep in mind the relatively high capital costs involved in the development and application of even simple technologies. Often enough such capital expenditures, of the most legitimate and indeed essential kind, will fall hopelessly beyond the economic capacities of the less developed countries. They are, moreover, bound to continue over a considerable period, which requires assurance of continuity at the outset if they are to appear acceptable to responsible statesmen. Now as already noted, the advanced technologies which the industrial nations may expect to evolve at ever-mounting pace over the coming years are not likely to be of great assistance to the newer countries until these have themselves achieved a roughly comparable technical, scientific and industrial civilization, with its broadened economic

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base. Until then, such technologies may actually widen rather than narrow existing economic gaps. Failure on either side to remember this can easily lead to dangerous errors and bitter disillusionment. This is one of the strongest arguments for the requests for the authorization of large-scale—and most importantly for long-term—aid funds at low interest rates recently sought and in part secured by the Administration.

Besides abounding in hazards, this aspect of foreign technical aid also poses squarely some far-reaching questions of internal policy. How, for example, does it bear upon the distribution of our internal technical effort? The implications reach quite as far as our own plans for the conquest of space. Which will ultimately be more impressive and useful to the new states—leadership on vast and spectacular and sophisticated frontiers of exploration and power, or demonstrated leadership in technologies more relevant to their own practical needs, coupled with genuine willingness and care and insight in making them available? Clearly there can never be a simple answer. Even the judgment of how we shall partition our efforts between such disparate extremes must vary with circumstances, and from year to year. But the flight of Vostok II has emphasized once again how constantly such matters must be kept in mind. We must continually remind ourselves that our scientific and technical resources are no more unlimited than our economic ones—that, indeed, they are far more limited and far slower and more difficult to build. For, comparatively wealthy as we are in both, we are not wealthy enough to do simultaneously all things well on the vast scale that the contemporary world demands.

IV

Vital as relevant technologies are for the new nations, in the end they will not be enough. In the long run, some, if not all, of the new nations will need an indigenous, living science of their own, however limited it may be in volume or in scope.

There are many reasons for this. The most practical and perhaps the least fundamental is that, as demonstrated by the whole history of the scientific revolution, technology cannot remain a vital and a growing thing in the modern world without continuing nourishment from the wellsprings of a living science. Without an indigenous science a new country must depend heavily and indefinitely upon borrowing if its technology is not to stagnate.

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Furthermore, since none can understand so well the subtle requirements and the new opportunities for technology within a particular country as the peoples who must actually employ it and live with its consequences, the effective adaptation even of borrowed technology to local use requires, in the most pragmatic sense, both a living and a practical indigenous science. It is probably no overstatement that, in the long run, a nation can be reckoned truly strong only if it possesses both a vital technology and a vital science in appropriate balance.

In a different vein, the ability to make independent, original contributions to the world's store of scientific knowledge has come to be a mark of progressiveness, and even fulfillment of national identity. The new nations are proud. They are entering a world where an indigenous science, however limited its scope, is a part of national greatness, an emblem of self-respect. How true this is has several times been demonstrated in Western Europe. Some technically and scientifically advanced nations have recently found themselves in positions where it would clearly have been more immediately economical to live on technology borrowed from outside—technology developed in many instances from scientific advances for which they themselves were originally responsible. Yet, they have decided, as a matter of policy, that to follow this easy and apparently frugal course would be to sacrifice elements of national morale, national self-respect and, in the long run, national autonomy. Many exceedingly interesting examples of this situation might be quoted—for instance, the British attitude toward continuing research in the field of plastics (polythene itself was a British invention) or in solid-state physics, despite the fact that the whole technical know-how of transistors is just as available to England as it is to the United States, where the device was invented—and at substantial savings in research costs. The emerging nations may be wise to take note of such experiences and decisions.

But in one sense these are all relatively shallow considerations. To assess those that are deeper and more compelling, it is necessary to review certain facets of the history of technology and of science. Modern historical research has demonstrated that many of our technologies are immensely old. It has revealed the striking and important fact that, closely as science and technology seem interwoven today, their origins were actually separated in place and time, and probably were of widely different character. The

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great initial developments in technology antedated the scientific revolution by several millennia, and, long before the first beginnings of a scientific revolution, some technologies had attained a remarkably modern cast. A genuine technological revolution, in fact, probably occurred coeval with the great prehistoric urban centers of Asia and Africa. The astonishing technical inventions of China between the first and eighth centuries A.D.—including paper, seismoscopes, wind gauges, the magnetic compass, explosives, printing with movable type—leave no doubt of the heights attained by Asian technical skill and inventiveness at a time when comparable European achievements were still of the most primitive kind. It seems probable, indeed, that the basis for a large share of European technical development was imported from the East.

Yet the scientific revolution in a proper sense, when it finally came, was peculiarly a phenomenon of Western Europe. At its outset, it hardly touched the East at all. Why this should have been true is one of the enigmas of history, for which many tentative hypotheses have been advanced. Its consequences for the modern day, and especially for the problems of the new nations, however, are wide and deep.

One obvious and highly relevant consequence is the fact that while the process of technological revolution is familiar everywhere, and the values and the essence of technology are generally understood, the historical experience of a scientific revolution is one from which virtually all the new nations of the eastern and southern hemispheres of the globe have until quite recently stood apart. Indeed, in large measure they have been spectators rather than participants in this strange phenomenon which has done so much to alter the whole cast of human experience. Now they are poised upon the edge of that transformation. Neither they nor we can predict precisely what it will mean. But there can be no doubting the depth and force it is bound to have. Moreover, since intellectual revolutions in general must be highly individual in all societies, it must be assumed that in no two nations will a scientific revolution take precisely the same form.

Certain features, however, adduced from the earlier scientific history of Western Europe, may be characteristic of science wherever it comes into being. One of these is the important fact that, closely linked as science is with both technology and with industry, and important as the partnership is in the modern in-

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dustrial nations, much of importance in science has always been essentially separate and independent of both. In its origins, science was closely linked with technology, and technology suggested many of the areas of its deepest concern. Yet for the first hundred years of its life there was relatively little of a practical nature that it could contribute to technologies already highly developed through centuries of practical experience. Science none the less flourished during this period, nourished by emotional and intellectual elements extending far beyond the sphere of practical concern. Its historical independence of industry is yet more marked. It is worth noting that in Great Britain, where the scientific revolution may be said to have first occurred, it antedated the industrial revolution by many years. The major steps in the transformation of the world view in British society from an essentially Ptolemaic concept of the universe to a Newtonian one came in the main—and very swiftly—between 1660 and 1700. The period of industrial "takeoff" in England, on the other hand, can be referred to the decades between 1783 and 1803, about a hundred years after the publication of Newton's "Principia." It is clearly not essential for a society to have attained a stage of considerable industrial or even of technical development in order to experience, and be profoundly affected by, a scientific revolution.

From these and similar considerations follow a number of less obvious reasons why the new nations must develop an independent science. Without some structure of indigenous, living science, they are likely to experience great difficulty in developing standards of judgment by which to apprehend the whole scientific "style" of the natural world. To distinguish between what is credible and possible and what is not, and to discriminate between the scientifically genuine and the scientifically deceptive, require continuing direct experience for their perfection. Without the capacity for making such judgments, a new nation must remain highly vulnerable in its contacts with the outer world. It will be vulnerable, indeed, even in its acceptance of technological aid proffered in the most disinterested spirit. But the greater danger is internal, for without such a sense of the world's scientific "style" informed judgments cannot be made in a whole field of critical matters at home. It was not idly that Solomon Caulker of Sierra Leone remarked during the recent Rehovoth Conference, "What we want from science is not prestige projects but the answers to our own witch doctors."

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But it is in the qualities of science as a structure of communication, of philosophy, of faith that we find the deepest reasons. Without a living science, the new countries will have no access to the cultural world fraternity that the fabric of scientific understanding implies. They will not share in the lofty concepts that form the priceless heritage of the scientifically literate peoples. They will be denied access to one of the significant assurances that there is an inherent logic, an underlying stability, unifying the currents of scientific and technical change that so alarmingly threaten to engulf them. In the politically bipolar world which they enter late as nations, the new countries stand in sore need of independent standards to which they may repair. Without a living science, one of the most fundamental, practical and accessible of those standards will be denied them. Without it, they are in some measure excluded from those international combinations, well exemplified in Western Europe, which in addition to all their practical benefits are so important in commanding the belief and confidence of peoples—especially those in smaller political units —and in evoking their verve and creativeness. Finally, an original science demands, as it also stimulates, the development of the critical and creative habits of mind that are essential to the leadership of the new nations in every field—the unfettered, flexible, empirical view so essential if the nations they lead are to survive and grow.

In one sense, the new countries should have a marked advantage as they enter upon their scientific and technical revolutions. They take the stage at a time when the basis of world scientific and technical knowledge is richer and more varied than ever before. To that extent we can properly expect their revolutions, if successful, to be even swifter than earlier ones, and the course to scientific maturity shorter. But the hazards, too, are greater. The new nations face the formidable difficulty of achieving an autonomous scientific effort of the first class in a world where the range of first-class scientific effort is already bewilderingly immense and the scientific competition cruelly severe. In addition, there are formidable obstacles of a practical sort—the difficulties of securing training for original scientific work where capital and institutions of higher learning are scarce, and of retaining the trained few at home, isolated as they must be among popular attitudes which at the outset may be uncomprehending of or even downright hostile to the scientific way. It is quite possible

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that in some cases it will take a generation to establish the means for training even a small core of qualified scientific workers. To establish international scientific programs and coöperative training centers among the new nations will demand similar energy and pertinacity.

There is much that we can do in detail to assist here, by means already moderately familiar, including aid in the overseas training of research workers and, probably more significantly, in establishing local institutes for scientific training. Institutes organized on a regional basis, to train students from neighboring countries, promise to be especially fruitful. We can assist also by expanding contractual arrangements between educational institutions in the new nations and American universities having special competence in appropriate areas. In addition, outstanding American teachers, administrators, scholars and research scientists can represent us in the new nations. And in various ways American scientific societies, notably the National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, can aid in establishing corresponding scientific organizations in the new nations. It would be hard indeed to overestimate the importance of such associations in promoting the earlier stages of a scientific revolution—a role in which they were predominantly important in the earlier stages of the scientific revolution in Western Europe. In similar vein, a *sine qua non* of a scientific revolution in its earlier stages is the social value attached to scientific eminence. This can be greatly enhanced by suitable international recognition of real scientific distinction wherever it may appear in the new nations. Traditionally the British Royal Society has played this role with discernment and skill. There is a great potential here.

V

But in the last analysis we shall need a far deeper understanding than we now possess of the essential nature of a scientific revolution in a nation newly awakened to scientific values. In no easier way can we attain to the wisdom required to render genuinely significant assistance.

It is true that in its details a scientific revolution must differ in each period when it occurs, and with each nation. Yet there are certain important characteristics that are likely to be constant, as earlier scientific revolutions vividly illustrate. The first is its

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cataclysmic nature. Though history makes evident that scientific revolutions are long in the making, and that typically they are initiated by a gifted few, the final period when the change affects a whole nation—the period of its greatest significance—is characteristically amazingly short. In the West it was not the theories of Copernicus nor the observations of Galileo nor the reasoning of Bacon that heralded the revolution, though they were critical in igniting it. It was, rather, the years following Newton, the years of the British Restoration, when the vision which had compelled the pioneers and the broader implications of their new ideas and attitudes suddenly infected a much wider public. It is hard indeed, at this remove, to comprehend the consuming hold of the Newtonian revolution when it suddenly took firm hold upon the imagination of a whole people. Within 40 years the outlook of an entire nation underwent a transformation more profound than wars or drastic political changes might have wrought. The fact that in less than a generation a people's world view was radically transformed seems especially significant for the new nations of today.

It may of course be properly asked whether a scientific revolution in a new country can ever have an impact comparable with that of the first revolution, when the whole scientific view of the world was new. The question must by its nature remain perpetually moot. But several considerations suggest that the impact today may not be too dissimilar. Many of the new countries may still be sufficiently insulated from the wider ranges of the new scientific knowledge so that its weight may not unduly dim their enthusiasm. Again, although the level of world scientific knowledge is high today, it is a serious question whether it is higher in relation to the challenges for the new nations than was the state of European technology in relation to early science in the days of the classical revolution.

Scientific revolutions may be long in the making—though of this we can by no means be sure—and it seems probable that they will be initiated by a rather small number of intellectuals who are apt to be young men. But when such revolutions culminate, they are likely to do so rapidly and with overwhelming effect. Internally, the social shifts which they entail must affect a nation deeply, destroying for the time being the precious margin of redundancy upon which societies in general, and traditional societies most of all, depend so heavily for their coher-

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ence and health, separating father from son in what will amount to different worlds.

During such times the new nations must be at their most vulnerable in their external relations as well as in their internal structures. Then especially they will need to guard against subtle as well as overt destruction or domination. And this will not always be easy, as guideposts will be at a minimum. In many cases, the critical apprehensions in scientific and technical matters, which only the experience of living through such a revolution can fully provide, will not have been adequately developed at the time they are most needed in making the hard choices which the revolution will inevitably impose. And yet the courses chosen at such times of upheaval may well have fundamental and lasting effects. The consequences of wrong choices will not be easily undone. And should such a scientific revolution fail at its critical point, widespread expectations are bound to be dashed and political attitudes may be dangerously affected.

At no point in its development will a new state need advice and wisdom more than at such a juncture, to enable it to pass through the turbulent period of maximum change as rapidly as possible and to handle itself as effectively as may be during the trying times. Will we be equipped with such wise advice? Will we be prepared to lend it with real effectiveness to any new countries truly seeking it?

We probably have to answer that we are very poorly prepared at present to serve in this way. Yet the assistance which we could provide simply through efforts to analyze and to understand would probably be more critical at such a juncture than any material technical aid that we could bring the new nations or than any detailed specific measures to forward scientific progress. In the final analysis, we probably know far less about the real nature of scientific revolutions even than we do of the nature of the economic or the industrial revolutions with which they are likely to be so closely associated. Like those movements, it is clear that scientific revolutions are enormously complex and that they rest upon a multitude of social and material prerequisites, many of which are not apparent in the present state of our understanding. Like economic and industrial revolutions, they are intimately interwoven with other qualities of societies to form a balanced, organic whole. There is far more to the nature of scientific revolutions than the substance of the science which they embody.

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To increase our ability to render scientific aid to the new nations the United States might constitute one or more advisory groups, preferably outside government but constantly in close touch with it and responsive to its needs, dedicated to a continuing major effort to understand such scientific revolutions as social phenomena and to give policy counsel concerning them. Such a group or groups should include representatives of many disciplines which can contribute to an understanding of the multifarious kinds of social change of which a scientific revolution is but one aspect, though an overwhelmingly important one. Moreover, they should be prepared for a long existence. The efforts to understand must be systematic and persistent, continually sifting the basic common denominators of experience from the more detailed aspects of less encompassing generality. The need for the advice of such a group or groups, if it can be effectively formulated, will continue to be acute through many years to come, as new nations approach the thresholds of their respective scientific revolutions and as the store of knowledge accumulates and analysis and judgment become more acute. The disciplines and the viewpoints comprehended in these studies are so various and divergent that communication itself will not be easy and can be developed only gradually.

An enterprise of this kind does not promise to be easy. At best, it is likely to require the passage of years to show substantial accomplishment. Yet we are not without models around which such an undertaking could be built, in the atmosphere of a university center dedicated to international affairs. Success would markedly increase our resources for comprehending forces which may well affect the configuration of world power in the years ahead. Never has such understanding been more vital than in the coming age, symbolized inevitably not only by space exploration but by an unparalleled depth and breadth of understanding of natural phenomena and a new order in their control. If in the end it should prove that the flight of Vostok II has stimulated these things among us, as that of Sputnik I stimulated our organization of scientific and technological concerns within our government, this might well, in the light of history, be reckoned its most significant contribution.

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TOWARD A NEW DIPLOMACY

By Chester Bowles

BEFORE the last war, the tasks of American foreign policy were comparatively well defined. Secretary Cordell Hull, with a Washington staff of less than 1,000, presided over our entire global diplomatic establishment from a building shared with the War and Navy Departments. The function of the 78 ambassadors and ministers stationed abroad consisted largely of reporting and analyzing the flow of events and representing the President in negotiations and ceremonial events.

Twenty critical years have changed this traditional pattern dramatically. As our responsibilities in world affairs grew, the task of our diplomacy became more complex and its instruments multiplied correspondingly.

For the ambassador, the transformation has meant a change of emphasis from discreet observation to active operations. In terms of budget and administration, the transformation has resulted in a 38,000-man Department of State, including the Foreign Service and the Agency for International Development (which accounts for 17,000 of the total). In addition, there are a Peace Corps, a Food for Peace program, a United States Information Agency, a Central Intelligence Agency, a variety of military programs and expanded overseas operations of the Labor, Commerce, Agriculture and Treasury Departments.

Moreover, we now have diplomatic missions in more than 100 countries, in addition to 166 consulates and consulates-general. In many of these posts the mission chief presides over what amounts to a cabinet. For instance, on the eve of World War II, our Paris embassy employed 78 people, including the staffs of four other agencies. Now it employs 700, including the staffs of 23 other agencies.

This extraordinary multiplication of activities and agencies reflects the complexity and interdependence of our modern world. Much of it would have occurred even if there were no Soviet challenge. Yet the increasing competition between our two societies, between the Soviet and the liberal-democratic approach to human development, has greatly hastened the process, and we know that this competition will be with us for the foreseeable future.

The challenge of our new age was initially—and understand-

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ably—interpreted by both the executive and legislative branches of our government as primarily a challenge to policy-making. But the development of an effective foreign policy is only the first step; we must also devise effective means to carry it out. And this challenge to our instruments of policy, to the organization, administration and operation of our efforts at home and abroad, has only recently begun to be appreciated and acted upon.

The lag between need and performance was understandable. For World War II brought the development of a vast array of special agencies and commissions to cope with new problems on a piecemeal, *ad hoc* basis. At the end of the war, some of these agencies vanished, some were absorbed and some were grudgingly accepted on a temporary basis in altered form. Because we were reluctant to face the greatly increased demands of the postwar world, we told ourselves that these recent manifestations of our national effort were designed to meet short-term commitments; that in a few years' time the problems would be mastered and we could somehow return to normal. As a result, improvisation took the place of long-range planning, and our expanded overseas activities were often characterized by overlapping programs, fuzzy lines of authority and a serious lack of coördination.

In some countries the damage was limited to a certain amount of digestible waste, confusion and delays. But in others, the ambassador, the aid administrator, the public information officer, the chief of the military mission and other officials found themselves working at cross-purposes in conditions of near anarchy.

Item: In one country the U.S. ambassador asked for an appointment with the Prime Minister only to discover that the matter he intended to discuss had already been agreed to by the Prime Minister after talking with an agency representative.

Item: In Paris, in the early 1950s, we not only had five officials with ambassadorial rank but also over 70 more or less autonomous U.S. agencies.

Item: In Asia, one U.S. ambassador assured the Prime Minister that we were not involved in an intelligence operation which, to the ambassador's chagrin, he eventually discovered was being masterminded in his own office. The Prime Minister concluded the ambassador was either a fool or a liar.

Item: In a key West European post, personal rivalry between the ambassador and the director of the aid mission resulted in a total breakdown of personal communications between them.

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In retrospect, it may be said that such problems, however costly and distressing, were the inevitable result of the changing focus of our federal government. Foreign affairs, once the special preserve of State and Defense, has become an area of increased concern and significance for other established departments such as Commerce, Labor, Agriculture and the Treasury, as well as for the many new specialized foreign service agencies which have grown up since the war. Each of these agencies, old and new, necessarily has its own representatives abroad.

It is against this background of challenge and growth that the Administration has been seeking to coördinate its overseas activities to increase their effectiveness. This effort has taken three forms: (1) a critical review of the special qualities now required of our ambassadors; (2) a presidential clarification of the ambassador's greatly expanded responsibilities in the country of his assignment; (3) a program to coördinate our far-flung activities wherever we maintain diplomatic or consular missions.

The transformed demands of diplomacy have clearly altered the qualities required in our ambassadors. Although personal charm, an attractive wife, political perceptiveness and analytical ability are still highly useful, they are no longer enough. In today's complex world, the modern ambassador must also be an administrator capable of supervising a wide range of operations; a creative leader capable of taking initiative, inspiring subordinates, delegating authority and cutting through details; a diplomat of tact and persuasiveness who knows how to combine toughness and restraint.

In these circumstances, the Administration concluded that the time-honored practice of awarding a number of ambassadorships to wealthy campaign contributors was something we could no longer afford. Thus, the percentage of Foreign Service career ambassadors appointed in 1961 was the highest in history. In addition, a special effort was made to provide rapid promotion for outstanding younger men in the service who were likely to be flexible and perceptive in dealing with the special problems of young and newly independent nations. The 20-or-so new, non-career ambassadors were, almost without exception, men with extensive foreign policy experience. Most of them were drawn from university faculties and foundations. With a handful of exceptions, all ambassadors now speak the language of official discussion in the country of their assignment.

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An effort was also made to see that each ambassador received an assignment which he felt personally qualified to handle. The hairshirt tradition of sending Foreign Service Officers to precisely those places to which they did not want to go in order to "strengthen their character" was abandoned. The normal term of an ambassador and his principal associates at a post was extended to four years. The ambassador and his wife were considered as a team. And he was given increased authority over the choice of his assistants.

The selection of better qualified personnel was the first essential step. The next was to clarify the ambassador's authority.

Thus, on May 29, 1961, President Kennedy sent a letter to each American ambassador in which he reaffirmed the recipient's role as the President's personal representative, with clear authority over all other U.S. government activities and personnel in the country of his assignment. "I shall count on you," the President wrote, "to oversee and coördinate all the activities of the United States Government. . . . You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations." The President noted that each Mission included "the representatives of all other United States agencies" in the country in question, and he promised the ambassador his "full support and backing in carrying out your assignment." It was the responsibility of all Mission members, he added, to keep the ambassador "fully informed of their views and activities and to abide by your decisions unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary." The President's letter sought to eliminate once and for all the problem of conflicting lines of responsibility. The ambassador was clearly established as the final authority, as the President's top representative.

The directive was followed by four State Department guidance papers which spelled out in detail the application of the President's instructions.

The first of these papers dealt with the ambassador's relations with the top representatives of the military, the United States Information Service and other coöperating agencies; it urged upon him a close and understanding relationship with the staff and programs under his general supervision. Emphasis was placed on his duties as the Mission leader who "bears the responsibility for success or failure in achieving United States foreign policy objectives in his country of assignment."

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The second guidance paper to ambassadors requested a tough-minded review of the importance of the hundreds of reports now taxing the energies of our missions overseas. This heavy burden, which in the words of the directive had too often diverted able men from "the essential tasks of getting to know the people and cultures among which we serve," was to be reappraised, report by report, to see what changes and cuts might be effected.

The third paper suggested a variety of techniques by which the ambassador and his staff might break away from some of the demands of traditional diplomatic protocol. Among other things, it urged the members of missions to familiarize themselves with the country's culture, visit outlying districts and establish informal relations with "labor leaders, . . . student groups, and to the extent feasible, with opposition leaders."

The final paper discussed, among other matters, the conduct of military personnel stationed abroad, the need for increased respect for local customs and the importance of avoiding ostentatious behavior. As a primary objective, it urged that our missions seek "to limit to the maximum extent possible the conspicuousness of the American presence."

The next step in the effort to modernize the practice of American diplomacy and to increase its effectiveness was a series of regional conferences to which were invited not only ambassadors but their wives, their administrative officers and their principal aid, information and military advisers. Although the ambassadors had been armed with new statements of authority, many were still skeptical as to whether the new directives really meant what they said. Moreover, administrative procedures had remained largely untouched, and communication between Washington and the field had left many operational questions unanswered. Nor had representatives of the Pentagon, the new A.I.D. administration, U.S.I.A., the Peace Corps, Food for Peace and such Departments as Commerce and Labor had an opportunity to thrash out specific details of operations, responsibility, and coöperation with the ambassadors and their staffs.

Therefore, seven regional conferences were organized to clear up these practical operational problems and to effect a total integration of our efforts abroad under the direction of the ambassador as the President's chief representative.

The first of these meetings, held in July in Lagos, Nigeria, included all United States missions in Africa south of the Sahara.

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The second, for our missions in the North African and Middle Eastern countries, took place in August in Nicosia, Cyprus. The third, in New Delhi, covered South and Southeast Asia. Two others were held in October—one in Lima, Peru, for our missions in South America, and one in San José, Costa Rica, for our representatives from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Similar meetings in 1962 will cover the Far East and Europe.

The group attending these meetings from Washington included representatives from the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Peace Corps, Food for Peace, the Bureau of the Budget and the Departments of Commerce and Labor, in addition to representatives from the administrative and geographic bureaus of the Department of State.

The directors of the various agencies had an opportunity to discuss their own programs in detail with those who would carry them out. The ambassadors and their colleagues, in turn, were able to discuss on an intimate basis a wide variety of substantive and administrative questions involving their particular country. In many cases, on-the-spot decisions were made on questions which had been previously swept under the rug.

One of the innovations of the regional conferences was the attendance of the ambassadors' wives. As every Foreign Service Officer knows, the wife who is sensitive to local problems, aware of our national purposes and anxious to help carry them out is an invaluable addition to any embassy. Likewise, one who lacks such qualities can be a serious liability. It is the ambassador's wife, for better or worse, who sits regularly beside the highest officials of the government at dinner parties and official functions. At each conference, the wives accompanied their husbands to all but the highly classified meetings.

These conferences produced nearly 200 proposals for administrative improvements within the State Department alone, more than half of which have already been acted upon. The proposals range all the way from the desirability of smaller official automobiles to more intensive language training for clerical and officer personnel. A large number of constructive measures were suggested for eliminating operational red tape, for speeding up communications between Washington and the overseas missions, and for better coördination with international agencies.

Although the primary emphasis was on improved operations,

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the conferences also underscored the sharply altered nature of diplomacy in our present era. Simply to list some of the questions under discussion is enough to illustrate the dimensions of the challenge.

How, for instance, are the various agencies involved in foreign affairs to deal with the rapidly emerging new African nations? How are we to gear our A.I.D. and information programs to changing African attitudes toward the United States? How can we relate our economic aid and military security assistance to the facts of political and economic regionalism in Africa? How can the exchange programs of State, U.S.I.A., and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare be best used to meet African needs for educational development? Where can we recruit the urgently needed French-speaking Foreign Service clerks and secretaries for service in French-speaking Africa? Where and how can the Peace Corps be most helpful?

Can we bring the productive power of our farmers and the techniques of the Food for Peace program to bear on problems of unemployment as well as food shortages in differing parts of the world? And how do we coördinate the functions of Food for Peace, A.I.D., Agriculture and Commerce to accomplish this?

In the Middle East, how can we foster more affirmative U.S. policies in view of the political straitjacket imposed by the Arab-Israeli conflict? In South and East Asia, how can we deal most effectively with the impact of Communist China? In Latin America, with the unprecedented problems and prospects of the Alliance for Progress?

On what basis can the new aid program distribute its funds? To what extent can criteria be developed to avoid costly and merely expedient decisions based purely on short-term political considerations? For instance, how can a Latin American nation where the arable soil is largely owned by a few landowners be persuaded of the wisdom of considering basic reforms in land tenure and distribution? Can a state ruled primarily by an oligarchy be shown the value of installing progressive tax systems or preventing local capital from flowing abroad? And if the Alliance for Progress paves the way for the peaceful economic and social revolution which has been promised, are we psychologically prepared to see some Latin American nations express their newfound confidence in themselves by disregarding our views and taking a more independent course in foreign affairs?

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Such questions point to one firm conclusion: to perform his role in the new diplomacy the ambassador must have available far more complete and frequent information on a wide range of tools now at his disposal. Relatively new efforts such as the Peace Corps and the Food for Peace program provide enormous possibilities for developing and improving relations with other nations. For instance, in countries where planning has not yet developed to a stage where a major United States investment is advisable, the provision of powdered milk for the school children of major cities can be a vivid and inexpensive means of expressing our concern for the people.

On such matters and many more the ambassador must be better informed in order to be able to assume direction where needed. So it is fair to say that we have made only a start in the essential re-tooling and integration of the instruments by which American foreign policy can be made effective in this age of total diplomacy. More public education will be needed to persuade the American people and some officials as well that nearly everything we do, whether it involves labor, civil rights, food surpluses, trade, science or tourism, now bears in some degree on our foreign policy. And the problem, once we have recognized the interrelation of these many aspects of our foreign affairs, is to learn how to administer them with greater skill and effectiveness.

In this respect, we are fortunate in that the President's Cabinet today is made up of men who have a world view, who understand foreign affairs and the role of their departments in carrying out an integrated foreign policy. This is immensely important, for the progress we have made in coördinating our activities in our missions abroad under the ambassador's leadership must be backstopped by correspondingly better control and coördination of foreign policy in Washington.

The logical focus for such coördination lies in the regional assistant secretaries of state. By increasing the authority of these officials we can make them the actual coördinators of all our wide-ranging operations in their areas of responsibility. This is one of the many essential innovations which may meet resistance. But the task ahead necessarily calls for new approaches, more imaginative techniques, and tougher-minded administration if the instruments of our foreign policy are to keep pace with its requirements. Although a good start has been made, much remains to be done.

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PLANNING THROUGH THE MARKET

The Jugoslav Experience

By Janez Stanovnik

THE development of the Jugoslav economic system in the 1950s has puzzled many people in the world. No wonder. The fundamental principles of Marxist socialist economy have been applied in an unconventional manner, for it was decided that a solution had to be found simultaneously both for the problem of accelerating economic growth and for attaining an open economy in which the principle of economic coexistence could be implemented through the international market.

In accomplishing this complex task Jugoslavia often had to tread entirely unexplored ground. She had to rely for guidance partly on general theoretical knowledge, partly on the experiences of other countries, and partly on her own experiences both with the capitalist system between the wars and with the centralized administrative system in the period immediately following the Second World War. Stage by stage, by trial and error, she consolidated her achievements, each time in order to make further progress possible. Some people considered this a pragmatic approach, failing to see the consistency in the country's endeavor to attain its fundamental aims.

II. IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The capitalist system which had been in force in Jugoslavia in the interwar period had barely achieved a 1 percent rate of increase in the national income, and it had led to complete social stagnation. Similarly, the centralized administrative system in the early postwar period (1948–1952) also failed to secure a higher rate of growth. Although this system made possible the construction of some basic industries which served to promote further progress, the system itself created bureaucratic rigidity and economic inefficiency. Amid a turmoil of international events, the country had to find its answer to certain problems which it faced in common with others in the present epoch.

One basic problem was that of humanism in economic development. It was not just that under the bureaucratic centralized system economic development had become a matter of *l'art pour*

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l'art; more specifically, the conflict with the Cominform had led the Jugoslavs to give more emphasis to the humanistic traditions of the Marxist ideology. The discussions on "the withering away of the state" reflected in a general way this basic conflict. The same conflict appeared in the discussions on the role of the "law of value" in a socialist economy.

These ideological and theoretical discussions resulted in a revival of the basic principle of socialist relations, advanced by Marx, of "a full and free development of individuals." It clearly follows from this premise that it is not sufficient for a socialist system to declare that it stands *for* the working people. It has to bring into being a system of management both *of* and *by* the working people. Here lies the root of the whole idea of social self-government which President Tito proclaimed in 1950, and which in 1953 became by law the basis of the whole Jugoslav system.

III. PLAN AND MARKET

Radical changes in the Jugoslav system of planning and business management became inevitable when the individual, as producer, was placed in the center of the entire economic process.

Two other systems had failed to work satisfactorily:

The system of centralized operational planning leaves only a small margin to the initiative of the individual as agent of the economic process. Demand is determined by the central organs and the structure of production is then planned accordingly. True, enterprises are stimulated to over-fulfill the plan, but they are not stimulated to do so by additional demand but by a system of bonuses. Supposing the planned demand had been correct, the stimulation they received would then help to upset the balance between supply and demand. Moreover, in this system the preference given to producer goods is elevated to a basic law of economic development; the priority accorded key industries in the allocation of raw materials has the inevitable result of underrating the consumer's demand and limiting his freedom of choice.

The free-market system is also inadequate for an accelerated economic development, since the low level of demand does not provide enough stimulus for the development of key industries. In an underdeveloped country, accordingly, the profit motive fails to provide the optimal allocation of productive resources, since a low level of demand does not automatically create an adequate industrial capacity.

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It was necessary for the development of the socialist system—based on the principle "to everyone according to his work"—to find a solution between these two extremes. The basic task of every economic system is to allocate productive factors in the way best calculated to attain the highest national income. It can be said that in general the central planning system neglects the postulate of economic efficiency, but instead emphasizes growth of the country's economic capacity; and in this it succeeds fairly well. However, the maximum increase in national income is not achieved by mere increases in quantity of production but by the actual satisfaction of demand. This requires that the consumer's preference be given higher priority. Jugoslavia thus was faced with a double task: to give the human element the greatest possible expression and to accelerate economic growth to the maximum possible extent. In what framework could this be done?

Relations between supply and demand, as expressed in the market through the oscillation of prices, perform two economic functions: on the one hand, they indicate the efficiency of production; on the other, they can act as automatic allocators of the resources. The first of these functions should be maintained to the greatest possible extent. So long as we wish to have actual consumption determined by the consumer and not by the plan—*i.e.* the administration—we should leave it to the consumer, for whom the production is meant, to assess the value and quality of products by freely showing his preferences. This is the basic requirement in the humanization of the economic process.

The market's role in allocating the factors that go into production is a different matter. The interests of the community do not necessarily coincide with an arithmetical sum of the individual interests of its members. Instrumentalities must therefore be created which will bring economic growth to new heights. They should be built into the machinery of the market so as to accelerate growth in ways which best serve the community as a whole.

The Jugoslav policy of economic planning has evolved within this general framework. After abandoning the detailed operational planning of 1947–1952, and all through the succeeding period up to 1957, there were no long-term Jugoslav economic plans. Attempts were made, however, to introduce the new approach gradually through changes in annual plans. In these, direct physical planning was almost entirely absent, but they still did not remove altogether the administration's interference

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in the economic process, because they set certain standards in various areas of the economy which were of key importance. The Second Five Year Plan (1957–1961), and particularly the Third (1961–1965), ended physical planning completely as well as direct administrative control over the economic process.

Today Jugoslavia has what might be called "planned guidance" of the economy. In form the plan is comparable to an economic budget, based on an analysis of national income, as used by some countries in the West. It relies on an analysis of trends revealed in the preceding period as well as on the targets set by the National Assembly, and from these it forecasts the movements in basic economic indices over the period in view. A principal task is to bring these indices, expressed in value and not in physical terms, into mutual dependence and balance.

Accordingly, the plan provides the framework within which economic activities should develop in the future. It does this in two ways:

First, the plan makes allowance for supply and demand to modify the expected development; at the same time, it guarantees that where needed there will be compensation in other sectors, so that an advance in one sector will not be checked by a slowing-down in another. Thus the actual supply and demand do not impair the plan as they do in the case of central planning, but on the contrary help achieve the planned targets. The corrections introduced by supply and demand into the planned forecasts stem inevitably from the shortcomings of economic analysis and the manifestations of free human action.

Second, the plan provides for a number of fiscal and monetary measures designed to create a favorable climate and built-in economic stimuli for achieving desired trends.

IV. WORKERS' SELF-GOVERNMENT

The basic function of the law of supply and demand could be achieved only if enterprises increased their economic independence. This general process, evolved over the last decade, is most often referred to as decentralization. However, explanations are necessary since the same term is used to describe the changes which have taken place in the Soviet system of planning.

In the Soviet system, decentralization refers to the transfer of specified administrative and operational functions to lower bodies of government—the *Sovnarhoz*. This does not give greater eco-

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nomic independence to Soviet enterprises. Although some reforms in the last few years have increased the funds at their disposal, their spending of those funds still remains under strict control.

In Jugoslavia, decentralization separates business management from government administration to a substantial degree. The method used has been to introduce workers' councils in all the larger enterprises and to have them take over the organization of economic activity, the function of manager. The formal fulfillment or over-fulfillment of the plan no longer serves as the criterion of good management. It has been replaced by the success which the enterprise achieves on the market. Since its financial position depends on its business success, the enterprise is, in its free conduct of business, guided primarily by economic efficiency and not by the non-economic considerations which are characteristic of decisions by administrative bodies.

Since the "Law on the Management of Enterprises by Workers' Collectives" was enacted on July 28, 1950, the system of workers' self-government has undergone a significant evolution. In order for the system to function successfully it was necessary for workers to acquire experience. By now, every second Jugoslav worker has been elected at least once to a workers' council. Since approximately one-third of the members of councils have by now been reëlected, the necessary continuity is also provided. Statistics show that only 16 percent of the members of the workers' councils consist of office personnel, while skilled workers are most highly represented, with 40.8 percent. It should be stressed that neither a workers' council nor the managing board which it elects constitutes the executive administration. The manager and other executive officers are appointed as experts and technicians by the workers' councils themselves or in coöperation with the bodies of local self-government.

Self-government by the workers and autonomy for enterprises could be fully achieved only after reforms had been introduced in the economic system as a whole which gave enterprises greater freedom of action on the market.

At the outset, workers' councils had a rather consultative character. In the second period, their role became mainly that of members in a profit-sharing institution. In the latest period, however, workers' councils have fully assumed entrepreneurial functions and have become sovereign agents in the economic process.

This evolution could have taken place successfully only along

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with gradual changes in government fiscal policy. The aim of these changes was to eliminate the disproportion in prices that would be caused by an abrupt disruption of supply-demand relations suddenly freed from the rigidity of the earlier economic régime.

V. THE FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES

Manufacturing industries, banks, the building industry and transport are nationalized in Jugoslavia. In handicrafts, however, the private sector still accounts for approximately one-half of all those employed and for one-third of the income from the activity. Public property has been handed over to the workers to manage. And in commerce, the private sector accounts for only a small percentage. In addition to the taxes paid by these enterprises, they must pay interest on that part of the national wealth which is put in their hands to use.

The community—meaning jointly the Federal state, the constituent republics and the municipalities—takes somewhat more than half the gross income of each enterprise. Of the dozen or so levies, only four need be mentioned here; in the aggregate, they account for 92 percent of the community's income.

The first is the interest paid by enterprises on both fixed and working capital as well as on loans which they take either for new investments or for current business. This interest yields 13.4 percent of the community's revenue.

Second is the turnover tax, which at one time represented the main instrument of planned intervention. It is losing more and more of its importance, although it still represents 19.3 percent of the public revenues.

Third is the contribution assessed on gross income; and fourth is a payroll tax. Together these represent the most important part of the community's income, both in amount—59.7 percent of the total—and, even more important, by reason of the principles applied. These principles have undergone considerable changes; at the same time, their main features have put their stamp on the evolution of the system as a whole.

In the first place, from 1951 to 1953, the main instruments for capital formation were the so-called "rates of accumulation," a tax which is graduated in proportion to fixed capital and the size of the labor force. This measure is closely linked to the name of the late Minister of Economy, Boris Kidric, whose indefatigable

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dynamism was responsible for drawing up the main lines of further development. Experience showed, however, that the system failed to provide sufficient incentive; and, at the same time, the great variety of rates was only a disguise for administrative intervention. That is why in 1954 a new system was applied which took as a tax base the gross profits of the enterprise. As applied, this amounted to a highly developed profit-sharing system. The underlying idea was to stimulate the workers by allowing them to participate in the profits of their enterprises. Year by year the system was improved in the light of experience. As early as 1955, pay scales began to be set by the enterprises instead of by laws which defined salary levels. This increased the workers' share in the profits from 4.8 to 5.8 percent. It was also proved that a comparatively high rate of local taxation diminished the workers' incentive; in consequence, local government's share in the taxes was reduced from 29 to 11 percent. At the same time, the financial resources put at the disposal of enterprises were increased.

Experience proved, however, that the workers' participation in the profits was still too small to offer a sufficient incentive. In 1957, the gross income was taken as the basis for taxation, making the entire income of the workers, and not only their marginal benefits, dependent on the successful conduct of the business. However, the new tax rose steeply with increase in gross income, and this proved to be a discouragement to efficient producers. Experience has now led to the newest reform, by which all enterprises are taxed a flat 15 percent of gross income. The basic idea of this decisive step was explained by Vice-President Todorovic in the following terms: "Instead of securing a balanced growth by impeding those who advance faster, our system has adopted the principle of stimulating everyone to advance as fast as possible according to his possibilities."

With the removal of the steep progressive scale of taxation, enterprises have become even more independent. The entrepreneurial function of the workers' councils is growing in importance, and the income of the workers takes on more and more the character of entrepreneurial income.

One who wished to demonstrate the degree of financial independence of Jugoslav enterprises in 1959 compared with that of American corporations over the 1950–59 period would find that the American corporations paid 49.5 percent of their gross profits

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in the form of direct taxation and the Jugoslav enterprises, under comparable headings, paid 56.3 percent. Whereas the American corporations paid their owners 29.7 percent of their gross profits in the form of dividends, the Jugoslav enterprises paid the community for the use of their share of the national wealth 13.7 percent. Accordingly, American corporations retained a sum amounting to 20.8 percent of their gross profits, whereas the Jugoslav enterprises were left with 30 percent at their disposal.

This growing financial independence explains how it is that the Jugoslav system has come to the point where enterprises, out of their own means, are contributing approximately one-third of the total amount of investments; where the income of the workers and the standard of living are both rising rapidly; and where efficiency and productivity are also increasing very fast.

VI. SOCIALIST AND PRIVATE COÖPERATION IN AGRICULTURE

While industry is fully nationalized in Jugoslavia, private ownership prevails in agriculture. In 1960 only 9.1 percent of cultivated land was in the socialist sector; yet it yielded 14.1 percent of the total agricultural product and 31.1 percent of the marketable surplus.

Vice-President Edvard Kardelj has defined the government's agricultural policy in the following terms: "In our practice in the sphere of the socialist transformation of rural areas we are pursuing two immediate purposes: to achieve economic results, greater production and higher productivity of labor; and to maintain and strengthen further the genuine political support given by the peasants to the socialist forces, in other words, to secure political stability in rural areas."

Although the rural population diminished by one-third in the course of the dynamic postwar developments, half the people still live on the land. That is why agricultural policy is not merely an economic issue but a political one as well. The essence of the rural transformation can be summarized under the following headings: a firm stand against any kind of forced collectivization; a strengthening of the big socialist farms by increased investments, their enlargement by the purchase of land from those who move to urban areas, and the organization there of the most up-to-date processes of production, so that the market demand can be supplied from the socialist sector; the improvement of agricultural coöperatives, particularly by increasing their equipment; and the

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coöperation of the socialist and coöperative sectors with the individual landholder so that his productivity may also be improved by the use of modern methods and equipment.

The road followed by Jugoslavia in this field is diametrically opposed to that followed by the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union carried out a total collectivization in the 1930s. Land left to members of a *Kolhoz* for private use amounted to less than 1 percent of the cultivated land; nevertheless, about 50 percent of the main products sold on the market—meat, milk, vegetables, etc.—came from such land. In contrast, Jugoslavia has only 10 percent of arable land collectivized; this land, however, yields 57 percent of the marketable surpluses of wheat and 53 percent of the marketable surpluses of dairy products.

The Jugoslav experience has shown that a mere change in ownership does not solve the problem. The public and coöperative network, within the predominantly private sector of agriculture, introduces new technological methods and furthers education, training and the modern organization of production.

The same principles of management applied in industry are also valid for the socialist farms, which are managed on the principle of workers' self-government. The members of general agricultural coöperatives are private holders, and have the use of certain coöperative property—some lands, equipment, marketing outlets and the like. They freely elect the managerial bodies. These coöperatives also have their own funds. When induced collectivization was abandoned in 1953, the membership in these general coöperatives decreased, but more than half of all private owners still belong.

The outstanding feature of agricultural development in the last few years has been coöperation between private farmers and the socialist sector. In 1957, only 0.4 percent of cultivated wheat land was covered by this coöperation but by 1960 the figure had grown to 16 percent. Approximately one-third of the private farmers coöperate in one form or another with the socialist sector.

The land reform carried out immediately after the war (affecting about 10 percent of the cultivated land) fixed the maximum size of private holdings at 25 acres. This is the size of farm which the private owner can cultivate by his own labor. This of course does not mean that lands cannot be grouped in larger tracts or that it is impossible to form large socialist farms which can use the most modern technological processes.

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VII. GUIDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The liberation of autonomous economic forces has not led either to cyclical movements or to other negative features of a market economy. This is primarily because of the controls which have been maintained at certain strategic points.

Investment policy provides the most important of these social controls. Investment funds from decentralized sources are considerable (and show a tendency to increase, from 57 percent in 1959 to 63 percent in 1960). But the investments derived from the centralized funds of the Federal state are of strategic importance. Approximately one-third of the over-all investments made from that source is sufficient to ensure that there will be a balanced growth among the various parts of the economy as well as to encourage growth in underdeveloped areas. In making new investments the enterprises themselves are guided by their estimate of likely profits; and this is even more true in the case of private investments in agriculture and handicrafts, which account for 10 percent of the total amount of new investments. However, the sums invested from the Federal investment fund remain of great importance for accelerating economic growth. The criterion applied here does not neglect the element of profit, but profit is not either the principal or the unique consideration.

The other significant instrument used in guiding the economic process is the turnover tax. Through it the government exercises an indirect influence on prices and thereby on movements of supply and demand. However, the turnover tax is more important in Jugoslav practice as an instrument for collecting revenue than as a method of influencing prices. In 1960 the total turnover taxes collected amounted to 2.5 percent of the value of all investments.

If we examine how this typical instrument of administrative and operational guidance of the economy is used in the Soviet Union and in Jugoslavia we see at once the differences in the two systems. In the period 1950–59 the turnover tax in the Soviet Union represented 46.7 percent of the total budgetary revenues; whereas in Jugoslavia, in 1960, it represented only 19.3 percent of the public revenues. With the introduction of the most recent changes in the economic system, moreover, the policy applied today in Jugoslavia tends to free the turnover tax from its discriminatory effect on prices.

Besides investments and turnover tax, monetary (*i.e.* credit)

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policy remains a strong instrument in controlling economic development. The fact that in 1960, 33.2 percent of the investments in fixed assets was financed by means of bank loans, and that the percentage was 38.7 in the case of working capital, sufficiently illustrates the role which monetary policy can play in the regulation of bank operations.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Jugoslavia's successful efforts in the course of a decade to evolve more liberal machinery for the operation of a planned socialist economy enabled her to proceed during the past year to reform in the field of foreign exchange. This should lead toward the convertibility of currency and a more intensive participation in international trade. On the one hand, this action was the result of considerations of principle; on the other, it was a logical extension of the course taken ten years ago in internal economic policy.

Jugoslavia opposes the formation of economic blocs behind protective walls not for reasons of political expediency but because she has strong feelings of principle regarding the question of peace and the world's general progressive development. Jugoslavia is known today for her consistent policy of active and peaceful coexistence. What could be more natural than to apply the same principle in the field of international economic relations? By liberalizing her foreign economic relations Jugoslavia has proved in practice that the existence and further development of the socialist system does not require either rigid centralized operational planning or a monopoly of foreign trade or isolation within the so-called "socialist world market."

Moreover, the opening of economic frontiers and the liberalization of relations with other countries is imperatively demanded by the international development of the system itself. The market cannot serve even as an indicator of relative efficiency if the national economy remains isolated from the international market. Accordingly, the search how best to allocate resources and attain the greatest income called for the elimination of barriers separating Jugoslavia from other countries.

Until recently Jugoslavia maintained protection by a very complicated system of multiple exchange rates. This was a remnant of the former state monopoly in foreign trade. This year Jugoslavia introduced the customs tariff system; the protective rate in the case of some infant industries is still high, and some export

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branches are subsidized. The success of this operation depends, of course, on whether it will lead to greater exports. In view of the fact that the country has no large monetary reserves (although aggregate debts represent only 1.7 percent of the national wealth), it was necessary to apply for assistance from abroad. This was offered by the United States, the International Monetary Fund and a majority of the West European countries.

The policy of dynamic economic development pursued in the last decade has produced deficits in the balance of payments. But whereas in the 1953–56 period that deficit represented 45.6 percent of import capacity, in the 1957–59 period it decreased to 24.3 percent, owing to considerably increased exports. One of the targets of the Five Year Plan is to reduce that deficit to 5 percent and by 1965 to remove it entirely. The balance-of-payments deficit has been aggravated by recurrent bad weather, chiefly droughts, which affected the country in 1950, 1952 and 1954, and now has done so again in 1961. This explains the fact that three-quarters of the balance-of-payments deficit is accounted for by food imports, mostly from the United States. The assistance received by Jugoslavia in the past years has contributed substantially to the economic results which she has achieved.

Thus we see that a decade of intense economic development by the methods here described has brought considerable results. One indication of this is the rate of increase in the national income (although the method of calculation is slightly different from that in Western countries). In the 1948–52 period the rate of growth remained at the prewar level of 1.9 percent; in the 1953–56 period it increased to 8.4 percent; and in the period of the Third Five Year Plan, 1957–60, it reached 13 percent. The average rate of growth in the postwar period as a whole is 7.2 percent. This is one of the highest rates of growth in the world for that period. A striking feature is the fact that the ratio of efficiency in the use of capital greatly improved, which means that the growth was not predominantly the result of increased employment and new investments but that a great factor was increased productivity. There is no doubt that by releasing the creative impulses of the working people the economic system has played a considerable role both in raising the country from economic backwardness and in creating the conditions for the development of free relations with all the countries of the world.

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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

By Franklin A. Lindsay

UNCONVENTIONAL war is the war that is being fought today in Laos and South Viet Nam; it is the war that the French fought in Indochina and are now fighting in Algeria. It is a form of warfare the Communists have learned to employ with great effectiveness, and one which they will continue to exploit to the maximum in furthering their long-range objectives.

Unconventional warfare differs profoundly from warfare in which regular armies are openly engaged in combat. The objective of such conventional combat is to win control of a state by defeating the enemy's military forces in the field. In contrast, the strategy of unconventional forces must be to win control of the state by first winning control of the civil population. For without the disciplined support of the civil population, militarily inferior guerrilla forces can have no hope of success.

As yet the West has not developed a form of defense that is adequate against this form of warfare. And even where the defense has been effective, the costs to the West of suppressing such attacks have been many times the costs to the Communists of mounting them. In Greece between 1945 and 1948, for example, Communist guerrilla forces, numbering less than 20,000 armed men, successfully cut the country in two so that the only communication between north and south was by sea and air. A Greek army of several hundred thousand men, heavily supported by the United States, was required to contain the very much smaller guerrilla force. The total cost of military and political pacification, and of economic reconstruction, was about $2 billion—or somewhere between 100 and 1,000 times what the Communists had spent. The fortuitous defection of Jugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, and the consequent loss of guerrilla bases in Macedonia, caused the Communists to call off their attack. Had this not occurred, the costs in men, money and matériel needed finally to subdue the Communist rebels would have been many times greater. And the outcome would not have been certain.

The essential reasons the Communists have been able to do so much with so little in many areas of the world are four:

1. They have learned thoroughly the techniques of gaining

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control of the civil population by combining effectively the positive incentives of a political doctrine, applied meticulously from the grass roots up, and the negative pressures of a terrorism applied against those who refuse to accept their leadership voluntarily.

2. They have mastered the principles and techniques of guerrilla warfare, a form of warfare quite apart from regular or frontal warfare.

3. They have directed their most determined attacks against countries whose territory is contiguous to the Communist empire so that safe haven and training areas can be provided for guerrillas and so that supplies can be provided clandestinely.

4. They have also been able to exploit effectively the pent-up hatreds against former colonial powers and pent-up frustrations with the slow pace of economic advancement.

In most cases these have proven to be unbeatable combinations.

To gain control of a key part of the civilian population is an absolute prerequisite for further action. Having gained this control, the Communist leadership is then in a position to use its guerrilla force with great advantage against equal or superior forces supporting the government in power.

A guerrilla force is like the top of an iceberg; the supporting civilian organization, without which it cannot survive, is the much larger part that can't be seen. Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare. From the outset of conflict, a major struggle for control over the civilian population will take place and it will continue throughout the entire course of the war. Each side must try to organize the civil population into a tightly disciplined force, and, through propaganda and police activities, try to break the grip exercised by its adversary.

In Viet Nam, for example, the defeat of the French was due primarily to the Communists' success in this regard. It made it possible to trap French forces in one bloody ambush after another until the French were so weakened they could no longer keep open supply lines to their fortified outposts. Once the fortified outposts were isolated and could no longer be supplied, except in driblets by air, the Communists were in a position to complete the establishment of political and military control over the rest of the country. With their base of operations thus se-

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cured, they could safely convert their guerrilla forces to regular assault forces equipped with heavy artillery and a supply system to back it. The final phase was to launch massive frontal assaults against these weakened fortresses.

Thus the French and their local supporters were progressively driven from the country into the villages, and from the villages into the cities until, at the end, they held in the north of Indochina only the heavily fortified perimeter immediately surrounding Hanoi. In the areas from which they had withdrawn, the Communists erected a political structure which exacted the positive loyalty of every peasant and his family by the stark example of violence to some and the threat of heavy punishment or death to others.

The key to the successes of the Communist guerrillas in Viet Nam and elsewhere is found in the fact that they had established control over the rural population as a first step. For every man in a guerrilla force carrying a rifle there must be a large number of civilians who provide the support he must have to survive and fight. They are the source of food, clothing and recruits. Even more important, the civilian organization must supply the guerrilla force with constant operational intelligence on every movement of the enemy. Only with such information can a militarily inferior guerrilla force be forewarned of an encircling trap, a planned offensive or an ambush. This intelligence net embraces not only the peasants who observe military movements but also spies in enemy headquarters who provide advance warning of intended offensives.

The cause of the French defeat in Viet Nam can be traced to their loss of the support of the civilian population. Here, as elsewhere, the Communists had been able to capitalize upon a basic anti-colonial feeling and to harness this antagonism into an effective tool for political indoctrination of the population. But in order to obtain effective control, the Communists go far beyond political indoctrination. Once they have a fanatically dedicated minority, they begin the application of systematic terror to ensure that the masses of the people will be brought under, and kept under, complete Communist control. Their objective is to build in each village—even though it may be under nominal control of the legitimate government—a shadow government completely controlled by the local Communist representative. It has often happened that in a single village two governments exist simulta-

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neously, one the official and open government representing the anti-Communist central government, the other the secret government which, in fact, exercises complete control over the actions of every member of the village.

The use of terror to form a secret government under the nose of the enemy has long been a Communist technique. In some of the worst German concentration camps, a secret Communist government was often sufficiently powerful to bring about the execution, through clandestine manipulation of Gestapo records, of those prisoners who failed to accept its control.

The French were defeated in Viet Nam because they were fighting blind. They never knew where the enemy was. They were repeatedly caught on the march in the most indefensible positions where, without warning, they were subjected to murderous rifle, machine gun and mortar fire from concealed positions on both sides of the track. The surviving remnants of one ambush lived only to be cut down the next day by the same Viet Minh force, which held them constantly under surveillance, and moved through the jungles on foot to prepare the next ambush on the expected line of march. When the French undertook mop-up operations in areas known to be harboring guerrilla forces, the Communist-controlled civil population collaborated in warning the guerrillas, and in helping them to hide or escape.

The pattern of, first, political organization, second, guerrilla warfare and, finally, frontal assault was followed in Jugoslavia during World War II, in China from the thirties until the Communist victory in 1950, and in Viet Nam prior to the partition of the country in 1955. Now it is being followed in South Viet Nam, where Communist organizers have been increasingly active in building clandestine organizations in the rural areas. During the last year, guerrilla activities were stepped up with the objective of forcing government troops to withdraw from the villages into the larger towns and into fortified positions. Now it appears from reports from Saigon that the Communist leaders have decided that their control of many areas outside the cities is sufficiently firm to permit the use of regular military units trained in North Viet Nam. If their judgment is correct, the war for South Viet Nam has entered the third, or final, assault stage.

Because the Communists have been permitted to consolidate their hold over most of the country, the forces of the government, supported by the United States, find themselves in a very pre-

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carious position. They can be extricated from the situation only by an extraordinary military effort coupled with a major effort to free the rural areas from the pressures of Communist terror.

In Malaya and in the Philippines are found two examples of the successful suppression and ultimate defeat of Communist guerrilla forces. In both cases, the heart of the Western strategy was twofold: (1) a vigorous and aggressive pursuit of the Communist guerrillas into their own territory while maintaining constant pressure on them so that they were denied the initiative and the ability to launch attacks on their own terms; (2) a major political program undertaken to win back the population, to protect it against the violence and reprisals of the Communists, and to match force with force.

The second of these represents one of the West's most difficult problems, for it is obvious that when two forces are contending for the loyalty of, and control over, the civilian population, the side which uses violent reprisals most aggressively will dominate most of the people, even though their sympathies may lie in the other direction. Communist efforts to dominate the population must be frustrated before their control has become strong enough to support guerrilla operations. If the Communists are unopposed in their initial application of force against the civilian population, and thereby gain control, the counterforce which must be applied finally to break that control will be far greater and the population will suffer far more than if action had been taken resolutely at the outset.

In 1945 in Rumania, for example, a broad popular feeling of support for the monarchy had developed spontaneously. As evidence of this loyalty, people wore badges with the royal coat of arms. Communist thugs began systematically beating up people wearing the monarchist symbol whom they were able to catch alone in back streets after dark. There was no reaction from the population other than to stop wearing these pins when they were alone at night. Thus emboldened, the Communists became more aggressive until they beat up, in broad daylight and in the open streets, those who still wore the monarchist pins. Finally the pins were driven completely from the streets; the will of the people had been broken and the first step in the Communist takeover had been accomplished.

The way in which force is applied to counter Communist terror is nevertheless all-important. The strategy of the Communists

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may be to use acts of terror and sabotage to goad the government into repressive counter-measures and thereby widen the split between the population and the government. Thus when the government and its security forces use force to meet the Communist terror they must do so resolutely, but with great selectivity and only against those who are directly responsible.

II

The first step in mobilizing a civilian population against Communist subversion and guerrilla attack is to establish a set of political goals expressed in terms that the average person can understand. They must be goals that strike a sympathetic response and that aim to remove the inequities in the existing society and the grievances which they have caused. Through mass communications these reform programs must be communicated effectively, and repeatedly, to the population.

But this is only the beginning of the task. Political organizers must be recruited and trained in sufficient numbers to reach by direct contact nearly every family in the land. They must be as thorough as the best of ward or district leaders in American politics. The organizer must know everyone in his village. He must know who are the Communist sympathizers and who are the secret Communist organizers. He must know who comes and goes in the village and what their business is. He must build a core of persons loyal to himself and to the government. Through these people he must be constantly informed of the activities of the Communists and the pressures they are placing on villagers to gain their secret help. Above all, he must be able to provide effective protection to those who, against their will, are being forced into Communist collaboration by threats of violence against themselves and their families. To accomplish this, he must have the support of his own government and of the West; he must be able not only to provide physical protection but to alleviate the legitimate economic and political grievances of his village. More than anyone else, the local political organizer holds the key to success or failure. If he is successful in his task, he will hold the loyalty of his village and will be able to integrate its people and resources into the effort to defeat the Communists.

If he is not successful, the shadow of Communist control will gradually be extended and consolidated until the village is organized entirely in support of the Communist forces. Food and money

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will regularly be collected for that purpose. The entire village will become part of the Communist intelligence network, reporting to the guerrilla commanders every movement of the government security forces. At the same time the government will be totally cut off from information about the guerrillas—their strength, their movements and their intentions.

The organization of the civilian population will require months, if not years. But where control by the Communists has already progressed to the point where they are able to launch guerrilla war, military operations must be conducted aggressively against them, regardless of the disadvantage at which government forces will be operating. Government patrols must push vigorously into Communist-dominated territory, try to contact the guerrillas and force them into open combat. Lacking the intelligence that the civilian population might have provided, the defending forces must employ to the fullest all other means, such as air reconnaissance. The United States has effectively applied its advanced scientific skills to the solution of major problems in the missile and space fields. There is now the opportunity, as yet largely untried, to apply these same scientific capabilities to the development of modern equipment designed to help meet the special problems of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.

The basic principle of counter-guerrilla military operations is to maintain the offensive and thereby deny the guerrillas the initiative. The Communist guerrilla strategy, in turn, will be to attempt to seize and hold the initiative by mounting a variety of attacks against fixed installations so that large government forces are pinned down defending towns and villages, rail lines, power lines, ports and other vital installations. A counter-guerrilla offensive, then, will have these objectives:

To keep guerrilla units off balance at all times; to force them to flee continuously from attacking government units, and thereby to minimize their opportunities to mount attacks on vital communication lines and military installations or to lay ambushes.

By maintaining the initiative, to force guerrilla units to overrun their intelligence screens, and thereby to deny them the protective cover they need to survive against superior military forces.

To prevent guerrilla forces from grouping for strong attacks against isolated points.

To tire them out, and keep them tired out, through constant offensive action against them; to force them into more isolated

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hinterlands where food supplies are less and less available; to force them through constant offensive action to expend their limited ammunition.

Whatever the means used to carry out this offensive strategy, the basic and overriding necessity is that counter-guerrilla forces be organized early enough and strongly enough so that they are able to meet and contain, at the outset, the attacks of guerrilla forces. *Too little and too late* has been the normal reaction of governments to the development of such forces.

The core of the counter-guerrilla troops must be a highly mobile attacking force. Normally it need not be substantially larger than the guerrilla elements opposed to it. It should be able to meet and defeat guerrilla forces essentially on their own terms, that is, with small mobile units capable of moving in patrols over extended periods in enemy territory. As soon as one patrol is withdrawn for rest, another should take its place.

Mobile counter-guerrilla units should operate without fixed plans, and with the ability to modify their operations quickly, in order to take advantage of unforeseen targets and to concentrate superior forces against guerrilla units that have been located and brought to combat. In contrast, the government force that relies on "set piece" offensives, based on plans drawn up days in advance, will always be at a disadvantage. Even before the operation is launched, such plans may find their way into the hands of the guerrillas, who will have moved meanwhile to another area. Periodic offensives of limited duration have the further disadvantage of permitting the guerrillas to hold the initiative between offensives. A strategy of constant offensive can effectively deprive the guerrillas of the opportunity to conduct the war on terms favorable to themselves.

It will also be necessary to provide defensive forces to guard key installations. Care must be exercised, however, that these forces are not spread out beyond all reasonable bounds in the attempt to defend an increasingly large number of fixed installations. A French military commentator has written, "There should be no fortified posts except those necessary for promoting mobility."

III

In a broader sense the dilemma of the West is that, even if we can develop a more effective strategy for defending countries

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against unconventional Communist warfare it can at best only limit further losses. When one considers a strategy for liberating areas over which the Communists have gained control, the difficulties are seen to be very great. The organization of clandestine activities in a Communist state faces extraordinary obstacles. It is, for example, common practice for the Communists to undertake provocative activities designed to test the loyalty of each individual in the régime. A person may at any time be contacted by someone purporting to represent a clandestine organization. Even though the sympathies of the person approached may be strongly anti-Communist and his fondest hopes that the Communists be overthrown, he must assume that this is not a genuine resistance movement but rather one conducted under the control of, and at the direction of, the secret police. To prove his loyalty he must not only refuse to join the purported clandestine organization, but must also inform the police. If he does not, he will have failed to demonstrate his positive loyalty to the régime and will be subject to reprisals and imprisonment. Thus a clandestinely organized resistance within a consolidated Communist régime is not likely to get very far before someone has, out of fear, reported its existence to the police.

A second device used by the Communists is to form a clandestine anti-Communist organization under their own secret control, to encourage its growth by recruiting unwitting members, and to permit them to conduct actual operations against the régime until finally, having attracted a large number of the most aggressive anti-Communists, its entire membership is arrested.

The communes and collective farms provide other means of containing potential resistance operations, by centralizing food supplies, rather than allowing them to remain under the control of individual peasants. It is thus extremely difficult to obtain locally the food needed to support a guerrilla force. Similarly, the Communist practice of issuing new currency from time to time minimizes the opportunities to build up currency reserves to finance resistance operations.

Because of these techniques, a Communist dictatorship probably can be overthrown from within only in an area in which the Communists have not yet consolidated their control, or in which their control has been seriously weakened by other events. It is therefore of the utmost importance to move quickly to prevent the total consolidation of a nation into a completely controlled

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police state. This struggle will take place at a very personal level, and the final outcome will depend on whether the individual, faced by the Communist instruments of terrorist control, can, in the face of this force, be given a viable alternative to complete surrender.

Where the effective political control of the country has passed to the Communists, it will not be enough to conduct long-distance propaganda activities or to make plans on the assumption that the very real and very considerable dissatisfactions with the Communist régime will automatically result in a popular uprising as soon as the guerrilla forces appear. Clandestine support of at least a part of the villages and the countryside is an absolute prerequisite to the employment of guerrilla forces, for they must have local intelligence support and supplies if they are to survive in areas in which superior enemy forces are openly in control. In Jugoslavia, for example, in World War II, the Communist partisans had in many ways as favorable a situation for guerrilla warfare as might be expected anywhere. The main German forces were engaged by powerful allies on other fronts. Tito's partisan forces had as overt allies not only the Soviet Union but the United States and Britain. And from the latter two they received massive air support. In Slovenia, where there were no Cêtnik forces of Mihailovich to contend with, the political commissars of the Communist-established National Liberation Front could represent themselves to the people as the only force fighting the invader, and as having the complete support of all the major powers fighting the Germans. Yet they still found it necessary, in the words of one commissar, to "prepare the area intensively by the introduction of clandestine political organizers for a period of several months before we dared to introduce guerrilla forces."

It is not merely with benefit of hindsight that one can say it would have been a better strategy in Cuba to have built organized support in the villages and rural areas of Cuba and to have organized widespread guerrilla activities rather than to have risked all on a spontaneous uprising following a single assault landing. By far the largest part of any population will not voluntarily risk reprisals even though their sympathies may be strong. Instead, they will sit on the sidelines while others battle it out, joining in only when the outcome becomes a foregone conclusion. The political organization of each village must be undertaken under the nose of vigilant Communist political and security serv-

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ices. This is not easy. It requires unusual men possessing great personal courage and high motivation as well as superior political organizing skills. They must be thoroughly trained and then supported to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances. Guerrilla operations can be initiated only as the Communist control at the village level is loosened so that clandestine support to guerrillas can be provided.

The West needs to acquire the ability to conduct unconventional warfare successfully, and it must do so quickly. The Communists have evolved a highly effective strategy combining grassroots political organization and guerrilla warfare which they are employing against the non-Communist world. They have devised a totalitarian political structure that is highly resistant to counter-attack. The creation by the West of an adequate defensive and offensive capability for political and guerrilla warfare will require time and effort. It must be pursued vigorously and without further delay.

The United States has expanded significantly its military capabilities and, in the Army's Special Forces units, is creating a highly competent corps of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla fighters. This capability must be quickly matched with the political skills to conduct unconventional warfare at the village level. This will require training in depth and an extraordinarily high level of individual aptitude and competence. Specifically, we require a system of training—both for our own personnel and for those we are aiding—comparable to that for an army officer, a physician or an engineer. A national institute or staff college comparable to those of the Army, Air Force and Navy is needed to provide a center for training of United States and possibly foreign personnel and for elaborating strategic concepts of unconventional warfare and developing practical and effective tactics to meet the operational problems we now face in many parts of the world. Similar institutes should be established jointly with our NATO partners and in the countries lying across the Communist lines of attack.

The Communists have allowed themselves lead times of as much as 10 to 20 years in training revolutionary leaders. One can only hope that the free world yet has time to build the political leadership, both abroad and at home, to meet their threat successfully.

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IRAN IN CONTINUING CRISIS

By T. Cuyler Young

AFTER several years of relative eclipse, Iran returned to the world's headlines during the summer of 1960 and since then has continued periodically to catch the world's attention. It began with the election of a new Majlis, or National Assembly, the first in four years. The Shah, who throughout this period had been personally running the government, previously had made an effort to stimulate "safe and stable" political competition by encouraging the development of a *Mardom* (Peoples) Party to function as "His Majesty's loyal opposition." He named as its leader Amir Alam, a landed aristocrat of Khurasan, who was generally regarded as a staunch royalist and good friend of the British. The new party was to serve in the Majlis as government critic and to contest the elections with the incumbent *Milliyun* (Nationalist) Party led by Premier Manucher Eqbal. This artificial manœuvre toward two-party democracy was scorned by the intellectuals and the majority of the electorate who are politically aware; even though the heat of the hustings led Alam to criticize the régime so severely as to pain and embarrass the Shah and to frighten Eqbal, they did not consider it representative of any really genuine opposition. The National Front, suppressed since the fall of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, emerged into open political activity, though it scarcely dared to compete formally—certainly not after Abdor Rahman Burumand, member of a prominent Isfahan family and admitted National Frontist, was arrested when he began drawing too large crowds.

More troublesome to the Shah and his government were two independents who sought office. The more prominent, vigorous and embarrassing of these was Dr. Ali Amini, who had been Ambassador in Washington in 1956–58. As Finance Minister under Premier Zahedi, he had been the chief negotiator of the present consortium oil agreement that in 1954 reactivated that industry following its nationalization under Dr. Mosaddeq. Dr. Muzaffar Baqa'i, head of the Toilers Party, originally a supporter of Mosaddeq and the National Front, but subsequently contributor to their overthrow in 1953, avoided any taint of revolution but was so vigorous in criticism of Eqbal, rigged elections and control of the press that he forced both Amini and Alam, belatedly, to join

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the protest against the elections when the absurd majorities of government candidates were announced.

This protest was so acute from all sides that the Shah, who had mistakenly invited foreign correspondents to report his new, free democratic elections to the world, decided to annul them. He called on all those elected to resign in the national interest, jettisoned his puppet Eqbal, and appointed a new premier, Jaafar Sharif-Imami, who forthwith promised new and honest elections.

New elections were held in midwinter, but, in the people's view, with no better methods and poorer results. In protest the National Front generally boycotted the elections, calling them a sham. Dr. Amini did not stand for election, and thereby aroused suspicion that he had made a deal with the Shah. Allayar Saleh, head of the Iran Party—the most moderate element in the National Front[1]—got elected from Kashan, where his backing was so strong as to make government interference unlikely to succeed; because he ran unopposed, some suspicious cynics charged that he too had made a deal with the Shah. In any event, the victory gave the National Front a responsible spokesman for genuine opposition in public discussion.

The Shah opened parliament in February 1961. It was soon apparent, however, that with few exceptions the deputies were of the traditional type, manœuvring for patronage and the spoils of office, hamstringing the best efforts of government, which they ungratefully and glibly harrassed, though not from any basic stance of principle. Within the framework of existing restraints, public dissatisfaction was relatively articulate; it included some vigorous demonstrations by students, and reached its climax in a widespread teachers' strike. The accompanying demonstrations, complicated by the killing of a young high school teacher by the police, led to the downfall of the Sharif-Imami government. Early in May the Shah called on Amini to form a government and shortly thereafter dissolved the 20th Majlis, to the obvious relief of most of the people.

Though much absorbed during the early weeks with the critical state of government finances and dwindling foreign exchange, Dr. Amini made a strong start on the political front. He relaxed previous restraints, allowed more freedom of press criticism, and permitted free assembly—even to the National Front opposition,

[1] The other parties are the Socialist Third Force, the Pan-Iranist, and the People of Iran; the last two are relatively small.

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at designated public places (in Tehran, not the provinces) and on condition of respect for public order. Within a fortnight the National Front, for example, had gathered a crowd at Jalalieh Stadium conservatively estimated at 70,000 people to demand that the government respect the constitution's provision for calling new elections within 30 days of the dissolution of the Majlis.

Although from the start Amini promised elections, any hint of an exact date has been avoided. Moreover, the Prime Minister makes no secret of his dissatisfaction with present electoral laws, and declares that he will not leave office tagged with the opprobrium of allegedly rigged elections, which he regards as inevitable under current regulations. His position is much complicated by the fact that, in response to his government's query, the highest judicial authority has decreed that the electoral law as drawn is constitutional. Opponents of the government know well enough that the Prime Minister does not control the security forces and therefore cannot guarantee such results. But this does not deter them from demanding immediate elections and thereby seriously embarrassing the government. Recent reports from Tehran indicate the Prime Minister is revising the electoral regulations after all.

Politically, the position of the premier has been complicated vis-à-vis the public and the opposition—especially the National Front—by his shift in policy regarding the freedoms of speech, press and assembly. About two months after taking office, he cracked down on the press, some of which had become quite harsh in its criticism; even the large dailies, *Ettela'at* and *Kayhan,* were regularly censored, and as a warning the latter was suspended a day for its alleged irresponsibility. The National Front's scheduled mass meeting to celebrate the anniversary of Mosaddeq's triumph over the Shah in July 1952 was forbidden, and in any case prevented by the arrest of almost all its leadership. Since then no public meetings of the National Front have been permitted. In early August police were sent into the grounds of the University—during the previous year an inviolate asylum of students—to stop meetings and demonstrations; and in the process of resisting students were harshly handled and some were severely beaten.

To these events we shall return later in another context. The point to note here is the disillusion of so many Iranians who had hoped that Amini would be the man to bridge the widening gulf

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between régime and people—the man to implement constitutional procedures and a greater measure of political freedom. They hoped he would lead in the economic, social and political reforms which an increasing number recognize as essential for Iran's development, if not indeed its very survival as a nation.

To understand these events and appreciate the state of the present seething political pot in Iran, one must go behind them to identify and analyze those major developments in the country that constitute essential components of its present political problem.

II

It is trite, yet necessary, to emphasize that Iran is now at a relatively advanced stage in that total social revolution which presently engages most of the non-Western world. Too few in the West appreciate the depth or the breadth of the social change that currently engulfs a country like Iran. Society is profoundly convulsed, wherever one turns to deal with it: the old patriarchal extended family and its patterns of relationships—of parents and children, of marriage and divorce, of status and security; the threatened paternalism, especially of the rural areas, where landlords are no longer taken for granted, and where these very landowners are exacerbating their tenant relationships by mechanization that converts farmers into wage laborers; the traditionally independent but now awakened tribes which, in exchange for military service and stricter taxation, demand a greater share in such welfare services of the state as education and public health; the remarkable advances in public health and hygiene that have lowered the death rate since World War II as much as that of Europe in this century, that have almost eliminated malaria and finally brought the country's opium curse under relative control, and that have contributed to an estimated population increase of 2.5 percent a year, so that half the population is now under 18 years of age; the recent rapid industrialization that is changing the urban scene, producing a growing proletarian labor force which is not satisfied with current conditions since it has been assured that improvement is possible as well as its right; the burgeoning middle class to be found in every city and especially articulate in Tehran, where it constitutes the major threat to the status quo and the old order; widespread education that for all its faults and limitations has produced a new substantial intel-

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lectual élite and has raised the literacy rate to about 65 percent in the capital, though still under 15 percent in rural areas; the majority of these urban groups impatient with the old traditions and avid for modernization of all kinds, even though it brings tension with traditional customs, mores and values, and cuts those involved—especially the youth—adrift from old moorings, rendering them unable as yet to find new values and convictions by which to live; the pattern of Islamic piety no longer meaningful for such groups, the bulk of whom adhere to their heritage mainly for purposes of social solidarity and identity, confusing much of this with their highly emotional nationalistic faith; and alas, despite individual brilliant exceptions, the majority of the Shii religious leaders still oriented toward medievalism, untutored in modern thought, and hence unable to give those moderns among their fellows any satisfying leads as to how to reconcile the old heritage with new necessities.

Of primary importance among all these changes is economic development, which in Iran has been remarkable, if not indeed spectacular during recent years. Iran is economically one of the most favored countries of Asia. In terms of natural and material resources, the country's problems are far less formidable than, for instance, those of Egypt, Pakistan or India. It has been self-sufficient in food, and has the resources of land and water—as yet not brought together—to continue so. There are varied and substantial material resources that need only adequate capital and skilled manpower to be exploited for building a relatively modest but reasonably diversified economy. And to help stimulate such development there are oil revenues of approximately $300,000,000 a year, representing about 10 percent of the estimated Gross National Product and about 25–30 percent of the governmental budget. From this source comes adequate foreign exchange, all of it in hard currencies.

The human resources are more developed than in many other countries, although education in greater quantity and quality is needed; especially needed is a better balance in the kind of education made available. The Persian Gulf Command of World War II and a decade of Point 4 technical assistance attest that here is a highly intelligent people, with rather unusual manual and artistic skills. Experienced managerial talent, trained technicians and highly skilled labor constitute the manpower bottlenecks in present economic and social development. Yet beyond

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even these is the urgent need for adequate and reliable administrative talent within the government to marshal and coördinate what is available to attain present goals. Presently there is a woeful waste of both material and human resources for want of a social environment within which they can become effective.

This has become particularly apparent in the difficulties recently met on the economic front. For five or six years following the reactivation of the oil industry late in 1954, economic development went forward by leaps and bounds. The annual rate of investment was at least 20 percent, perhaps a bit better; and that of net economic growth was between 5 and 6 percent. A steeply rising scale of oil royalties, a succession of good harvests, relative improvement in external security and internal order, and substantial external loans and grants have contributed to this rapid growth. In the last decade United States loans have amounted to over $200,000,000, while economic and military grants have totaled approximately $850,000,000.

Most significant was the share of the private sector in this over-all growth. During 1956–57, for instance, it appears that one-third of new investment was from private sources, spread in the fields of industry, construction, agriculture, and trade and banking—in that order of percentage. For the first time the industrial investment exceeded that in construction, traditionally the main area for private capital.

Yet the very rapidity of this development has brought its complicating problems. Imports were uncontrolled and large sums went for luxury goods within the reach only of the rich; the same economic élite profited most from the new investments, especially in industry and construction, both private and governmental; and the tax collection still pressed most heavily on the rank and file of society. Skyrocketing land values and exorbitant rents, especially in Tehran, constituted the largest burden for the urban groups, both salaried and wage-earning, whose buying power shrank under an annual inflation rate of about 10 percent, just when they were beginning to acquire tastes for new goods and services regarded by many as necessities for modern living.

Perhaps worst of all was the too easy and uncontrolled credit, expensive though it was by Western standards; this tempted many into inordinate expansion on shoestring capital and brought a number to bankruptcy in the last year, when finally curbs and controls had to be applied. For months during 1958–60, Plan Or-

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ganization economists had warned of such eventual trouble, but it was not until the early autumn of 1960 that the government adopted a program of economic stabilization—and then only under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, supported by United States lending authorities, all of which refused further loans without such measures. In fact, during the early months of 1961 the Sharif-Imami government defaulted on enforcement of this agreement so that the Plan Organization could not secure installments on previously authorized credits from the World Bank. Uncontrolled imports had seriously depleted foreign-exchange reserves. The budget for 1961–62 was apparently balanced but most who knew were sure there were unrealistic estimates on both sides of the ledger. Governmental credit with the Central and Melli Banks was perilously low.

This economic and monetary crisis absorbed much of Dr. Amini's best efforts during May and June, and in meeting it he demonstrated rather unusual understanding and courage. Not only were the provisions of economic stabilization reactivated but some unpopular measures to conserve foreign exchange were initiated, such as prohibiting exchange for some 200 super-luxury imports, raising duty on many other items by as much as four times, and eliminating all travel abroad except in cases of demonstrable necessity. To help meet the government's financial crisis, the United States made available $62.6 million although most of it was released from loans previously negotiated. The effect of all this has been salutary.

It is well to remember, however, that economic development (which in the case of Iran has been substantial, despite its shortcomings) is not, as many think, the preventer of revolution or the answer to social unrest. Enough is known historically of revolutions to indicate it is not at the nadir of poverty and distress that a people is restive and revolutionary but when the economy has experienced some growth and promise of a better life. Moreover, the really revolutionary and dangerous point is likely to be reached when a society, having achieved markedly improved growth and promise, is then unable to sustain that growth or to deliver the promised improvements. This is the thrust point of Iran's present danger, sharpened by the inability or unwillingness of the Shah and his ministers to perceive that hard political decisions are essential if economic growth is to be sustained and popular expectations minimally satisfied.

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III

Essential for such sustained growth is the Third Plan for development, now under cabinet consideration; later a Majlis will presumably have to review and approve it in some enabling legislation. Without question this represents the first truly comprehensive economic and social planning in Iran. Compared to it, the Second Seven Year Plan (the First never really got off the ground because of the interruption of oil production in 1951–53) was a congeries of disparate projects. The emphasis of the Third Plan is shifted from expensive infrastructures—such as dams (power and irrigation) and communications (air, land and sea) —to more basic needs such as agriculture (coöperatives, extension services and feeder roads: about 22 percent) and social affairs (local development, health and education: about 25 percent). Slightly over 50 percent of the total is allocated to rural areas, which were badly neglected in the Second Plan. Moreover, the Plan has been divided as to core necessities (60 percent) and less essential provisions, allowing planned flexibility in the face of unexpected shortages and necessary curtailment; and the allocations to the core in the fields of agriculture and social affairs are substantially higher than those for industry and communications.

In the improved economic and fiscal climate created by Amini it was possible for the Plan Organization last summer to send to Europe and to the United States representatives to open preliminary negotiations for foreign funding of a substantial segment of the Third Plan, which is to run for five and a half years beginning September 1962. The planners estimate that of a total outlay of almost $4.85 billion (public and private), almost 19 percent, or $900,000,000, represents the resource gap which will have to be filled by foreign borrowing (the present rate of $80,000,000 a year is considered possible and sound) and increased taxation (slightly more than $80,000,000 a year). There are, however, any number of serious problems connected with this program that will have to be faced and solved before Iran can hope to secure the external loans that she seeks. These involve internal reforms and self-help of the kind that President Kennedy has declared to be the conditions for aid, at least from the United States.

Although some ministries are badly understaffed, others are fat with the idle and incompetent; the ablest public servants

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work hard for long hours, but the majority do not. Many payrolls are padded with scores and hundreds of "consultants" or those "awaiting assignment," who draw half pay and never appear—a situation which the agency or ministry prefers to their incompetent presence and meddling. The Amini government began bravely and authorized clean-ups in certain agencies where chiefs were willing and aided by some tough assistants. In one agency the deputy for administration, who jettisoned 70 such persons as approved by the Prime Minister, complained that he had no time to get on to the next category for surgery since a large part of his time went to telephone calls from cabinet and other high officials pleading for their friends and families. He refused to budge on a single one; but there are few administrators with such gumption and disregard of big names. The government in August circulated the draft of a new civil service law that would improve administration were it ever to be enacted and enforced. The question is whether any government in the old tradition can effect such reform. This could test the nature and quality of Amini's government.

Connected with this problem is the scandal of corruption, meriting serious attention because of its alleged kind and degree, organized in the highest circles and involving colossal sums. The allegations are naturally exaggerated; but the fact that corruption is firmly and widely believed to be on a vast scale is in itself a matter that must be reckoned with.

On assuming office Dr. Amini jailed four prominent generals in the previous government, along with other agency and bureau chiefs dealing with licensing, monopolies and the like. Although the Justice Ministry has worked hard on the cases, and Amini is quoted as saying that he "means business," only one general has so far been brought to trial, much less convicted. To arrest and not be able to file an indictment, let alone secure a conviction, is likely to boomerang with the public—convinced as it is of the accused's guilt but not of the integrity of justice and cabinet officials.

Corruption on high and in large sums there undoubtedly is, but to prove it is not easy when the rot is widespread, especially in top circles. Yet one suspects that these more spectacular leakages in public funds, large though they be, are not as significant absolutely as they are relatively—as symbol and example in lowering the tone of public morality and morale. In this respect

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such corruption increases that leakage by what is regarded as normal influence percentages and the sheer inefficiency of an overstuffed bureaucracy; for excusing and dodging responsibility for these, the corruption scandal is convenient—real though it certainly is.

IV

To effect vital reforms in these areas there are two possible approaches: drastic measures to be taken at the very top, provided there is both the necessary will and power; and the pitiless exposure of corruption and inefficiency before the public, the force of whose consensus may then be expressed by informal denunciation and formal franchise. A close look at these possibilities, not necessarily mutually exclusive, will lead us to the heart of the issues now stirring Iran.

Take, first, reform from the top. Is there the will to act by those responsible: the Shah, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and all those who must impose whatever sanctions are invoked? Such will is publicized, but past efforts to exercise it have not produced results which satisfied an alienated and skeptical public. Substantial portions of that public, though ready to voice criticism and skepticism, will resist reform when it touches them on the quick of ingrained habits or vested privileges. One wonders if, in a paternalistic and personalized society where an interrelated, privileged élite constitutes the governing majority, even sincere leaders, with reasonable courage, can adequately conceive, much less successfully implement, these necessary governmental and administrative reforms. One regrets to report the deep skepticism of the majority of the urban middle class, which is in revolt against tradition and these interests, and becoming increasingly frustrated and angered at what they consider to be the betrayal of the country by these traditional interests.

But why should not the "top," if sincere in will, enlist this public, especially its leadership, in the task of identification and exposure of the inefficient, inadequate and immoral? Mainly because the "top" fears that such partnership might involve its own "toppling"—that to share its prestige and power might endanger the nation's stability and security. In short, society's top does not trust the bottom, and even less the awakened and aware middle. The heart of Iran's problem is the need for revolutionary *and* responsible leadership; how to traverse the distance from a

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traditional paternalism to a modern industrialism, how to bridge the gulf of mistrust that has developed between modern tinkerers with tradition and rebels against that tradition, how to transmit power from the small, habitual élite to the substantial, untested middle sector of society, and how to effect this in a disturbed and dynamic world in which the country's integrity and independence are ever in peril.

As elsewhere, the problem of how to attain freedom with order is central. Premier Amini during his first two months gave evidence of welcoming criticism and extending freedom. It was inevitable that once the sluice gates were opened there should be a rush of pent-up waters, leading in some instances to violent overstatement. Critics became bold and shot accusations at specific top-flight targets that began to squirm and cry "Foul"—in some cases with reason. In a highly surcharged atmosphere, huge public meetings were held to demand constitutional procedures without delay. Attack came not only from the aggressive left but from the intriguing right. Neither was handled with finesse. The two major political fishermen on the right (Azamudeh and Aramesh), instead of being coolly discredited by facts and then ridiculed before the public, were arrested (later released on bail), and thereby given valuable publicity and made political martyrs.

More serious was the government's conflict with the National Front, which the Shah deeply distrusts. Ever since he clashed with Mosaddeq in 1953, was victorious and returned to power, he has been less than rational on the subject of the National Front. Understandable though this may be, it is extremely unfortunate for the future of Iran.

Undeniably the Front has hardly inspired confidence. Despite its assurances of a completely orderly mass meeting and despite its protestations of loyalty to His Majesty as a constitutional sovereign, at a moment of internal economic and political crisis coinciding with unusual external world tension, the Front planned to celebrate a day on which the Shah was humiliated by Mosaddeq. This seemed to be irresponsible provocation. The Front argues that the day was made a national holiday by the Majlis and the law signed by the Shah; but this is doctrinaire and unrealistic, if not naïve. Amini (convinced by the Shah and his military?) argues, *after* he had arrested almost all the Front leaders and filled Tehran with tanks to prevent a gathering, that the Soviets and the Tudeh Communists were clearly preparing to

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create disorder, if not perhaps a holocaust. Why did he not denounce Front irresponsibility *before* the event, permit the gathering in accordance with initially announced principles, and then put the tanks at readiness for action in the event of disorder? Thus he could have tested Front intentions and claims, held it strictly responsible for any disorder, and preserved his own stance in favor of promised freedom of assembly. Granted the risk, the result could scarcely have been worse than his loss, from this point on, of what support he had retained with the left and urban middle class.

On the other hand, the Front could ask why, a month later, the government deemed it appropriate to celebrate the anniversary of the overthrow of Mosaddeq and the National Front, with the Shah as sole speaker and supported by the régime's security forces. To reverse the coin of judgment, it may be observed that it was questionable statesmanship for the Shah and his government to widen the gap between themselves and the people by rubbing salt in these old wounds, when what the nation much needs in critical days is more unity and some rapprochement between the two. In between these two anniversaries came Constitution Day. What a difference it might have made had the National Front planned to celebrate this day only; and even more, if the government, instead of exploiting the day for its own propaganda, had scheduled a celebration in which all citizens could truly have united!

Clearly each side in this contest is deeply convinced there is no room for compromise or possible rapprochement. Shades of Ahuramazdah and Ahriman! Here is Allah arrayed against the Devil, each side convinced that it is clothed in white, its antagonist in black: a dangerous political impasse, weighted with portent of trouble.

In this political tussle and head-on collision, Premier Amini has been manœuvred into a position of staunch supporter of the Shah, if not indeed of identification with his policies. The central question is whether the Shah or the National Front represents the people and the policy that is best for the nation; or whether some third ground between them is what the country needs.

There is little doubt that the overwhelming majority of the politically concerned and aware among the people are back of the National Front. This excludes the masses—peasants, tribesmen and laborers—who are relatively indifferent or inarticulate,

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though rapidly awakening and becoming potentially important; they damn the régime, but blame the Shah's advisers and entourage. In a negative sense, the wide support of the National Front is underlined by the fact that recent governments have had to maintain stability and themselves in power by force, one instrument of which is SAVAK, the hated security police, which has been privately denounced by former ministers and elder statesmen. It is also clear from the fact that when within the last year some loosening of controls has been allowed, dissatisfaction has become so apparent as to frighten those in power.

Yet whether the National Front leadership, for all its popular support, is able to forge, much less to execute, policies for better guardianship and guidance of the nation seems doubtful. The leaders of the Front support constitutionalism, avow loyalty to the throne, emphasize freedom, promise honest administration, and denounce Communism; but these admirable principles are not accompanied by much evidence of political realism or practicality or by any specific program that would give thoughtful people, in and out of government, a basis for confidence in supporting the Front. As a coalition the Front apparently cannot agree on such a program, argues that this is the task of individual parties. This may seem to be good negative tactics for ousting those presently in power (though this is debatable), but it does not inspire confidence that the Front would come to power with a unified executive and a constructive, integrated program. There are many sympathizers with the Front, especially among the educated youth and intellectuals, who share these misgivings.

There was reason to believe that Amini might help to bridge the deep gulf between the National Front and the Shah, and it was hoped he might find some third ground between the two. But that hope has been dimmed as events have moved the Premier nearer the Shah, farther from the Front—primarily because he has postponed new elections indefinitely, returned to a strict press censorship, denied public assembly, agreed to governmental policing of the university campus, and tacitly fostered the confusion, if not indeed identification, of the National Front with the Tudeh Communists.

The relation of the National Front to the Tudeh Communists is important. The Front denies any collaboration, and there is substantial reason to believe this is true. The danger is not collaboration, but infiltration, despite the best efforts of the Front

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to prevent it; most Frontists could be duped by dissimulating Tudeh members. None knows how strong the Tudeh is, except presumably the security police. Many, however, doubt even this, and point to the confusion this service creates, presumably with royal sanction, by using a variety of means to smear the National Front with the Communist label; this is for the benefit of the Americans, so the cynics observe. The danger would come from any sudden release of all restraints by any radically new government, bringing home all Tudeh exiles and into the open all those underground. Russia would likely exploit such a situation in Iran better than she did in Iraq in 1958. Yet one gets the impression that National Front leaders have learned much on this score since 1953 and would take great pains to resist such Tudeh exploitation of the Front's position—provided, of course, that such exploitation were evident and identifiable.

V

This brings us to a deep and long-standing governmental problem in Iran: the nature of the monarchy. To put it bluntly: Is the Shah to reign or rule? By constitutional theory, he reigns; and, compared to most constitutional monarchs, he has much power. Yet, for the last six years the Shah has chosen to rule. His strong father, Reza Shah, established Iran's independence and launched her modernization between the two World Wars as a dictator, for all his continuation of constitutional forms. Mohammed Reza in his first decade on the throne tried to reign as a constitutional king. Influenced by his father's shadow, alarmed by his near loss of the throne in 1953, and genuinely concerned with promoting "positive nationalism" and practical modernization, he has become convinced—almost mystically—that he has a mission to save his country. During recent years he has ruled, not reigned.

Despite demonstrable economic progress, as well as the admirable example set by the Shah's distribution of at least half the royal estates to the peasants tilling them, it is the opinion of a large and varied segment of the population—especially of the intellectuals, professional men, smaller businessmen, government officials and other members of the urban middle group—that the Shah's rule has been inadequate in results; they feel so particularly because of the price that has been paid in the curtailment of freedom and the extension of the penetrating power of the secret

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police. They complain that the rule is too personal and arbitrary, that no one person, not even the exceptionally intelligent, knowledgeable and hard-working Shah, can be expected to be adequate on all fronts of government, especially when so many of his close advisers are inadequate in vision, dedication and competence, and unprepared to question his personal and sometimes mistaken desires and decisions.

What is most disturbing to so many, including some of His Majesty's staunchest supporters, is that such rule may imperil the throne, to which they are more strongly attached than to its present occupant. As Premier Amini himself expressed it, both the constitution and political prudence require that the throne be above responsibility and not become identified with day-to-day government, since no government, however competent or successful, can indefinitely satisfy a people, particularly one impatient, inexperienced and uncomprehending of the complexities and difficulties of government in a period of revolutionary social change. The Prime Minister is to be admired for his policy of assuming full responsibility for his government, insisting that the Shah be separated from such responsibility. All the more courageous is this when there is reason to believe that in many instances he may have been pressed by the Shah and the court entourage to take action about which he himself may have had grave doubts; and that in other instances he has found that his governmental writ goes only to the doors of the security forces and secret police.

This state within a state is rooted in the constitutional provision that the military forces are under the command of the Shah, not of the civilian chief of state. In recent years these forces have come to include those of the Ministry of Interior—the rural gendarmerie, municipal police and secret service. During the last 20 years this problem has actively concerned in varying degrees the strong premiers—Qavam, Razmara, Mosaddeq and even Zahedi. It was on this issue that the Shah challenged Mosaddeq in July 1952 and soon had to yield to intense public opinion marshalled by the National Front in a general strike. Understandably, since 1953 the Shah has determined that such a threat should not be allowed to reëmerge, much less to succeed. This is a basic constitutional and governmental problem in Iran, not likely to yield to any radical solution during the leadership of the present Shah, even were he to return to reign, rather than to rule.

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Under a strong Prime Minister, there may be some royal withdrawal from direct and specific contact with the business of government; but there is no evidence of withholding the whole battery of available indirect pressures which His Majesty is very skilled at marshalling. It is the results of the exercise of this skill which have led many of those dissatisfied or disillusioned with the Shah's recent personal rule to conclude that Amini has been manœuvred into the position of another, though tougher and abler, supporter of the existing régime. Their hopes that here was the bridge to a new pattern and a faster pace of modernization appear dampened. This situation is further complicated by the fact that a powerful conservative élite, blind to inevitable social change, also mistrusts the court and the Shah, who tries to operate somewhere between this élite and demands for modernization. A kind of political triangulation results, involving the Shah, the conservative élite and the urban middle class led by the National Front.

This political pattern poses a serious problem in regard to the development of a new and abler cadre of public servants from the swelling reservoir of educated youth. Much of the credit for recent economic progress must go to a group of competent young men in and out of government. Within the government this cadre of dedicated technocrats has accomplished much when given adequate opportunity and leadership. Their education and competence propel them upward toward posts of political importance and policy; yet to join the régime at the policy level renders them suspect with many of their fellows. Some of this suspicion is born of jealousy or envy; much of it, however, arises out of the conviction that compromises must have been made with the powerful and corrupt, and that there is room at the top only for those willing to betray the values of democracy and freedom.

Whatever else may be said for the Shah's policy and rule during recent years—and this can be substantial—certain it is that conditions have not been created in which the oncoming generation can mature into responsible leaders. The glaring inadequacy of Reza Shah's dictatorship was his thwarting of the development of a cadre of experienced and mature younger statesmen. As a result, Iran suffered a famine of such men after World War II when there were great opportunities; the country had to rely almost solely on those trained and tested before Reza Shah's dictatorship. This has impoverished Iranian leadership in the last

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decade. Mohammed Reza has scarcely bettered his father in this respect, and the worst results of the leadership famine are still to come in the decade ahead.

VI

Examination of one other set of political developments in Iran may conclude this review and point up some basic issues. These involve international relationships, particularly as they relate to the cold war.

Basic in this area is the traditional neutralist policy of Iran in this century, born out of the rivalry of Britain-in-India and Russia since the eighteenth century. Iran survived by playing the one off against the other, trying to keep an even balance between them; and thereby she acquired a deep psychic habit of viewing most of her affairs—internal and external—in this context.

Immediately after World War II the United States championed Iranian independence against Soviet threats in Azerbaijan and in connection with the Soviet-Iranian oil treaty subsequently proposed for development of Northern Iran; in 1946 the U.S.S.R. withdrew from Azerbaijan and in 1947 Iran rejected the treaty. Then during Iran's struggle with Britain over the southern oil industry, the United States, initially restraining Britain, finally joined her in a policy that overthrew Dr. Mosaddeq and the National Front and returned the Shah to throne and power. Thereafter the United States became the dominant Western power and partner in Iran, naturally opposed to the Soviets who had begun the cold war in Azerbaijan.

The Shah in 1955 abandoned traditional foreign policy, joined the Baghdad Pact, now CENTO. Although the United States has never formally joined, everyone recognizes that it is available United States power that gives CENTO any effectiveness; and the United States has underlined this by the bilateral military defense pact with Iran. During the last decade, as we have noted, the United States has furnished Iran more than a billion dollars in economic and military aid. Like it or not, justly or unjustly, this has served to identify the United States with the Shah's régime, together with responsibility for what that régime has done, or failed to do. Also, however unjustly, popular opinion holds that the sums have been wasted as far as helping the common people of Iran is concerned.

For this reason the United States is distrusted, if not indeed

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thoroughly disliked, by all those who have come to distrust the Shah and oppose his policies. Among these anti-Western, anti-United States groups are those who still think and feel in the neutralist tradition, who deplore such complete alliance with, but especially dependence upon, the United States. This is not so much because of fear of what Russia may do by way of reaction, though this is real; it is rather their fear of becoming so beholden to, and identified with, the United States that the nation loses its independence and freedom of action. Fiercely patriotic and nationalistic, they are suspicious of any policy that might give any great power undue hold upon them; and this they believe massive economic and military aid makes possible. Beyond this, they believe that the United States is interested primarily in the status quo and fearful of permitting any change that could in any way mean social revolution. This may seem unfair to Americans; but we need to realize this is our dominant image in Iran today.

What the United States can do in the light of the present situation is another subject and not easy to determine. What she does will inevitably affect basic issues and the trend of future events. But these trends will be primarily determined by the Iranians themselves as they struggle with their most basic issue, that of adequate leadership. Amidst such tension and turmoil, much of it seething beneath the surface, some sudden coup or lightning accident could alter the scene overnight. The present pattern cannot persist without explosion or significant change. One can but hope that sane, steady and competent leadership may somehow emerge sufficient to the challenge of the crisis.

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THE NEW AFRICAN PROFILE

By Chief H. O. Davies

THE revolutionary transformation of the African continent from a congeries of passive, dependent territories into an association of active, sovereign states attained its climax in 1960. At the end of 1959, there were only nine independent states on the continent; a year later there were 27. Even without the additions that occurred during 1961, sovereign states became the majority on the African continent as against a minority of colonial or quasi-colonial territories. The revolution of African independence had become an objective fact.

After a year, the question may be asked: How are these new states faring in their independence? How are their constitutions working out in relation to the needs and aspirations of their people? What is the pattern, if any, of the constitutional system which is evolving and what is the shape of the African profile that is emerging? A comprehensive answer to these questions would require a review not only of the political activities of the new states, but also of what they are doing in economic, social, cultural and spiritual realms. Although this obviously cannot be undertaken here, we may find a partial answer by examining some of the problems, contradictions and inconsistencies bequeathed to us by colonial rule, or created by independence itself, and the manner in which they are being solved or reconciled.

Perhaps the most fundamental problem that has confronted the newly independent states is the difficult task of fitting their people to the alien constitutions which have been adopted. The colonial powers have greatly influenced the former colonies in the making of their constitutions. The educated élite in the colonial territory and the representatives of the metropolitan country who negotiated and drafted the constitutions had both been bred in the climate of the metropolitan constitution and were *ad idem* in the belief that a carbon copy of that constitution was all that was required. Little did they realize that their outlook on life generally was completely foreign to that of the ordinary citizens of the colony. In the end, the constitutions that were made were not only alien to the nature and needs of the ordinary citizens of the new states, they were so advanced and complicated as to be completely misunderstood. The net result is that, in the absence

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of constitutions suitable for the people, the people have to be suited to their new constitutions. This arduous process is still going on.

In the British territories, for example, after some 30 years of colonial rule, only a handful of Africans had exercised the vote and this was restricted to people with specified incomes in a few important towns. The masses lived more or less the old traditional life of uncritical obedience to their chiefs and to the expatriate administrative officers, for the system of indirect rule perpetuated the old method of government by limited leadership. The Obas, Emirs, Asantehene, chiefs and district heads were the leaders of the people and commanded their unflinching loyalty. Contrary to the misconception of the uninformed critics, these leaders were not autocrats ruling by whim and caprice. They had their councils of distinguished chiefs and elders with whom they discussed issues and constantly consulted. The authority of the leaders devolved on a hierarchy of lesser rulers from the national level to the remotest village. Every ruler, great or small, was advised by his own council which gave him its loyalty. Both the leader and the council members were selected either on hereditary qualifications or on the merit of their past performance in the community.

With the coming of self-government, however, the alien system of parliamentary democracy, as practiced in the metropolitan country, was introduced, as it were, overnight. In the English-speaking states, party politics, electioneering campaigns, universal adult suffrage, secret ballot, parliament, ministries, the cabinet, the Speaker and the Opposition all sprang into existence as if by the magician's wand. The obvious underlying assumption was that a constitution which was good for Britain, and the facsimile of which had kept the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand together, must be good enough for everybody else. It was assumed that the greatness achieved by the colonial power had been due to the constitution under which it was governed and that the colonial peoples must submit to complete transformation if they wished to attain greatness.

Elsewhere, the constitution followed the French Presidential system. Chieftaincy, on the whole, had suffered a decline in the French-speaking territories, for there the colonial rulers believed in "direct" rule and paid relatively little attention to African political tradition. To this extent, the impact of an imposed alien

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constitution, introduced suddenly upon the attainment of self-government, was somewhat moderated.

Generally speaking, however, these facsimile constitutions have not been a tremendous success anywhere. The ordinary people do not understand party politics, except as a call to war against the members of the rival parties. The martial spirit in the people, which had become moribund or latent with the abolition of the slave trade and the stoppage of raiding expeditions, seems to be suddenly aroused by the coming of party politics. The truth about human nature is that adventure and war are more exciting and therefore more welcome than a life of drudgery and peaceful inactivity. The stimulus of a new world to conquer has throughout the ages evoked enthusiastic response. The unsophisticated citizens of the new African states mistake party slogans for a clarion call to war and they go into it with zest. The result is that the people who enjoyed peace and unity during the colonial days are now divided into political warring camps, sniping at each other and sometimes engaging in violent encounter.

The alien system of government by party politics opened new vistas of wealth and power to a people who had literally been starved of them. Everybody who could, therefore, has sallied forth along the road to political and plutocratic eminence. Those who found themselves in power have used every stratagem to keep themselves there, while for those in the minority no weapon has been too mean to employ in an effort to encompass the downfall of the government and to attain power. In Ghana and in some parts of Nigeria, supporters of rival political parties are constantly in conflict, beating each other up and wounding and sometimes killing. Nigerian national newspapers are regularly full of stories of partisan clashes which often result in casualties.

It is a source of constant complaint in Nigeria that the customary courts and Tax Assessment Committees which have been established in the Regions are manned wholly by members and supporters of the government party and that they use their position to victimize their opponents, imposing upon them arbitrary and excessive tax assessments. In default of payment, the victims face prosecution and imprisonment without just cause.

One would like to be able to say that these tactics are a passing phase and that, as political education and experience spread, normal relations will soon be established. Unfortunately, the politicians show no interest in encouraging such political educa-

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tion as might enable their supporters to overcome prejudices which so far have operated to their own advantage.

A careful analysis of party politics suggests that the evil is probably in the method of choosing the people's representatives. Under the indigenous African political system, the most common criterion in the selection of the leader or chief is heredity. However inequitable that method may be, it at least makes for stability. Once the leader is chosen, he functions for the whole of his life, subject to good behavior, and he therefore has no cause to curry favor with his fellow citizens. Any dispute about succession that may arise is narrowed down to which of rival candidates is the most entitled, and this is an issue of status. Once that is settled and the leader accepted, that is the end of the matter. Until he dies or is removed by higher powers, he continues to function without the fear of being defeated at the next election.

The system of parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, rests on the unproven theory that every citizen or taxpayer has a right to be represented and that he should exercise that right by direct vote for the candidate of his choice. No prerequisite qualification of behavior, ability or performance is demanded of the parliamentary candidate and everybody, literally speaking, is entitled to put himself forward. In an unenlightened community, it thus becomes expedient, if not legitimate, for any aspirant, conscious of his limitations and the electorate's lack of judgment, to use all methods available to get himself into office. Thus the two-party system of election lends itself to bribery and corruption on a large scale, and encourages hooliganism, and the invocation of tribal, racial and religious prejudices. These stratagems are indulged in by political parties and their candidates notwithstanding the written law which forbids them. And since elections are periodic, those who get into power want to stay in power; they resort to the use of patronage and nepotism in favor of their supporters and to creating an atmosphere of frustration around those who do not give them their support.

On the use of violence in furtherance of party interests in Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah wrote: "A campaign of violence developed in Ashanti where the situation became so desperate that hundreds of Ashanti C.P.P. men and women were forced to leave their homes and to seek refuge in other parts of the country."[1]

[1] "Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah." New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957, p. 216.

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In Nigeria, similar charges have been constantly made by various political parties about the plight of their members and supporters in the Regions where they are in the minority. The parties in power were accused of using such strong-arm methods against members of the Opposition that several of them were forced to leave their Regions and find temporary refuge elsewhere.

In this "War of the Roses," the party in power, having all the organs of government at its disposal, has almost invariably come out victorious. It is a matter for serious doubt whether any party in power in any African state can ever be defeated in subsequent elections. In the older states like Liberia or Ethiopia, the governments of President Tubman and Emperor Haile Selassie seem to run on incessantly. In Ghana, the methods used by Dr. Nkrumah and his party, the C.P.P., to liquidate the Opposition were a ruthless and arbitrary exercise of powers by a government which had overwhelming support. The excuse that the Opposition were resorting to methods unfavorable to unity seems very poor justification for arresting and imprisoning members of the Opposition, without trial, under the Preventive Detention Act. In Sierra Leone, which attained independence in April 1961, the members of a minority opposition party, the African Peoples Party, were rounded up and locked in jail during the independence celebrations in order that they might not wreck the ceremonies, as they were alleged to have threatened to do.

Broadly speaking, the African parliamentarian does not understand the meaning or function of the Opposition. He believes that once a leader has been elected, he is in for good and everybody must accept his leadership. He tends to regard the opposition member as a saboteur who should be hounded out of the political arena. The only place throughout West Africa where the Opposition appears to be happily accommodated is in the Federal Parliament of Nigeria. This is due, in large measure, to the federal character of the legislature. But the personality of the Federal Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a thoroughbred democrat, and the willingness of the people to accept compromise, both make a significant contribution. All things taken into consideration, however, the emergent profile of the African politician appears to be that of the leader who has no use and no sympathy for the Opposition.

Another serious defect of the two-party system, as it is applied in Africa, is its wastefulness in human and material resources.

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Owing to party antagonism, a government in power is never inclined to rely upon the administrative or technical skill of members or supporters of any rival party. In most places, the applicant for a government post is disqualified immediately if he belongs to or sympathizes with a rival party. Thus one sees the paradox of a country which suffers from want of managerial and technological skill, and which has embarked upon ambitious plans for development, excluding qualified citizens from service simply because they belong to a different political party.

The practice of parliamentary democracy itself is terribly expensive, especially under a federal system. Nigeria, for example, has eight legislative houses, which are likely soon to be increased to ten. She has one Governor-General and three governors; one Prime Minister and three Premiers; over 100 ministers, about the same number of junior ministers; and myriad legislators. The expense of supporting the formidable array of institutions and instrumentalities which are called into active play is enormous and it is doubtful whether Nigeria, with its comparatively slender means, can shoulder the burden for long. Each government, regional as well as federal, slavishly imitates the structure and forms of parliamentary practice of the metropolitan country. The result is that the citizens of Nigeria, who number less than the population of the United Kingdom, are called upon to pay four times as much for their administration as the British people. This is a crippling burden that threatens to overwhelm a young state.

There are one or two other constitutional problems which may be briefly mentioned. Since the powers of the different legislative and executive organs of the new states are set out in written constitutions, the task of interpreting the constitution falls upon the judiciary.

Both in the British and the French African states, provision is made in the constitution for safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, which is regarded everywhere as the guardian of the freedom of the individual. To place the judges above influence and corruption, their salaries are made bounteous. Appointments, promotions, dismissals and the general welfare of judicial officers are normally removed from governmental interference and left in the hands of an independent Judicial Service Commission or Superior Judiciary Council. In some of the constitutions it is provided that judges may not be removed from office.

The politicians assail this security in several ways. In Ghana,

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for example, by legislative adroitness the Judicial Service Commission was abolished and some of the judges are now appointed, in effect, by the President of the Republic. In Nigeria, some of the legislatures frequently exclude the jurisdiction of the courts by express provisions in the acts they pass. Also, new courts of a subordinate character, *e.g.* the customary courts in Nigeria, have been created, and these are generally placed outside the control of the Judicial Service Commission and under a politician, usually the Minister of Local Government. In these ways, the safeguards provided in the constitution are often bypassed and the courts are sometimes made an organ of political action.

In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, several fundamental human rights are imbedded in the constitution and a clause provides that any law which is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution shall be void to the extent of that inconsistency. Here lies an ever-present opportunity for serious friction between the judiciary and the legislature, some of whose members cannot understand why any limitations should be placed on the sovereignty of Parliament, or why an individual judge should be set above the collective wisdom of the legislators.

The contradictions and inconsistencies which independence itself has brought have created additional problems for the new states. Every citizen wants to be completely rid of all vestiges of colonialism. He is very sensitive to anything which savors of the old relationship. The slogan throughout the African world appears to be: "Away with neo-colonialism."

For this reason, each state takes early steps to Africanize its administrative service, sometimes at the expense of efficiency and almost invariably upon the payment of heavy compensation to the expatriates relieved of their employment. This really is as it should be. The continuance of an expatriate citizen in a strategic administrative position would be expected to arouse a nationalist's suspicion that colonialism might be returning by the back door. He therefore insists that the expatriate servants of the government and corporations should be replaced by Africans. Since no government can afford to ignore the views of the nationalists, "ization"[2] has become a cardinal policy of all new states, subject only to the proviso that it should not be implemented at reckless cost in efficiency.

[2] A suffix to words like Nigerian, Ghanaian, Sudan, etc., and indicating the process by which expatriates are replaced by nationals. The initial letter "i" undoubtedly stands for India, where the effort to replace expatriates with indigenes first started as a national policy.

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What really frustrates "ization" is the patent fact that the new states are poor, and that they lack capital, technological know-how and managerial skill. Conscious of the vital importance of economic development, they have to look to the old source for expertise, and they fully realize that economic aid, whether by way of loan or gift, would appear to come more gracefully from the pocket of the erstwhile colonial power, which may feel a sense of obligation to see the young state well on its feet.

There is, however, a lingering suspicion that such aid will carry with it some obligations which may amount to a return of imperialism in a new guise. So the nationalist in the new state shouts at the top of his voice for "Aid without strings!" and "Freedom to borrow from any source!" But as time goes on, it becomes increasingly obvious, even to the least observant, that such slogans overlook a simple political truth. Altruism does not have any place in international relations. As this fact becomes more evident, the young state unobtrusively returns to the old friend. He then accepts the truism that it is better to treat with the devil that one knows. Thus Britain and France continue to play a leading role in aiding the economic development of their former colonies. The United States is strongly identified with these two powers and it is for that reason that the new states have no hesitation in seeking and accepting American aid. Furthermore, in spite of an avowed policy of neutralism, and the abhorrence of "neo-colonialism," the "British" African states seek membership in the British Commonwealth, and the "French" African states retain their comradeship within the *Communauté Rénovée.*

There is an ever-present danger of overdoing "ization" of the administrative service. Where this has happened, and there has been a breakdown in efficiency, the new state has had to rehire expatriates on much less favorable terms than were available initially.

One may now attempt an answer to the last questions posed above: "What is the pattern, if any, of the constitutional system which is evolving on the independent continent? What is the shape of the emergent African profile?" Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, being ex-British colonial territories, started independence with two-party parliamentary democracy patterned on the British system. The "French" African Republics, on the other hand, adopted the presidential system and seem to have preferred the one-party rule. Even in places like the Ivory Coast

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and Senegal, where more than one political party contested election, the electorate returned the government party to power with virtually a 100 percent victory.

Apart from the defects and unsuitability of the two-party system already noted, it is a matter for comment that fewer upheavals have bedevilled the French African states which have one-party systems of government than have disturbed the British African two-party governments. It seems the former have avoided the instability which characterized the earlier French Republic, by adopting the governmental system established by General de Gaulle.

Nigeria has not yet had occasion to amend its constitution. Ghana, on the other hand, has altered her own beyond recognition and has noticeably drifted toward a one-party system of government almost from the beginning. There is now no Opposition in Ghana worth talking about and the powers assumed by the President are as wide as, if not wider than, those of any French-speaking African state. For instance, the appointment of Ministers by the Ghanaian President does not require the approval or ratification of the National Assembly. Also, if a bill is vetoed by him, it cannot be sent back later for his assent by the Assembly. What stands out preëminently is the fact that Ghana, like the majority of African states, is practically committed to a one-party system.

It has been widely suggested that Dr. Nkrumah is rapidly heading toward dictatorship. He has taken every conceivable opportunity available to deny it. It is only fair to grant him *bona fides* and to accept, as he has always claimed, that he does not eschew democracy. It is at least clear that, without expressly declaring for a one-party system, he seems to have been concerned with the obvious defects of two-party democracy and to have proceeded to cure them on his own terms and to his own advantage. He has carried the reforms of the Ghanaian constitution to the point of annihilating the Opposition.

Since Dr. Nkrumah attained power under a two-party system of democracy, one would have preferred that, if he found that system irksome or the Opposition intolerable, he should seek the mandate of the people to alter the constitution before he destroyed the Opposition, not after. The issue of a one-party as against a two-party system is not only important, it is fundamental. To have won election under a two-party constitution and

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then to proceed to exterminate the Opposition without the people's mandate was to break faith with the electorate of Ghana. By his ruthless use of his majority, he has derogated the sovereignty of the people of Ghana and has equated the authority of the members of the Convention Peoples Party to that of the whole nation. His challenge to that sovereignty reached its climax when he clapped into jail under the Preventive Detention Act his Presidential rival, Dr. J. B. Danquah. So long as Ghana is still ostensibly committed to the two-party system of government, this can only be interpreted as disregarding the rights of the minority whose will and number were expressed in the votes cast for Dr. Danquah.

Sierra Leone, like Nigeria, entered independence with a coalition government. In the case of Nigeria, coalition was enforced by the nature of the election results. In Sierra Leone, however, the coalition is in the nature of a national front, formed in acknowledgment of the unsuitability of a two-party system for a young state newly emerged from colonial rule. Perhaps Sierra Leone decided to benefit from the experience of other states.

The pattern of the constitution which is evolving on the African continent is therefore "democracy with strong leadership." It is the African equivalent of the "guided democracy" of President Sukarno of Indonesia and the authoritarian military régimes of Pakistan, Sudan and, until the last election, Burma. Africans obviously believe that the commencement of independent life calls for a united and disciplined people under a strong and dedicated leadership. Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea, General Aboud of Sudan, President Nasser of Egypt—this is the profile that is emerging in independent Africa. The stress is not on "the people" but on "the leader" and the leader unmistakably speaks with the tongue of the millions of his people.

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AMERICAN POLICY IN AFRICA

By Rupert Emerson

THE United States is far freer from commitments in Africa south of the Sahara than in any other region of the world. Everywhere else American policy operates in a setting of old-established friendships and understandings, supplemented in the postwar years by a network of alliances such as those creating NATO, CENTO and SEATO; and American bases are scattered about the globe. In Africa to an unprecedented degree the United States is not bound by established positions or traditions, by fixed agreements or vested interests. While in any given situation it may find itself hemmed in by extra-African considerations and by the particular circumstances of the case, it still has a unique freedom, indeed a necessity, constantly to create policies to meet the issues presented by what for American diplomacy is virtually a new continent.

Although the United States has long been associated with some parts of North Africa, it is very much a newcomer to sub-Saharan Africa. The American interest in Africa—emotional, intellectual and political—has grown monumentally in the last years, but concrete and identifiable American interests are sparse. Although the United States is now being pilloried as the leader among the neo-colonialists, seeking to exploit the newly independent peoples, the actual American stake in Africa is relatively slight. In 1960 the whole of the continent, including the U.A.R., took only 4 percent of the exports of the United States and supplied only 3.7 percent of American imports. An impressive list of minerals and other raw materials of which Africa is a major supplier can be drawn up, but one is presumably still justified in maintaining, as did Andrew N. Kamarck of the International Bank in 1958, that "We could get along without African commodities and African markets with an imperceptible ripple in our standard of living."

On the score of private investment the story is much the same. In round figures it is estimated that of the $30,000,000,000 which Americans have invested abroad less than $850,000,000 has found its way to Africa—again, speaking of the entire continent. This contrasts with an American investment of over $10,000,000,000 in Canada and more than $8,000,000,000 in Latin America. While it is true that American investments in Africa are increasing, the

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increase is slow; political instability and the tendency toward a leftward drift cannot inspire great confidence among foreign investors. Furthermore, much of the investment which Africa most gravely needs, and which would prepare the way for other investment, has no charms for the private investor since it concerns such non-profitable spheres as education, health and sanitation, housing, and transport and communications.

From a military standpoint the United States appears to attach no great importance to Africa—save, of course, in terms of the negative consideration that in the cold war era no piece of real estate can be lightly allowed to drift into the hands of the enemy. American bases have been established only in Morocco (whence they will soon be withdrawn in compliance with the request of the Moroccan government), Libya and Ethiopia, and none exists south of the Sahara. For the foreseeable future the continent is unlikely to be equipped with significant military forces, and the manpower on which the imperial powers have drawn for their recent wars will no longer be available to them. Apart from its material resources, what Africa primarily has to offer is strategic depth for America's European allies—granted that its vast expanses remain in relatively friendly hands.

Of other specific commitments there are almost none except the old-standing attachments to Liberia. These date from the origin of the country as a depository for freed American slaves and have, in a somewhat fitful fashion, been maintained ever since. American economic interests play a large role, and in 1959 a defense agreement was signed under which the two countries pledged themselves to consult if Liberia were attacked or threatened by attack.

For the rest, American commitments in relation to Africa are couched in the general terms of assurances of good will and support for legitimate aspirations. We have also repeatedly asserted that we back the right of self-determination for all peoples ready and able to assume its responsibilities, and have promised assistance in the drive for development. The scale of American aid to Africa has so far been trifling in comparison with our largesse elsewhere, but as the number of independent African states multiplies, the American aid program expands.

The United States is, of course, involved with Africa in a number of other ways but not in such fashion as to create further commitments or vested interests. American missionaries have been

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engaged in Africa for decades and continue active there. African students have been coming to this country for many years and in 1960–61 the number rose to 2,831 in American colleges, a gain of 44 percent over the previous academic year, but even this figure represents only a small fraction of the 53,107 foreign students reported as enrolled here. In the reverse flow, American researchers, students and travellers have been flocking to Africa in unprecedented numbers of late. The establishment of embassies in newly independent countries, and the expansion of consulates elsewhere, has brought a great increase in official contacts with Africa, which finds its counterpart in the recently opened African embassies in Washington.

In human terms by far the most significant American involvement with Africa is the fact that one-tenth of the population of the United States traces at least some part of its ancestry to Africa. The interaction of Africans and American Negroes is of long standing, and the emergence of Africa into the headlines in the last decade has inevitably enhanced American Negro interest. In the flood of American visitors to Africa, many have been Negroes, some in search of their identity in a world which still only grudgingly acknowledges their right to an equal share in it.

It needs no underlining that the domestic racial difficulties of the United States curtail the possible success of American policies in Africa. Little Rock has entered into the international vocabulary. While only a few Africans, ranging from ambassadors to students, have direct experience of the American practice of racial discrimination, almost all are exposed to the news of it which rapidly spreads around the world. So long as men's lives are prejudiced by the color of their skins the American standing in Africa will rest on shaky foundations.

II

Two large and familiar features of the international scene impinge so sharply on American policy as to deserve special mention.

The first is the fact that the imperial powers which carved up Africa among them remain the principal allies of the United States. NATO, embracing these powers, is the cornerstone of the coalition which the United States has shaped to meet the Communist challenge, and Britain and France are our closest friends. The effect on American policy is to introduce a note of uncertainty and ambiguity. We can neither wholly deny the claims of friends and

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allies nor turn our backs upon the Africans at the bidding of the present or former colonial powers. The acceptance of the end of colonialism by the powers other than Portugal has blurred the sharp lines of controversy, but the white settler areas remain as trouble centers, and disagreements can easily break out over differing views of Africa's proper future and the role that outside countries might play.

The general rule must surely be that decisions on African matters should rest on a consideration primarily of American and African interests and not those of third parties. Since the American national interest, however, involves other matters than African independence and well-being, cases will inevitably arise in which the urgent demands of an ally will force a decision different from that which African considerations alone would dictate. An alliance has its obligations no less than a devotion to freedom from colonialism. If the cherished concerns of one partner were thought to be cavalierly overridden, the effectiveness of an alliance might be seriously impaired, if not wholly cancelled out.

Furthermore, if the direct American interests and commitments in Africa are slight and amorphous, this is by no means true for America's allies who continue to have very extensive and even vital African interests of many kinds. Some measure of resentment seems unavoidable as the United States intrudes itself on what were their private preserves, including the suspicion that one of the American purposes is to squeeze the Europeans out, leaving the field clear for American enterprise and political supremacy. In some instances the American interest reaches embarrassingly beyond the category of support for an ally's needs; examples are the direct strategic value of the Azores to the United States, despite Portugal's African shortcomings, or the need for de Gaulle's collaboration in the Berlin crisis, despite the bloody battle at Bizerte.

Obviously, head-on clashes should be avoided wherever possible, by the fullest private consultation on questions of significant concern to our allies. Quiet work behind the scenes—of a kind which is in fact constantly being undertaken—is likely to be far more useful than outright public opposition. But it must be recognized at the outset that, whichever way the game is played, Europeans or Africans will find themselves disaffected where the United States takes sides or refrains from taking sides, thus perhaps offending both.

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The second feature which conditions American policy is the existence of the Communist bloc, so short a time ago much more remote from Africa than even the United States and now beginning to establish itself as a major rival to the West. Anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, uninhibited enemies of colonialism and self-proclaimed protectors of all underdogs not within the Communist orbit, the U.S.S.R. and China have an inescapable appeal to non-white peoples in process of breaking loose from the domination of white capitalist empires. Although they have still not spread themselves as widely as has the United States, the members of the Communist bloc are also in full swing of establishing embassies in Africa, furnishing aid, sending out and receiving missions, propagandizing and drawing African students to their universities.

By turns the Soviet Union puts itself forth as representing the polar extreme of everything characteristic of America and as being the true champion of the ideals which the United States pretends to stand for. Thus American democracy is a democracy of fraud and oppression as compared with the real article in the Communist countries; independence granted under American or other Western auspices is a sham to conceal continued domination —although here the Chinese position is more militant and rigidly orthodox than that of Moscow; and the Western pretense of aiding economic development only masks an exploitation which is up to the same old tricks.

III

It has been said with considerable justice that American policy in Africa is marked by its moderation and responsibility, but regrettably, even when their existence is acknowledged, these are not virtues which necessarily endear the policy to those affected by it. Thus Africans have accused the United States of exercising moderation primarily in the restraint shown in backing African causes and of assuming that its responsibilities ran rather to its European allies than to African states and peoples, while the imperial powers have deplored the irresponsibility with which Americans have encouraged African nationalism.

A summary comparison of the Communist and American positions in relation to Africa brings into sharper focus where the United States stands. American policy has the earmarks of moderation and responsibility in that it seeks an orderly transition from

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colonialism to independence, stable governments promoting development, and the maintenance of friendly ties between the new states and their former colonial rulers. The Soviet Union, with everything to gain and almost nothing to lose in Africa, urges self-determination as a means of bringing about the revolutionary overthrow of the imperial authorities, and concentrates on widening the breach between Africa and the West. Save where their friends are in power, the Communists back continuing revolution in Africa confident that they will be the ones to pick up the pieces.

A specific example of how the two positions diverge may be found in a trivial episode. When G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visited East Africa early in 1961, he created two mildly embarrassing situations for himself. In Nairobi, then engaged in a hotly contested election, he declared that America stood for "Africa for the Africans." When this was greeted with professions of shocked surprise in London and by the white community in Kenya, he retreated to the explanation that he had, of course, not meant that Africa should be only for the black Africans but for all its inhabitants, whatever their color. In Uganda, soon thereafter, he warned the Africans that when independence came their way they would not want to exchange one tyranny for another. The warning against the new tyranny which might follow independence caused no difficulty, but Mr. Williams felt it necessary to issue prompt assurance that he naturally had not meant to characterize the existing British rule as tyranny. In both instances the second version was more acceptable than the first and more properly represented the moderate and responsible American position; but is it conceivable that in either instance a Communist spokesman could have withdrawn from the original statement? He would have said "Africa for the Africans" and "tyranny" and stuck by it.

It was characteristic of the two countries that in 1960, when the General Assembly debated the declaration on colonial independence, the Soviet bloc went all out for immediate freedom for colonies while the United States backed and filled, and ultimately abstained in the company not only of its NATO allies but also of Spain, Portugal, South Africa and the Dominican Republic. Here, if the reports which circulate are correct, was a splendid example of the fact and the folly of yielding to the pleas of an ally. The Kennedy Administration would presumably have taken a different line; Africans noted with appreciation that the new United

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States delegation did in fact line up against Portugal on the Angolan issue. But their fears that the New Frontier might after all represent no fundamental change were fed by such things as the Portuguese use against the Angolan rebels of NATO arms supplied from the United States, the American abstention in August in the Assembly vote on Bizerte, and by the Cuban invasion fiasco.

The traditional American hostility to colonialism has lost its vigor just at the time that the attack upon the colonial system has become most universal and successful. The undiscriminating damnation of colonialism, expected as a ritual matter of course by the Africans, comes harder to Americans, in part because they are beginning to have second thoughts on the subject in the light of actual events, and in part because the demands of ordinary courtesy make it difficult to denounce as wholly evil what their allies are inclined to point to with pride.

In a broader setting, the softening of the attitude toward colonialism is only one phase of the general American turn toward conservatism in world affairs. In its least palatable aspect this has brought the United States into alliance with right-wing dictators and authoritarian régimes around the world, provided they were prepared to proclaim their anti-Communism loudly enough. President Kennedy has occasionally singled out the revolutionary element in the American tradition as one to which we should return, but, given the present situation at home and abroad, it is dubious that the United States can or will actively embrace his proposal. His Administration has adopted a more positive and flexible policy toward Africa, and Africans have expected great things of it, but the basic American positions remain unchanged. Where the Communists boast of violent revolution, we currently incline to shrink from it. In so far as we support self-determination we are associated with revolutionary forces; but we are conservative in our effort to preserve what we find good in the colonial régimes and the heritage they leave behind them.

Beyond that, the United States may still be held to be revolutionary in the example it sets as the most successful practitioner of the modern rationalized society and economy. In place of the old order everywhere, it promotes the substitution of a new and dynamic economy and a political system which accepts the distinctive identity of the individual, runs by the rule of law, and has at least a reasonable facsimile of democracy in it. The American

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past and present contain legitimately revolutionary elements such as these, but, in a transformed world, the radical liberalism for which the United States stood has been elbowed over to a position on the right where it is likely to be regarded in contemporary terms as conservatism. American enthusiasm for a free-enterprise economy, the backing for established and respectable elements in society and government, and the insistent harping on the sins and dangers of Communism all tend to remove the United States from meaningful identification with the new forces rising in Africa.

IV

Another significant reason for a conservative American attitude is that the over-all balance in the countries of tropical Africa now tends to be favorable to the United States, while any marked change in it is likely to represent a slipping away toward the left, which would be at least potentially disadvantageous to the West. The United States will probably have to run fast to stay in as good a position as it holds now.

The present favorable position derives not only from the accumulated store of popular good will toward Americans but also from the fact that the transition from colonial rule to independence has in so many cases been made on the basis of amicable agreement. This has meant that with few exceptions the first heirs of empire have been men of temperate views who looked on the West in tolerant fashion, or at least without overt hostility, and were prepared to enter into some sort of collaborative relationship with the former colonial power—particularly, no doubt, while it continued as a source of economic and technical assistance. The readiness of the African leaders to work with the West, and the United States in particular, differs from time to time and place to place, but in the large the record is impressive, if allowance is made for the necessity occasionally to denounce colonialism and the threatening intrigues of the imperialists.

In the brief span since 1957 when the Gold Coast started the landslide toward African independence, only Ghana, Guinea and Mali—the three sub-Saharan members of the Casablanca group—have moved far toward curtailing their attachments to the West. None of them, however, has made anything like a formal entry into the Communist bloc, nor would it make any sense to write them off as lost. Elsewhere the extent of friendly intercourse between the Western powers and the ex-dependencies is, if anything,

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greater than could reasonably be expected, considering how profoundly colonialism is detested. All the African countries have exhibited a greater or less drift toward neutralism, but in the first stages at least, this has usually been a neutralism shaded in favor of the West.

The prospects for the future must be accounted less cheerful. The United States has already experienced a not inconsiderable loss of standing with many Africans, a disillusionment deriving often from the ambivalence of the American position. The unhappy affairs of the Congo contributed markedly to this, and in particular the assassination of Lumumba for which many held the United States responsible. In the eyes of most Africans, Lumumba was the chosen national leader of the Congo and the defender of its unity, but the United States was clearly on the record as opposing him and backing Kasavubu; it was accused of collaborating with Belgium and condoning Katangan separatism.

The decline in American stature was reflected in the strongly anti-American tone of the third All-African Peoples' Conference, held in Cairo in March 1961, and attended by some 70 delegations from 35 or more African countries. Far from being hailed as the great and good friend of African freedom, the United States was attacked as the ringleader of the neo-colonial conspiracy which, while bowing to the inevitability of recognizing national independence, tries, as a key resolution put it, "to deprive this independence of its essence of real independence . . . through economic and political intervention, intimidation and blackmail. . . ." Observers from the United States were dismayed to find that they were shunned even by their friends among the Africans at the conference. It may be contended that no great importance should be attached to this conference because of its failure to reflect currently dominant African opinion. Undoubtedly it was too heavily weighted on the left, the more moderate parties and movements being largely absent or silenced. None the less, I believe that most recent observers of Africa would agree that the conference reflected the mood of many of the rising younger forces in Africa which will take over in the years ahead.

If it is necessary, as I fear it is, to be pessimistic about the immediate future of at least some of the African societies, overwhelmed by problems beyond their grasp, then the likelihood is that the position of the West will progressively deteriorate. Judging from experience elsewhere and in the light of actual African

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conditions, one can only assume that in a number of instances the brave hopes for economic development will dwindle away and that such fruits as are produced will go to the few and not to the many. Some of the new African governments seem sure to decline into lethargy, corruption and nepotism, as similar governments have so often done in other parts of the world. Where such backsliding occurs the prospects are that it is the Communist bloc which will profit rather than the West.

It is easy to talk of a leftward drift in Africa, but more difficult to determine whether the standard categories of "left" and "right" are meaningful in the African connection, and if so, what it is that they signify. From the American standpoint the one matter of paramount importance is that Africa in its parts and as a whole be preserved from ending up in the Communist camp. A question to which Washington should be essentially indifferent is the extent to which African countries move toward a mixed or a Socialist economy; the presumption must be that, for both ideological and highly pragmatic reasons, governments will play a very large role in the economic sphere. In other words, there is a large margin of leftward drift, in the conventional use of the term, which we should not only not oppose but should actively assist if we want to keep in touch with the vital realities of Africa.

Wherever possible the non-Communist left is surely to be dealt with as a friend and not rejected as an enemy, but much of what may be categorized as the "left" sets off with a chip on its shoulder as far as the West is concerned. To many of the rising young people of Africa, the capitalist, NATO-oriented United States represents, or can easily be made out to represent, the old world of colonialism, oppression and discrimination, whereas the U.S.S.R. and China, themselves underdeveloped peoples thrusting vigorously forward into the modern world, seem new and inspiring champions of the underdog, breaking the chains of the old order. The furor which exploded in Ibadan over the incautious Peace Corps postcard can be taken as a good demonstration of the resentments and frustrations which are building up and of the suspicious antagonism to the West which smolders under cover, where it has not burst into open flame. The "progressive" Casablanca group has its adherents everywhere, and is, on the face of it, more likely to enlist the enthusiasm of the young than its more moderate Monrovia counterpart, although it should be added that the line between the two contingents is by no means fixed and stable. It

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would be amazing if in the near future some of the ex-French territories did not try to end or diminish their present dependence on France and open their door to the Communist bloc's trade and aid.

Two countervailing, and perhaps decisive, items should be borne in mind. In the first place, there is no faintest reason to think that African leaders or peoples want to abandon their new-found independence in favor of control by either or both of the Communist giants. Having thrown off colonialism they want to explore the whole expanse and variety of what the world has to offer; there is much in the Communist experiments to interest them; and they want to pass up no benefits which may come their way, particularly if those benefits also bolster them against their former colonial masters. But to sacrifice Africa and Pan-Africanism to Russian or Chinese domination is a very different matter. Secondly, the U.S.S.R. and China can also make mistakes and by their miscalculations and their heavy-handedness alienate those whom they seek to win. The U.A.R and Iraq, to name only two, seemed to teeter on the edge of the Communist abyss, but they pulled back, leaving Moscow far from happy at the impermanence of the gains it had made and at the opportunities it had muffed.

V

The central question is whether Africa's leftist revolution and the United States of the twentieth century can mix. Serious barriers unquestionably block the way.

Precisely what has been described as the moderate and responsible character of American policy—its critics will find less flattering adjectives for it—may prove to be its greatest handicap. It is a policy which has its admirable features since, at its best, it proposes that Africans, having achieved their legitimate freedom, should be aided to build on what is already available in order to advance by orderly and peaceful stages to more adequate governments and more prosperous economies. But the cautious and hesitant way in which the United States moves toward these goals and the partners in whose company it travels inhibit intimate collaboration with the emerging leaders of the African countries.

In Africa, and elsewhere as well, a peculiar dilemma plagues American policy. The paramount American concern is that Africa be preserved from falling into Communist hands, but this is a

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concern which has little or no appeal to Africans and even alienates those whom we are trying to win. Africans sense no urgent threat from Moscow or Peking; they resent American attempts to rescue them from an unfeared fate and consider it an effort to embroil them in a remote international conflict of which they want no part. They are aware of many burning issues with which they must deal, but anti-Communism is not one of them. Sékou Touré has protested that Africans should not be asked whether they adhere to East or West, but that East and West should answer up to the question, "Yes or no, are you for the liberation of Africa?"

The United States agrees that Africa should be spared involvement in the cold war. In its private dreams it sees the happiest means of attaining this end as the banning of the Communist bloc from the exercise of influence in Africa. In the real world it must accept the fact of constantly intensified Communist competition, and seek to counter it, not by preachments about its horrors, but by aiding to strengthen African societies to stand solidly on their own two feet without needing to yield to blandishments from either side. The fundamental American aim is the negative one of curtailing Communist encroachment on Africa. We can reach it only by positive action which succeeds in identifying us with aspirations acknowledged by the Africans as their own.

A further point of adjustment to African realities is essential. Americans may be intellectually persuaded that neutralism must be accepted and worked with; but they still find it very difficult to stomach concrete instances of a neutralism which turns against them. The conviction lingers that our stance in the world is so totally right as necessarily to render immoral a neutralism which avoids making distinctions that seem to us obvious and essential. As far as aid is concerned, despite repeated reappraisals of the situation, we have generally avoided taking the position that it shall be rendered only to those who overtly support our cause. President Kennedy appeared to modify this approach after the Belgrade Conference, when he said that in allocating aid special attention should be given those nations which embrace our view of the world crisis; but he later interpreted this to mean only that we should back those countries interested in maintaining their independence. The latter version—the one which has in fact prevailed for some years—sits far better with Africans.

If the present African leaders are not to be discredited and

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pushed aside by more radical successors hostile to the West, they must be able to produce results which will meet the expectations of their people; but the potential successors must also be won over as far as possible from a sense of alienation from the West. These things in turn rest upon the successful achievement of economic and social development within the framework of African independence, giving to the peoples of Africa a sense that they are masters in their own house and that it is a house whose standards of living are rising.

It is to be hoped that the United States can abstain from being drawn into every African issue and every dispute between African states and the European powers. If anything, the United Nations already forces too large an intermixing of everybody in the affairs of everybody else, but it is certain that the United States cannot be disinterested in any major aspect of the fate of Africa even if it can avoid entanglement in more local issues. We have the hard choice between playing God and holding aloof when we should accept some measure of responsibility.

Certainly it is not the business of the United States to dictate what governments or kinds of governments Africa should have, but it is a very real American concern to aid in the establishment and maintenance in power of popular régimes, ready and able to devote themselves to the integration of their countries and the laying of sound political and administrative foundations. Without these prerequisites, no development program is worth the paper it is written on. Aside from sympathetic political and diplomatic support, the essential American contribution must be in helping to meet the virtually unlimited need for trained manpower and in providing technical and economic assistance.

It is almost beside the point to inquire whether Americans have an interest in African development for its own sake. Whether they do or not, it is the stark reality that either there is development under the aegis of Western aid or African governments will progressively disintegrate and thus extend an invitation to the Communists to apply to them their drastic totalitarian discipline.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By A. J. P. TAYLOR. New York: Atheneum, 1962, 296 p. $4.50. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961, 25/.)

This book has raised a storm of controversy which is likely to continue, since it touches some very sensitive spots. Briefly, it attacks the "Nuremberg trial" thesis of the origins of the war, and proposes that there was much of blunder and accident on all sides, including the German. "This is a story without heroes; and perhaps even without villains." Mr. Taylor tells it in a way to turn commonly accepted judgments on their heads. At times he indulges in playing the bad boy of historical scholarship.

MAY MAN PREVAIL? By ERICH FROMM. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 252 p. $4.50. (Paper, 95 cents.)

A well-known psychoanalyst turns to an examination of American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Communist world. He strongly disagrees with most of the working premises on which that policy is based and argues that much of our current strategic and military thinking verges on the pathological. The book shows every promise of being warmly debated, especially among students of the Soviet Union.

AMERICA IN BRITAIN'S PLACE. By LIONEL GELBER. New York: Praeger, 1961, 356 p. $5.00.

Mr. Gelber, a Canadian who knows Britain and the United States well, and has written much about them, discusses the problems of Anglo-American unity under the current international strains. Of much interest are his chapters on "Who Speaks for America?" and on the crisis in relations produced by the Suez episode.

NEW DIMENSIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY. By MAX BELOFF. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 208 p. $5.75.

In this perceptive study Mr. Beloff looks into "the impact upon the administration and political systems of independent States of the network of international organizations in whose work they are increasingly involved." The British experience since 1947 is taken as the particular example.

FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT. By JOSEPH P. MORRAY. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961, 368 p. $8.50.

A selection of speeches and documents, with commentary, to illustrate the nature of the international debate on the major issues that have divided the United States and the U.S.S.R.

BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE. By HANNAH ARENDT. New York: Viking, 1961, 246 p. $5.00.

Six essays on fundamental historical, cultural and political themes, by one of the most discerning and subtle writers of our time.

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THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN. By Edmond Cahn. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 194 p. $3.95.

The predicament of democratic man, as the author sees it, is "his moral involvement in the misdeeds of government." The book is an effort to define and meet this problem.

THE CHANGING FACE OF COMMUNISM. By Sir Percival Griffiths. London: Bodley Head, 1961, 223 p. 21/.

A former Indian civil servant discusses for the general reader the background and development of Communism and its operations throughout the world.

THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AND RELATED DOCUMENTS. Edited by Dan N. Jacobs. Evanston (Ill.): Row, Peterson, 1961, 218 p. $1.90.

A convenient collection of some major Communist pronouncements since 1956.

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919. By Seth P. Tillman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 442 p. $8.50.

A detailed and scholarly study of Anglo-American coöperation and dispute in meeting the various issues arising at the Versailles Peace Conference.

ICELAND, RELUCTANT ALLY. By Donald E. Nuechterlein. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961, 213 p. $4.50.

A study of United States-Icelandic defense relations since 1940.

DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. By Glenn H. Snyder. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 294 p. $6.50.

A serious effort to provide a theoretical framework for dealing, in national security policy, with the difficult choice between deterrence of and defense against military attacks.

VERTEIDIGUNG ODER VERGELTUNG. By Helmut Schmidt. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961, 290 p. DM. 16.80.

An analysis of NATO strategy by an S.P.D. member of the Federal Bundestag.

NATIONAL CHARACTER IN ACTION. By Brigadier General Washington Platt. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961, 250 p. $6.00.

An analytical study based on the premises that "An understanding of national character is one of the basic factors in good foreign intelligence" and that "Our Intelligence Community and our Foreign Service have unnecessarily and dangerously neglected this basic factor."

THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE. By Hedley Bull. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1961, 215 p. $3.95.

A study of the arms race and of the measures by which it might be controlled, whether by reduction or restraints. It is less concerned with recommendations than with presenting the complexity of the issue.

THE BIRTH OF THE BOMB. By Ronald W. Clark. New York: Horizon Press, 1961, 209 p. $3.95.

This book is of particular interest in tracing the role played in nuclear research by British scientists in the early years of the war.

THE SEAS AND THE SUBS. By Ed Rees. New York: Duell, 1961, 233 p. $4.50.

Centrally an account of the development of the nuclear-powered submarine and the Polaris missile system.

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HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE AÉRO-NAVALE. By Admiral Barjot. Paris: Flammarion, 1961, 441 p. NF. 14.50.

A substantial history of naval aircraft and its role in warfare.

WHEN NATIONS DISAGREE. By Arthur Larson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961, 251 p. $3.95.

A lively discussion for the general reader of the premises of world law and of the prospects for extending its scope and effectiveness with the goal of maintaining peace.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD AND CRISIS DIPLOMACY. By Richard I. Miller. New York: Oceana Publications, 1961, 344 p. $6.00. (Paper, $2.25.)

The story of the late Secretary-General's growing stature and influence, gained chiefly through his handling of a number of major crises in the last decade.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD: CUSTODIAN OF THE BRUSHFIRE PEACE. By Joseph P. Lash. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 304 p. $4.50.

An appreciative review of Hammarskjold's career in the U.N., written before his death in September 1961.

THE UNITED NATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, GROWTH, AND POSSIBILITIES. By Benjamin V. Cohen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 106 p. $2.75.

Lectures by an American well acquainted with the U.N. on the powers in the Charter, the responsibilities of member states and some problems and prospects for the future.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

FEDERALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By U. K. Hicks and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 185 p. $4.00.

A symposium of papers dealing with the relation, which is seen as a positive one, between political federalism and the conditions for economic growth.

THE BACKWARD SOCIETY. By Raymond Frost. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 246 p. $5.00.

An economist with the World Bank discusses the situation of the backward countries and the measures for overcoming the economic obstacles they face.

ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER: WAHN UND WIRKLICHKEIT. By W. Röpke and Others. Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1961, 237 p. Swiss Fr. 11.

A symposium of essays, written largely from the perspective of liberal economic theory.

UNTERSUCHUNGEN EINZELNER ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER. Edited by Rudolf Stucken. Berlin: Duncker, 1960, 132 p. DM. 13.60.

Essays on economic development in Peru, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria.

DIE GOLDMÄRKTE DER WELT SEIT VERLASSEN DES GOLDSTANDARDS. By Hermann Bartels. Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1960. 265 p. DM. 34.80.

A dissertation on gold production, transfers and prices in recent decades.

THE THEORY OF CAPITAL. By F. A. Lutz and D. C. Hague. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 414 p. $12.00.

Papers presented at the 1958 Round Table Conference of the International Economic Association.

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POPULATION. By William Petersen. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 652 p. $7.95.

A general textbook on demography, including a section on the United States, the demographic patterns in various types of societies and the determinants of population.

ATLAS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Norton Ginsburg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 119 p. $7.50. (Paper, $5.00.)

A useful atlas of demography, resources and economic development.

INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Bernard Goodman. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961, 217 p. $7.00.

A study centering on the importation by the United States of industrial materials from Canada.

The Second World War

THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY, 1939–1945. By Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland. London: H.M.S.O., 1961, 4 v. (New York: British Information Services, $30.80.)

This major contribution to the official British "History of the Second World War" deals with one of the most important and controversial aspects of the conflict: the selection of the objectives for a strategic air offensive and the coördination of British and American strategies. The first three volumes trace the narrative through to the eventual victory; the fourth comprises technical annexes and documentation.

1939–1945: DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG IN CHRONIK UND DOKUMENTEN. By Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961, 764 p. DM. 19.80.

A documentary chronology of the Second World War.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. By Anne Armstrong. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961, 304 p. $6.50.

A judicious historical review in pursuit of the difficult question: "What were the probable effects on Germany of the Casablanca demand for unconditional surrender?" On balance, the author feels that this demand did narrow the range of possible outcomes.

ANZIO. By Wynford Vaughan-Thomas. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, 243 p. $5.00.

An excellent account of the Anzio landing—an operation that achieved complete surprise and yet eventually was stalled on the beaches. The author was a B.B.C. war correspondent with the landing forces.

BUT NOT IN SHAME: THE SIX MONTHS AFTER PEARL HARBOR. By John Toland. New York: Random House, 1961, 427 p. $6.50.

The author, making extensive use of interviews as well as of the written records, has written a dramatic account of the desperate U. S. efforts to stem and reverse the tide in the months after the surprise attack.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939–45. CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1941–42. By K. D. Bhargava and K. N. V. Sastri. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), 1960, 424 p. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, Rs. 25.)

This volume deals with the defense operations of the Indian and Allied forces against the Japanese in the first four months after Japan's entry into the war.

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SINGAPORE: THE JAPANESE VERSION. By Colonel Masanobu Tsuji. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 358 p. $5.50.

A detailed account by the former Chief of Operations and Planning Staff, 25th Japanese Army, of the conquest of Malaya and Singapore in the winter of 1941–1942. The Japanese edition was published ten years ago.

THE NEW GUINEA OFFENSIVES. By David Dexter. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961, 851 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 40/.)

This volume in the official Australian war history deals with the operations of the Australian Army in New Guinea from April 1943 to the middle of 1944.

SAVO: THE INCREDIBLE NAVAL DEBACLE OFF GUADALCANAL. By Richard F. Newcomb. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, 278 p. $4.95.

A lively account of the disaster to the U.S. Naval task force off Guadalcanal in August 1942.

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY. By Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961, 504 p. $4.00.

This volume in the Technical Services sub-series of "United States Army in World War II" deals with the production, delivery and storage of the vast quantities of munitions required for the conduct of the war.

GREEK TRAGEDY 1941. By Anthony Heckstall-Smith and Vice-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman. New York: Norton, 1961, 238 p. $3.95.

The grim story, by two former naval officers, of the evacuation of British troops from Greece after the disastrous 1941 campaign.

EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, 1939–1945. New York: Pergamon Press, 1960, 410 p. $6.00.

Papers in English, French and German presented at the First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements.

The United States

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUNCTIONS. By William Barnes and John Heath Morgan. Washington: Department of State, 1961, 430 p. $3.50.

This volume, prepared in the Historical Office of the Department of State, is chiefly a history of the Foreign Service from its origins to the present. A final chapter provides a brief description of the Foreign Service today.

JOHN F. KENNEDY: A SENSE OF PURPOSE. By Charles Lam Markmann and Mark Sherwin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 346 p. $4.95.

Chiefly an appraisal, generally a sympathetic one, by two newspapermen, of the first months of the Kennedy Administration.

THE CROSS OF THE MOMENT. By Bert Cochran. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 267 p. $5.00.

A critical review of the recent past—"the time of the shrug"—as something of a spiritual desert in which Americans have been unable to meet the mounting foreign and domestic challenges of the present era.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM. By Nathan Glazer. New York: Harcourt, 1961, 244 p. $5.50.

In this contribution to the series, "Communism in American Life," Mr. Glazer ex-

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amines the condition and outlook of various social and ethnic groups within which the Communists hoped to, or did, recruit their membership.

FRANK B. KELLOGG AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1925–1929. By L. Ethan Ellis. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961, 303 p. $7.50.

A study of U.S. foreign relations during the Coolidge Administration, an era dominated by the figures of Kellogg, Dwight W. Morrow and Henry L. Stimson.

AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION. Edited by Norman A. Graebner. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961, 341 p. $6.95.

A symposium of essays on 14 American Secretaries of State of the twentieth century—from John Hay to John Foster Dulles.

BORAH. By Marian C. McKenna. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961, 450 p. $7.50.

An ambitious and conscientious biography, based on the late Senator's papers.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT. New York: Harper, 1961, 454 p. $6.95.

This is a consolidation and abbreviated version of Mrs. Roosevelt's three earlier volumes of autobiography.

THE OFFICIAL GERMAN REPORT. By O. John Rogge. New York: Yoseloff, 1961, 478 p. $6.00.

An account of Nazi penetration in the United States during World War II, based chiefly on a 1946 report of Mr. Rogge to the Department of Justice.

VOENNO-GOSUDARSTVENNYI MONOPOLISTICHESKII KAPITALIZM V SSHA. By S. A. Dalin. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961, 350 p. 1 Rub. 33 k.

A Soviet analysis of the operation of American "monopolistic capitalism" in periods of war, more specifically the two world wars and the Korean war.

POTENTIALS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF SUMNER H. SLICHTER. Edited by John T. Dunlop. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 467 p. $7.50.

A selection of 28 pieces, written over several decades, and dealing with the American economy, and its prospects, industrial relations and policy issues.

ECONOMIC AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Donald J. Bogue and Calvin L. Beale. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, 1,162 p. $27.50.

An enormous demographic and economic statistical analysis of the United States, by region and sub-region and by states.

L'AMÉRIQUE EST-ELLE TROP RICHE? By Claude Alphandéry. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1960, 177 p. NF. 5.75.

Reflections on a visit to the United States, with emphasis on the "exuberance" of American mass consumption.

Western Europe

ZWEIFEL AN EUROPA. By Mario Moessinger. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961, 205 p. DM. 12.80.

A critique of the theme of European unity and integration as an inadequate concept in face of the world-wide challenges and opportunities of the present time.

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EWG UND EFTA IN WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DISKUSSION. Edited by Ernst Lagler. Berlin: Duncker, 1961, 163 p. DM. 19.80.

A symposium of papers on European integration and unity.

THREE INTELLECTUALS IN POLITICS. By James Joll. New York: Pantheon, 1961, 203 p. $4.50.

In these three essays on the role of the intellectual in twentieth-century politics Mr. Joll examines the careers of Léon Blum, Walther Rathenau and F. T. Marinetti.

L'EUROPE UNIE, ROUTE DE LA PROSPÉRITÉ. By Maurice Allais. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1960, 368 p. NF. 22.

A distinguished economist assesses the economic prospects of European unification.

EUROPE'S NEEDS AND RESOURCES. By J. Frederic Dewhurst and Others. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, 1,198 p. $12.00.

This is a massive collaborative study of non-Communist Europe's economic trends, achievements, needs and prospects. A major source of information.

LA MÉDITERRANÉE ET LE DESTIN DE L'EUROPE. By Rear Admiral R. de Belot. Paris: Payot, 1961, 215 p. NF. 15.

A survey of the role of the Mediterranean in European history.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS. By Raul Hilberg. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961, 788 p. $17.50.

A very detailed and well-documented reconstruction of the vast organization the Nazis developed to destroy the Jewish population of Europe.

MR. EUROPE. By James H. Huizinga. New York: Praeger, 1961, 248 p. $6.50.

An excellent political portrait of Paul-Henri Spaak; of particular interest in its account of the conflict that developed between Spaak and former King Leopold.

ÉVOLUTION DE LA STRUCTURE DU PARTI RADICAL. By Daniel Bardonnet. Paris: Montchrestien, 1960, 293 p. NF. 29.

A close examination of the curious evolution of the structure of the Radical Party in France in the Third and Fourth Republics.

THE TRIUMPH OF INTEGRITY: A PORTRAIT OF CHARLES DE GAULLE. By Duncan Grinnell-Milne. London: Bodley Head, 1961, 320 p. 30/.

An admiring but not very satisfactory biographical portrait of President de Gaulle. Greatest emphasis is on the war years.

FREIHEIT UND WIEDERVEREINIGUNG. By Karl Jaspers. Munich: Piper, 1960, 123 p. DM. 6.50.

An eminent philosopher presents his views in a series of brief articles on such themes as German reunification, national consciousness, East Germany and Berlin, Adenauer, and the political future of the Federal Republic.

FREIHEIT AUF ABRUF. By Winfried Martini. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1960, 451 p. DM. 18.50.

A rather grim analysis—in the spirit of "constructive pessimism"—of the various perils, internal and external, confronting the Federal Republic.

VOM BISMARCK-REICH ZUM GETEILTEN DEUTSCHLAND. By Johannes Bühler. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960, 1,027 p. DM. 36.

This sixth volume in a history of Germany surveys domestic and foreign developments in the period from 1871 to 1945.

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DEUTSCHLAND IM JAHRE I: PANORAMA 1946–1948. By Josef Müller-Marein. Hamburg: Nannen-Verlag, 1960, 340 p. DM. 17.80.

A collection of the author's writings in the early postwar period, giving a vivid impression of physical and spiritual conditions in those years of defeat and disorganization.

THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DESPAIR. By Fritz Stern. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, 367 p. $8.00.

In this scholarly and perceptive study of "the pathology of cultural criticism" Professor Stern deals with Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck—three important precursors of German National Socialism.

MUSSOLINI'S ENEMIES. By Charles F. Delzell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 620 p. $12.50.

An excellent, and very welcome, full-length treatment of the Italian anti-Fascist resistance to Mussolini, both in the underground years from 1924 to 1943 and during the later years of armed conflict.

THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLICAN ITALY. By John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile. Boston: Houghton, 1961, 245 p. $1.95.

A concise description of the Italian political and constitutional system.

MUSSOLINI. By Laura Fermi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 477 p. $5.95.

A serious and sensitive biography of the Fascist leader by the late Enrico Fermi's widow, who lived in Rome until 1938. Better in dealing with Mussolini as an individual than with his role in the setting of Italian and world politics.

CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALY 1850–1950. By A. C. Jemolo. Philadelphia: Dufour, 1961, 344 p. $6.50.

An abridged translation of an important Italian study on church-state relations, originally published in 1949.

LINEAMENTI DI POLITICA ECONOMICA IN ITALIA (1945–1959). By Bruzio Manzocchi. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1960, 212 p. L. 1000.

A Communist review of political and economic developments in Italy since 1945.

FALANGE: A HISTORY OF SPANISH FASCISM. By Stanley G. Payne. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 316 p. $6.00.

A scholarly study of the rise and decline of Spanish Fascism with particular emphasis on the central years 1936–1943.

SANTA MARIA: MY CRUSADE FOR PORTUGAL. By Henrique Galvão. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1961, 246 p. $4.50.

An interesting account of the background to the seizure of the liner *Santa Maria* as a romantic act of rebellion against the Salazar régime.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

DER OSTBLOCK: DIE PRODUKTION DES ÖSTLICHEN WIRTSCHAFTSBLOCKES EINSCHLIESSLICH CHINA, NACH DEM SCHWERPUNKTPROGRAMM. By Karl Krüger. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1960, 395 p. DM. 28.

DER OSTBLOCK: AUSSENHANDEL DES ÖSTLICHEN WIRTSCHAFTSBLOCKES EINSCHLIESSLICH CHINA. By Bruno Kiesewetter. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1960, 386 p. DM. 28.

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These two substantial volumes on the economy of the Communist bloc, including China, deal with trade, foreign aid, production, division of labor and integration.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD. By Hubert Ripka. New York: Praeger, 1961, 266 p. $5.95.

In this posthumously published work the late Czech journalist and public servant reviewed the development of Soviet rule in East Central Europe, with particular attention to the upheavals of 1956.

SECRET NAZI PLANS FOR EASTERN EUROPE. By Ihor Kamenetsky. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961, 263 p. $5.00.

A monograph on Nazi policies—colonization, Germanization, enslavement and extermination—in the East European *Lebensraum*.

DIE FEINDLICHEN BRÜDER: JUGOSLAWIENS NEUER KONFLIKT MIT DEM OSTBLOCK 1958. Edited by Curt Gasteyger. Berne: Schweizerische Ost-Institut, 1960, 314 p. Swiss Fr. 24.50.

A selection of documents relating to Jugoslavia's differences with the states of the Communist bloc from 1948 through 1958.

THE POLITICS OF TOTALITARIANISM. By John A. Armstrong. New York: Random House, 1961, 458 p. $7.50.

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The larger volume listed above is Part III of a collaborative study of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Covering the years 1934–1960, it is a detailed and scholarly review of the evolution of the central instrumentality of the Soviet system. Professor Armstrong's separate short essay on the sources available for this study will be of much assistance to other scholars in the field.

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A report on the Soviet Union in the confusing two years after the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress, by two Italian writers who traveled widely in the country at that time.

HOUSE WITHOUT A ROOF. By Maurice Hindus. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 562 p. $6.95.

In this account of his latest visits to the Soviet Union, in 1958 and 1960, Mr. Hindus presents a most interesting portrait of the country 43 years after the Revolution. As in his other writings on Russia, he is at his best in reporting on people and moods, especially in the countryside.

CONQUEST WITHOUT WAR. Compiled and Edited by N. H. Mager and Jacques Katel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961, 545 p. $7.50.

An anthology, by topic, of Khrushchev's statements on a variety of themes, with occasional obbligatos by his predecessors, Lenin and Stalin.

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Chiefly an analysis of the Soviet Union's coal, shale, oil and natural gas resources and production.

INTERVENTION AND THE WAR. By Richard H. Ullman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 360 p. $7.50.

This first volume of a major study of Anglo-Soviet relations in the early years of the Revolution deals with the months preceding the end of the First World War. It ranges widely, from Vladivostok to Murmansk to the Caucasus.

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The author, a former president of the American Committee of Jewish Writers, Artists and Scientists, describes his three visits to the Soviet Union, in 1934, 1946 and 1959, discusses the vicissitudes of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union and suggests possible solutions.

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A solid, informed and scholarly analysis of events in Hungary since 1945. The core of the book is the uprising of 1956 and its background, but the author brings the melancholy narrative of the aftermath up to 1961.

THE BELOVED LAND. By Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961, 381 p. $5.95.

These very personal and absorbing memoirs of an officer in the Partisan Movement, the biographer of Tito, are also a "book about my beloved land, Yugoslavia, about its peoples and the issues, ideals and struggles which have influenced their lives and shaped their history."

DAS SYSTEM DER BETRIEBLICHEN SELBSTVERWALTUNG IN JUGOSLAWIEN. By Harry Schleicher. Berlin: Duncker, 1961, 465 p. DM. 48.

A substantial economic, legal and sociological analysis of the development of elements of local control and management in industry in Tito's Jugoslavia.

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The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE STAGNANT SOCIETY: A WARNING. By Michael Shanks. Baltimore: Penguin, 1961, 236 p. 95 cents.

An analysis of the reasons for the United Kingdom's relatively slow economic growth in recent years, together with the author's vigorous prescriptions for improvement.

MEMOIRS OF A PUBLIC SERVANT. By Lord Salter. London: Faber, 1961, 355 p. 30/.

In these memoirs, Lord Salter—long more familiarly known as Sir Arthur Salter—reviews his protracted career as a civil servant, scholar and Member of Parliament. Eminently civilized and humane, in the best tradition of British recollections, the work has many nice reflections on persons and politics from the First World War to the 1950s.

ANEURIN BEVAN: CAUTIOUS REBEL. By Mark M. Krug. New York: Yoseloff, 1961, 316 p. $5.00.

A fair appraisal of the Welsh rebel who died in 1960, a "shorn Samson."

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LABOUR PARTY. By Henry Pelling. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 134 p. $4.75.

A good, concise summary from 1900 to the present.

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NEW UNIVERSITIES OVERSEAS. By A. M. Carr-Saunders. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 260 p. 32/. (New York: Oxford University Press, $5.15.)

An authoritative account of the expansion of university education in British overseas territories.

The Middle East

THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM. By Muhammad Asad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, 107 p. $3.00.

A brief exposition by a European scholar, a convert to Islam.

DIVIDE AND LOSE: THE ARAB REVOLT OF 1955–1958. By Michael Ionides. London: Bles, 1960, 271 p. 21/.

An informative account of the Middle Eastern crisis from 1955 to 1958. The author, a civil engineer with many years' experience in the area, was at that time a member of the Development Board of Iraq.

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THE ARAB REVIVAL. By Francesco Gabrieli. New York: Random House, 1961, 178 p. $3.95.

A professor of Arabic language and literature at Rome University provides a concise and dispassionate survey of the background to the present tumult in the Arab world.

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A leading historian of the Middle East has written a most substantial and authoritative study of the emergence of Turkey from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire. The narrative brings the story up to 1950.

CRISIS IN LEBANON. By Fahim I. Qubain. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1961, 243 p. $5.00.

A quite detailed study of the Lebanon crisis of the late spring and summer of 1958—background, domestic events and international repercussions. The author is Director of the Research Department of the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C.

AUSSENHANDEL UND AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK DES IRAN. By Abolfazl Adli. Berlin: Duncker, 1960, 314 p. DM. 33.60.

A historical and analytical study of Iran's foreign trade and foreign economic policy since 1931.

South and Southeast Asia

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This general survey in the University of Michigan "History of the Modern World" series includes 100 pages on events since 1914.

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In this survey of a relatively unexplored field the author traces the evolution of the Indian middle class from pre-British times to independence.

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The author of a recent work on Chinese-Indian relations, "Weltprobleme am Himalaya" (noted here October 1959), turns to Communist China's ambitions in and relations with Southeast Asia.

PANCHSHEELA AND AFTER. By Girilal Jain. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 241 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $4.75.)

A very critical reappraisal of Sino-Indian relations in consequence of Chinese actions on India's northern borders.

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A Soviet study of agrarian problems in India, Burma and Indonesia.

BETWEEN OXUS AND JUMNA. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 211 p. $5.00.

Mr. Toynbee, who has become quite a rover in recent years, here gives his impressions of his recent travels in Northwest India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

STORM OVER LAOS. By Sisouk Na Champassak. New York: Praeger, 1961, 202 p. $5.00.

An uneven but valuable account of recent events, written from the perspective of a young Laotian who serves as Laos' representative to the U.N.

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An overly concise sketch of the situation of the 12 million Chinese in Southeast Asia.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

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Mr. Newman presents the arguments pro and con with respect to U.S. recognition of Communist China and the related but distinct issue of U.N. representation, compares them, and eventually favors the case for recognition.

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A quite grim picture, by an Australian foreign correspondent, of Communist China which, in his view, is making real though painful headway in agriculture and has been quite successful in its hate-America campaign.

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A Danish journalist's informal account of his travels through Communist China in 1956.

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A Dutch explorer's brief sketches, not particularly authoritative or penetrating, of some of the leading political figures in Africa.

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This excellently written book is one of the best to appear on the Algerian problem. Both in its analysis of the difficult internal situation and in its account of the conflict between the French and the Moslem nationalists it provides a vivid and disturbing picture of this highly neuralgic point on the world scene.

EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY. By Nadav Safran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 298 p. $6.75.

A study of political evolution in Egypt since the beginning of the nineteenth century, with particular attention to ideological developments. The Cairo-born author is now a member of the Government Department at Harvard.

A MODERN HISTORY OF THE SUDAN. By P. M. Holt. New York: Grove Press, 1961, 241 p. $5.95.

A good, brief history which is valuable in demonstrating the continuing relevance of Sudanese traditions long antedating the Condominium.

JOMO KENYATTA: TOWARDS TRUTH ABOUT "THE LIGHT OF KENYA." By George Delf. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 215 p. $3.95.

In this study of the leading and controversial figure in Kenyan politics the author argues that Kenyatta was not responsible for the Mau Mau excesses and that his whole case was badly handled by the British authorities.

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A study of the structure of the Central African Federation and the particular influence upon it of Southern Rhodesian traditions.

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Following a brief introductory economic history of Sierra Leone the author turns to an analysis of its economy during the "prosperity" of the two world wars and in the depression years 1929–1935.

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Former Senator Benton's report on Latin America, its economic, political and educational problems, and the role the United States might play—based on a trip through the continent in 1960 in company with Adlai Stevenson.

THE MAKING OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY. By Bryce Wood. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 438 p. $7.50.

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A vehement attack on American foreign policy and Yankee imperialism by the former President of Guatemala. Of considerable symptomatic interest.

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This revised edition of a study first published in 1960 includes a new chapter on recent developments in Cuba and elsewhere.

THE CUBAN STORY. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Braziller, 1961, 318 p. $4.50.

A personal, troubled, somewhat embattled but very interesting discussion of the Cuban revolution by the *New York Times* correspondent whose dispatches in 1957 brought Fidel Castro to general public notice. While Mr. Matthews clearly feels dismay at the eventual course of the Castro régime he is still seeking the root causes for this disaster.

TRAGIC ISLAND: HOW COMMUNISM CAME TO CUBA. By Irving Peter Pflaum. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1961, 196 p. $3.95.

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Two different editions and translations of a manual on guerrilla fighting prepared by a leading figure in Fidel Castro's revolutionary movement.

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A brief survey of the background and present situation of the Caribbean peoples.

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The author of a volume on rural Mexico here describes the major sociological features of Guatemalan society—livelihoods, living standards and social institutions. The work is based on several field trips to the country in the 1940s and 1950s.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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
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

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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(Atheneum is simultaneously publishing "A Long and Happy Life" in hard covers at $3.95.)

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

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

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

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

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